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ABSTRACT 
Two quasi-experimental studies (a pilot study and a main study) were carried out 
to investigate the effects of metaconceptually-enhanced, simulation-based inquiry 
learning on the 8th grade students’ conceptual change in science and their development of 
science epistemological beliefs. In each of the studies, the students engaged in 
simulation-based science inquiry learning activities over a period of two weeks, 
supported by different simulation guides. One guide was enhanced with metaconceptual 
intervention while the other was not.  The findings from both pilot study and main study 
led to the following conclusions: (a) metaconceptual intervention can enhance 
simulation-based learning by significantly reducing science misconceptions, but it is not 
as effective in changing students’ mental models consisting of multiple interrelated key 
concepts; (b) students’ beliefs about the speed of learning and the construction of 
knowledge are strong predictors of their conceptual change and learning outcomes; (c) 
epistemologically more advanced students do not benefit more from the metaconceptual 
intervention than those with less mature epistemological beliefs; (d) inquiry learning and 
metaconceptual intervention have limitations in their promoting of students’ development 
of science epistemological beliefs. Theoretical and practical implications as well as 
directions for future research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Terina, a fifth grader knows that the earth is round. When questioned about why 
the earth looks flat and what the real shape of the earth is, she answers, “Round, like a 
thick pancake” (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, p. 548). This case illustrates how Terina’s 
personal experience, that the earth appears to be flat, might interfere with her learning in 
the science classroom. Starting from the 1970s, science educators came to realize that 
students bring to science classrooms numerous misconceptions developed over their 
years of life experience. When learning the often counter-intuitive science concepts, 
especially those that cannot be easily observed (National Research Council, 2000), 
students often have difficulty reconciling the new information with their alternative 
conceptions, resulting in isolated and fragmental understanding (Hestenes, Wells, & 
Swackhamer, 1992). Lacking a coherent and systematic knowledge base, many students 
have to rely on rote memorization to solve science problems.  
Now let us turn to a high school science classroom. Ms. Johnson, a science 
teacher, tries to encourage her students to discuss a question raised earlier by a student. 
While some students are apparently engaged in discussing and sharing their views with 
each other, Michael, a student, grumbles to his neighbor, “I don’t understand why we 
have to do this. Why can’t she just tell us the answer? There is only one right answer 
anyway!” Michael’s reaction reveals some underlying beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge and learning (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), which are common among students 
and affect their learning approach and learning outcomes in a profound way.  
The two vignettes above illustrate two very important constructs in today’s 
science education – conceptual change and science epistemological beliefs. Conceptual 
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change refers to the development of one’s naïve ideas toward scientific conceptions; 
Science epistemological beliefs are an individual’s beliefs about the nature of knowledge 
and learning in science. Science researchers and educators have recognized the problems 
of misconceptions in science and various complications associated with naïve 
epistemological beliefs, and thus made it an important agenda item to actively promote 
conceptual change and develop mature epistemological beliefs among students (Pintrich, 
Marx, & Boyle, 1993; Sinatra, 2005; Vosniadou, 2007b; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).  
In a broader picture, as a country that has led the world in science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM), the United States has been falling behind in 
STEM education when compared with other industrialized countries (Kuenzi, 2008). 
According to a 2003 international survey on science literacy of 15-year-olds, the United 
States ranked 24th among the 40 participating countries (Kuenzi, 2008). When students in 
the United States reach college level, 30% of freshmen need remedial science classes 
before they can take college-level courses (National Science Board, 2007). To maintain 
its competitive edge in an era of knowledge economy, the nation has taken up STEM 
education as a top priority (National Science Board, 2007). In such a context, the 
National Research Council (2005) has recommended three important principles of 
science learning and instruction: (a) addressing students’ preconceptions, (b) promoting 
students’ knowledge of what it means to do science, and (c) emphasizing metacognition. 
These three principles are precisely what this study aimed at investigating. Specifically, 
this study was intended to examine ways to facilitate students’ conceptual change and 
epistemological development in science, while at the same time exploring the complex 
interrelationships among various constructs involved in this process.  
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Study Background 
Ever since the discovery of problems with student misconceptions in science 
learning in the 1970’s, science misconceptions have become the main focus to be 
addressed in science education. Conceptual change, although bearing different definitions 
by different researchers, has been generally recognized as an important learning outcome 
that cannot be achieved by conventional teaching strategies that are characterized by 
directly imparting knowledge to students without addressing their preconceptions 
(Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). As a result, different conceptual change models 
have been proposed. Among them, the most influential one was proposed by Strike and 
Posner (1982), who were inspired by Kuhn’s (1996) paradigm shift theory from his 
observation of scientific revolution in the history of science. Drawing connections 
between conceptual change in science learning and theory changes in the science 
community, Strike and Posner (1982) proposed four essential conditions required for 
conceptual change: 1) the learners must be dissatisfied with their existing conceptions; 2) 
there must be a new alternative conception that is intelligible to the learner; 3) the new 
conception must be plausible; and 4) the new conception must also be fruitful.  
Strike and Posner’s (1982) model, as well as other conceptual change strategies 
along the same line, has provided practical guidelines for science education researchers 
and thus led to the early implementation and investigation of instructional interventions. 
The interventions often confront learners with anomalous data or contradictory 
information, which supposedly induces cognitive conflict in learners’ minds. Learners are 
expected to detect the conflict, be dissatisfied with it, compare it with new alternatives, 
and resolve the conflict, which leads to conceptual change in the end. However, often 
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students failed to achieve conceptual change as researchers had expected. In some cases, 
conceptual change had hardly occurred. Learners did not react to cognitive conflict at all 
or they reacted at a superficial level (Chan, Burtis, & Bereiter, 1997; Chinn & Malhotra, 
2002; Limon, 2001). When conceptual change did occur after an intervention, the change 
did not last long and learners were soon found to revert back to their initial 
preconceptions (e.g., Hynd, 1998; Tao & Gunstone, 1999b). 
As researchers reflected on the reasons why conceptual change did not always 
occur nor was it sustained, they questioned the assumption that students would think like 
scientists as they learn science.  This is an assumption which underlay many early 
instructional interventions (Caravita & Halldén, 1994; Greiffenhagen & Sherman, 2006; 
Schnotz, Vosniadou, & Carretero, 1999). With this assumption, students are assumed to 
be able to plan and conduct experiments, evaluate results, identify inconsistencies, search 
for evidence, and give up their own ideas in favor of some competing scientific 
conceptions. However, in reality, students often do not treat their ideas as a thinking 
object like scientists do. They are often unaware of their existing ideas on a topic, nor do 
they actively track the development of their ideas through continuous monitoring and 
evaluation. To cite Murphy and Mason (2006), students are merely thinking with, but not 
about their conceptions.  
Another criticism of the traditional models of conceptual change revealed another, 
yet more fundamental, aspect of the notion of thinking like a scientist. Questioning the 
cold, overly rational tradition of the conceptual change research that focused exclusively 
on the cognitive aspect of the change process, some motivation researchers introduced a 
“warming trend” (Sinatra, 2005, p. 107) into the conceptual change research, which 
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suggested taking motivational and affective factors into consideration. This group of 
researchers postulated that motivational beliefs, including individuals’ epistemological 
beliefs, that is, beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 
1997), could all play significant roles in conceptual change. Some empirical evidence 
revealed the link between learners’ epistemological beliefs and conceptual change 
learning outcomes (e.g., Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Windschitl, 1997).  
The two criticisms above on the traditional models of conceptual change converge 
to suggest that simply exposing learners to cognitive conflict is not adequate to bring 
about conceptual change. The process of conceptual change is a process of becoming 
more like a scientist, which involves at least two important aspects: (a) development of 
mature beliefs about knowledge and learning; and (b) intentional effort to engage in a 
metaconceptual level of thinking, that is, thinking about the development of one’s 
conceptions. Moreover, it is very likely that these two aspects are not mutually exclusive, 
as there is evidence suggesting that those with more sophisticated epistemological beliefs 
are more likely to demonstrate metaconceptual level of thinking (e.g., Stathopoulou & 
Vosniadou, 2007). Conversely, engaging in reflective discourse may also help 
individuals’ epistemological development (Lam & Chan, 2008; Smith, Maclin, Houghton, 
& Hennessey, 2000).  
A closer look at the literature on epistemological beliefs also reveals that, in 
addition to their effects on conceptual change, the improvement of epistemological 
beliefs itself is an important learning goal. In their early studies on post-adolescent 
epistemological development, Kitchener and King (1981) theorized seven 
epistemological development stages with increasing maturity. While the ultimate goal is 
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to help individuals to reach the highest stage (stage 7), King and Kitchener (2004) 
observed that the majority of college students stay at the fourth stage, which is 
characterized by the inability to link evidence to conclusions in the face of ill-structured, 
controversial problems that require one’s reflective judgment. Apparently, more research 
is needed to advance students’ epistemological beliefs to a higher level.  
Epistemological beliefs have traditionally been examined as a trait-like construct 
which develops only as one matures through years of education and life experience. In 
recent years, however, researchers have experimented with instructional interventions to 
foster the development of students’ epistemological beliefs, particularly in the domain of 
science, and several studies have yielded positive findings (Conley, Pintrich, Vekiri, & 
Harrison, 2004; Lam & Chan, 2008; Smith, et al., 2000). Most of the interventions 
engaged learners in certain inquiry learning activities, in which students actively 
constructed knowledge by hands-on experimentation and reflective discourse. These 
studies shed light on the possibility of advancing epistemological development through 
thoughtfully designed instructional interventions. 
Therefore, with conceptual change being influenced by individuals’ 
epistemological beliefs and metaconceptual thinking, with epistemological beliefs being a 
possible mediator for conceptual change, and with the development of epistemological 
beliefs being a learning goal itself, we return to our original question: How can we 
promote conceptual change and epistemological development?  
There is yet another layer to add to the complexity of the above question. With the 
advance of technology in today’s society, and with the increasing need to engage students 
in scientific inquiry, computer-based simulations have increasingly been used as 
7 
 
cognitive tools to support science learning. These pedagogical tools are relatively new in 
science classrooms, and research up to this point is yet to provide sufficient guidelines on 
the effective use of computer simulations to facilitate conceptual change and 
epistemological development. As such, this research was deliberately situated in the 
context of inquiry learning with computer-based simulations, for the purpose of 
investigating potential instructional interventions to promote conceptual change and 
epistemological development in science.  
Problem Statement 
As stated earlier, this study focused on conceptual change and its closely related 
belief change as two important learning outcomes in the context of simulation-based 
science inquiry. Particularly, this study implemented metaconceptual intervention aiming 
at stimulating students’ metaconceptual thinking in their simulation-based inquiry and 
examining how the interventions affected students’ conceptual changes as well as the 
development of their science epistemological beliefs. 
Metaconceptual thinking is one of the characteristics of thinking like a scientist. 
Often termed as metaconceptual awareness, metaconceptual thinking has been 
emphasized by many researchers as one of the key factors in promoting conceptual 
change (Murphy & Mason, 2006; Vosniadou, Ioannides, Dimitrakopoulou, & 
Papademetriou, 2001). Yet, few studies have explicitly examined the effect of 
metaconceptual thinking on conceptual change, especially within a simulation-based 
inquiry learning environment. Therefore, this study asked whether metaconceptually-
enhanced, simulation-based inquiry learning would promote better conceptual change 
when compared with simulation-based inquiry learning by itself. Similarly, since 
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epistemological belief is another important factor in conceptual change, this study was 
also designed to assess the role of students’ general epistemological beliefs in conceptual 
change in a simulation-based inquiry learning environment, with or without 
metaconceptual intervention. 
 In addition, this study also sought to investigate whether metaconceptual 
intervention implemented in a simulation-based learning environment would help 
advance learners’ science epistemological beliefs.   
Significance of the Study 
 This study potentially has both theoretical and practical significance. 
Theoretically, the findings from this study may contribute to our knowledge base by 
revealing the interrelationships among several important constructs in science education 
and educational psychology – conceptual change, epistemological beliefs, 
metaconceptual thinking, and inquiry learning. While each of these constructs has been 
studied, their interrelationships have rarely been simultaneously examined, especially in a 
simulation-based inquiry learning environment. Specifically, the findings in this study 
were expected to demonstrate the effects of learners’ epistemological beliefs and 
metaconceptual intervention on conceptual change in simulation-based inquiry learning. 
The findings may also help us to understand the relationship between learners’ 
epistemological beliefs and metaconceptual intervention. Moreover, the study may 
provide evidence as to whether learners’ epistemological beliefs in science are malleable 
through simulation-based inquiry and metaconceptual intervention. Most existing studies 
(e.g., Biemans & Simons, 1996; Mikkila-Erdmann, 2001; Qian & Alvermann, 2000) 
were conducted in a lab setting and for a relatively short period of time. By comparison, 
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this study was conducted in naturalistic science classrooms over a relatively longer period 
of time in the hope of building upon past research and yielding fruitful results, from 
which we can draw practical implications for educational practice. 
Practically, helping students to face and overcome their misconceptions in science 
is an important goal in science education. Yet, it points to the need to develop more 
sophisticated epistemological beliefs and advance metaconceptual skills in science 
education, which is an arduous undertaking for science education. These educational 
goals become more critical as the nation is actively promoting STEM education and 
devoting a significant amount of energy, time and resources to improve the outcomes 
(National Science Board, 2007). The findings of this study may provide important 
guidelines for teachers and instructional designers to design and implement simulation-
based inquiries that will facilitate students’ conceptual change and epistemological 
development. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This review first provides a broad overview of the three major constructs in this 
study: conceptual change, epistemological beliefs, and metaconceptual thinking. The 
general overview is followed by a more focused literature review of the relations among 
the constructs which set the stage for the study. Next, the review discusses relevant 
literature on the situating context of this study – simulation-based inquiry learning 
environment. At the end of the chapter, research questions are presented. 
Understanding the Background: Overview of the Constructs 
Conceptual Change 
Conceptual change originated from two lines of research – science education and 
developmental psychology. In recent years, new schools of thoughts started to influence 
conceptual change research as well as educational research in general (a subset of 
metacognition that is related to one's conceptual understanding, Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Pintrich, et al., 1993). This section first reviews the science education and developmental 
psychology traditions of conceptual change, and then introduces the new perspectives – 
motivational/affective and sociocultural perspectives. 
Science education tradition. The term conceptual change originally came from 
studies on the history and philosophy of science. Kuhn (1996), in his analysis of theory 
changes in the history of science, distinguished between normal science and scientific 
revolution. Normal science is mainly knowledge accumulation, whereas scientific 
revolution necessitates radical revisions of existing scientific beliefs or practice, leading 
to a paradigm shift.  
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When science educators found the problem of students’ misconceptions, Kuhn’s 
work inspired them. Strike and Posner (1982) drew connections between conceptual 
change in science learning and theory change in the science community, and proposed 
four conditions for conceptual change: (a) the learner must be dissatisfied with his/her 
existing conceptions; (b) there must be a new alternative conception that is intelligible to 
the learner; (c) the new conception must be plausible; and (d) the new conception must 
also be fruitful. The model became very influential and has been the leading paradigm in 
the field for a long time. Following this model, instruction is often designed to induce 
learners’ dissatisfaction with their existing conceptions by creating certain “cognitive 
conflict.” The cognitive conflict can be induced by refutational texts that explicitly refute 
science misconceptions, by having students perform experiments to examine 
contradictive results, or by human interactions in which misconceptions may be exposed 
and confronted (Limon, 2001).  
Over time Strike and Posner’s (1982) classic model met several challenges. The 
controversial results from research studies led to the criticism of the model’s underlying 
metaphor of student as scientist (Caravita & Halldén, 1994; Greiffenhagen & Sherman, 
2006; Schnotz, et al., 1999), which assumes that students can engage in science learning 
like scientists who rationally examine deficiencies of their own ideas and evaluate and 
adopt new possible alternatives. In reality, however, students are not like scientists. In the 
face of an intended cognitive conflict, many students do not realize the conflict or feel 
dissatisfied with their naïve conceptions (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; D. Kuhn & Lao, 1998; 
Vosniadou, 1994). In her critical appraisal of the cognitive conflict as conceptual change 
strategy, Limon (2001) noted that cognitive conflict alone cannot guarantee successful 
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conceptual change. It should be coupled with additional strategies to take care of other 
factors that may come into play, such as motivation, epistemological beliefs, prior 
knowledge, values and attitudes, social factors, etc. 
Another challenge to the model is its “replacement” view, that conceptual change 
entails the replacement of misconceptions with scientific conceptions. Evidence suggests 
that alternative and scientific conceptions may coexist at the same time (Pozo, Gomez, & 
Sanz, 1999; Spada, 1994; Tao & Gunstone, 1999b).  
Cognitive/developmental psychology tradition. Whereas the science education 
approach drew inferences from the history of science without referring to the cognitive 
structures underlying conceptual change, cognitive/developmental psychologists placed 
focus on mental states and provided more insights into the nature and process of 
conceptual change. 
From her studies on children learning biology, Carey (1985) concluded that 
children’s intuitive knowledge has theory-like, coherent structure and that conceptual 
change requires “strong” reconstruction of the structure. Similarly, Vosniadou and 
Brewer (1992) found from their studies on elementary children learning basic astronomy 
that children at an early age develop a certain “framework theory” to interpret their daily 
experience. The framework contains “basic ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions about the nature of physical objects and the way they function in the 
physical world” (p. 64). It shapes children’s understanding when they learn. When new 
information is at odds with their framework theory, children construct so-called synthetic 
models (e.g., the earth as a pancake) to reconcile the new information with the framework 
theory. Conceptual change in this sense is not the instant replacement of alternative 
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conceptions, but rather a gradual process of the reorganization of the initial explanatory 
framework into scientific conceptualization.  
diSessa (1983, 1988) does not agree that naïve knowledge is coherent. His 
“knowledge in pieces” view argues that intuitive knowledge contains fragmented mental 
entities gained from daily experiences (e.g., force as a mover) (diSessa, 1983), and 
conceptual change is achieved when learners organize and configure these mental entities 
into a coherent whole (diSessa, 2002).  
 Still another explanation was proposed by Chi, Slotta and de Leeuw (1994), that 
misconception is the result of incorrect mental assignment of a concept into a wrong 
ontological category (e.g., heat as “matter” instead of a “process”). Conceptual change is 
thus the shift of a concept to its correct ontological category. In their effort to address 
student misconceptions on the topic of electric current, Slotta and Chi (2006) trained 
students to understand and distinguish different ontological categories, and found positive 
results from the training. However, Vosniadou(2002) questioned this perspective by 
arguing that ontological shift might be just one case of the many kinds of conceptual 
change, and that the proposed ontological categories lacked theoretical evidence.  
The warming trend: Motivational and affective factors. Questioning the sole focus 
of conceptual change research on cognition, Pintrich and colleagues (Pintrich, 1999; 
Pintrich, et al., 1993) advocated the consideration of motivational constructs and 
classroom contextual factors and discussed the potential relationship between conceptual 
change and goal orientations, interest and values, self-efficacy, control beliefs, and 
epistemological beliefs. The “warming trend” started to emerge (Sinatra, 2005) as more 
and more conceptual change research involved motivational and affective factors in 
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investigation. The link between conceptual change and motivational factors such as goal 
orientations (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, 2002; Sinatra & Mason, 2008) and interest (Andre 
& Windschitl, 2003; Pintrich, 1999) have been explored. Incorporating these additional 
factors in conceptual change, Sinatra and Pintrich (2003) proposed an intentional 
conceptual change model, and defined it as “goal-directed and conscious initiation and 
regulation of cognitive, metacognitive, and motivational processes to bring about a 
change in knowledge” (p.6).  
Sociocultural perspectives. Whereas Pintrich et al. (1993) consider classroom 
contextual factors as potential moderators between motivational beliefs and conceptual 
change, the sociocultural perspective pushes contextual factors to the center stage of 
conceptual change. Researchers from this camp believe that cognitive structure is not the 
only construct when studying conceptual change and they zoom out the lens from 
individual learners to the learner community and the surrounding environment (Greeno & 
The Middle School Mathematics Through Applications Project Group, 1998; Wilson & 
Myers, 1999). Sociocultural factors like the role of a teacher (Chinn, 1998; Kelly & 
Green, 1998) and group culture (Gorodetsky & Keiny, 2002; Moje & Shepardson, 1998) 
have been found to affect conceptual change in different ways. Theorists such as Caravita 
and Halldén (1994) argue that learning is situated, and that difficulty in conceptual 
change does not lie in the change of conceptual structure in individuals’ mind, but rather 
the change in the situatedness of knowledge (Schnotz, et al., 1999). Multiple 
representations of a concept may co-exist and the activation of one over another is 
through the recognition of embedding context (Pozo, et al., 1999). Consequently, 
conceptual change is achieved when a situation is created “where the appropriate 
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scientific idea will come into play” (Halldén, 1999, p. 53). Sociocultural researchers pay 
special attention to tools, signs, and discourses, and argue that learners’ reasoning can be 
very different with or without the access to tools (e.g., Ivarsson, Schoultz, & Saljo, 2002). 
Summary. This section introduces the major perspectives of conceptual change, 
the factors hindering or contributing to conceptual change, and the instructional 
implications from different perspectives. As can be seen, salient differences exist 
between the cognitive and the sociocultural perspectives. While cognitive tradition 
considers conceptual change as ultimately the acquisition of scientifically correct mental 
structure, sociocultural perspectives emphasize the participation in communities of 
practice, the engagement in social discourse, and the utilization of the tools. Sfard’s 
(1998) “acquisition” versus “participation” metaphor vividly captures the difference 
(Mason, 2007). Recently researchers called for the bridging of the two different views 
and advanced different proposals. Some researchers tried to reconcile the two 
perspectives by suggesting the “acquisition via participation” proposal (e.g., Vosniadou, 
2007a), while others believe that the bridging is unachievable because the two views are 
epistemologically incommensurable (Alexander, 2007; Ivarsson, et al., 2002). 
From a pragmatic point of view, I lean toward Vosniadou’s (2007a) “acquisition 
via participation” proposal. The importance of cognitive functioning has been established 
by a long history of empirical research. On the other hand, studies have also convincingly 
shown that learning is not a function of mental activities alone. I recognize that the two 
perspectives, coming from distinctly different philosophical roots, are indeed 
epistemologically incommensurable – one emphasizes that learning takes place in 
individuals’ minds and that knowledge is the acquisition of expert cognitive structure, 
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while the other conceptualizes learning as a sociocultural activity and knowledge as 
“getting better at participating in a situated activity” (Greeno, Smith, & Moore, 1993, p. 
100). In the mean time I also believe that in educational research and practice much can 
be done to reconcile the two. Both perspectives can inform the design of instruction to 
promote conceptual change. Therefore, this study investigated conceptual change by 
incorporating cognitive, motivational, and sociocultural perspectives. In the context of 
the current study, conceptual change is defined as a gradual process during which one’s 
cognition, metacognition, motivation, affect, and sociocultural experiences interact with 
each other, with the outcome being the radical reconstruction of one’s original cognitive 
structure. While the “acquisition” of expert cognitive structure is important, the process 
of “participation” in the intentional, sociocultural learning process is equally important. 
Among the factors that may influence conceptual change, of particular interest in 
this study were two factors: (a) a metacognitive factor – metaconceptual thinking [a 
subset of metacognition that is related to one’s conceptual understanding (Yuruk, Beeth, 
& Andersen, 2008)], and (b) a motivational factor – epistemological beliefs [one’s beliefs 
about the nature of knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997)]. 
Linking back to the criticism of the traditional conceptual change model’s 
assumption of the learner as scientist, we can see that the two factors being addressed in 
this study – epistemological beliefs and metaconceptual thinking, are essentially about 
being more like a scientist – in terms of developing a sophisticated view of what 
constitutes knowledge and knowing in science and in terms of taking one’s conceptual 
ecology under close examination. These two aspects are addressed in the next two 
sections of this chapter.  
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Epistemological Beliefs 
The origin and the unidimensional models. Epistemology is a branch of 
philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). 
As human beings, we hold implicit beliefs about knowledge and knowing, which are 
termed as epistemological beliefs or personal epistemology (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002). 
Empirical studies on epistemological beliefs originated from Perry’s (1970) earlier 
investigations of college students’ ethical and intellectual development. In his 15-year 
longitudinal study, Perry followed a group of male undergraduate students at Harvard 
University throughout their years in college. The analysis of interviews throughout these 
students’ college years revealed a pattern which was summarized by Perry (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Perry, 1970). According to Perry (1970), college students’ moral and 
intellectual development can be characterized by nine positions which were further 
clustered into four categories: dualism, multiplicity, relativism, and commitment within 
relativism. Along this continuum, individuals develop from viewing the world as dualist, 
black or white, and absolute to a more mature view that recognizes multiplicity, 
understands the world as relative, contingent, contextual and makes a commitment to 
one’s values, responsibilities, and identity within relativism (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  
Following Perry’s pioneering study, more researchers started to take interest in 
the nature of people’s intellectual development. While Perry’s study was almost 
exclusively on male college students, Belenky and colleagues (Belenky, Clinchy, 
Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) conducted their phenomenological studies on college-
educated female students. Their model, which was named as “women’s ways of 
knowing,” suggested five positions that characterize how women perceive knowing: 
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silence, received knowing, subjective knowing, procedural knowing, and constructed 
knowing (Buehl & Alexander, 2001).  
While both Perry’s and Belenky et al’s studies were each of a single gender, 
Baxter-Magolda (1992) followed Perry’s study approach but included both female and 
male samples from a university. The research on both genders yielded findings different 
from those of Perry’s, leading Baxter-Magolda to develop her own Epistemological 
Reflection Model to explain the ways in which students conceptualize knowledge and 
learning (Buehl & Alexander, 2001). The model consists of four ways of knowing with 
increasing maturity: absolute knowing, transitional knowing, independent knowing, and 
contextual knowing.  
King and Kitchener (2004) also studied the epistemological development of both 
genders, but their study included both high school students and middle-age adults. King 
and Kitchener’s focus was on people’s underlying epistemological assumptions when 
faced with ill-structured, controversial problems. From their interview data, Kitchener 
and King (1981) proposed the Reflective Judgment Model (RJM). RJM suggests a seven-
stage developmental sequence of reflective thinking distinguished by different underlying 
epistemological assumptions. The seven stages are grouped in three levels: prereflective 
thinking (Stages 1-3), quasi-reflective thinking (Stages 4-5), and reflective thinking 
(Stages 6-7) (P. King & Kitchener, 2004). Individuals with prereflective thinking believe 
that knowledge is certain and therefore there is always one single correct answer for all 
questions. With quasi-reflective thinking, individuals start to realize the uncertainty and 
the constructive nature of knowledge and knowing. While recognizing that evidence is 
important in the process of knowing, individuals at this level are still not competent at 
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linking evidence to conclusions. Only when individuals reach the third, reflective level 
can they comfortably navigate between evidence and judgment with reasoning. 
Individuals at this level also start to recognize that knowledge is contextual and are open 
to review and revise their understandings (P. King & Kitchener, 2004).  According to 
King and Kitchener (2004), the fourth stage, which belongs to quasi-reflective thinking, 
is the stage where the majority of college students are located, while the seventh stage, 
which is the stage with the highest level of reflective thinking, is the ultimate goal of 
higher education.  
In a similar manner, Kuhn (1991), who was interested in people’s everyday 
reasoning, interviewed individuals of different ages (teens, 20s, 40s, and 60s) to make 
sense of their reasoning. Her study summarized three epistemological views regarding the 
certainty of knowledge, ranging from absolutists (who believe knowledge is certain and 
absolute), multiplists (who admit that there are different but equally equivalent views), to 
evaluative (who realize that different views can be compared and evaluated). 
While the researchers reviewed above took different study interests, used different 
approaches, and studied different populations, their findings share the same 
developmental trend. That is, their models all suggest a developmental spectrum along a 
single dimension, with naïve views on one end and sophisticated views on the other, and 
the views appear to move to the mature end as individuals grow and gain more 
educational and life experience.  
On the other hand, as some researchers have pointed out (Buehl & Alexander, 
2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), the models reviewed above were mainly meant to study 
people’s everyday reasoning rather than learning in an academic setting, and therefore the 
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subjects’ epistemological beliefs and their relationship with learning were not explicitly 
focused on in these studies. Further, these models all suggest a general, unidimensional 
progress of epistemological beliefs (Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Schommer, 1990), 
ranging from viewing knowledge and knowing as dualistic, absolutist and objectivist on 
one end to “relativist, subjectivist, contextual, constructivist, and evaluative” on the other 
(Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007, p. 146).  Starting from the 1990s, Schommer and 
other researchers explored new conceptions of epistemological beliefs, which are 
reviewed next.  
The multi-dimensional model of epistemological beliefs. In reflecting on the 
mixed study results based on Perry’s developmental model and asking how 
epistemological beliefs impact student learning (particularly comprehension), Schommer 
(1990) questioned the unidimensional conception of epistemological beliefs, suggesting 
that epistemological beliefs may be a system consisting of several independent 
dimensions. Therefore Schommer proposed five dimensions of the epistemological belief 
system, and developed a self-report quantitative survey – Schommer Epistemological 
Questionnaire (SEQ) to test her model. Factor analysis yielded four factors: innate ability, 
simple knowledge, quick learning, and certain knowledge.  
 While proposing still another developmental model of epistemological beliefs, 
Schommer changed the landscape of epistemological belief research in several ways. 
First, in contrast with the traditional unidimensional conception of epistemological 
beliefs, Schommer (1990) suggested the possible multidimensionality of this construct. 
Second, the SEQ, a quantitative self-report survey instrument, made it possible to 
quantitatively study epistemological beliefs on a large scale. Thirdly, because of the 
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availability of the quantitative survey instrument, researchers were able to examine the 
link between epistemological beliefs and various aspects of learning. Following 
Schommer’s lead, researchers began to develop more self-report survey instruments 
trying to capture the multidimensionality of epistemological beliefs and use the 
instruments to study the relationships between epistemological beliefs and a variety of 
cognitive, affective, and motivational factors involved in student learning. The section 
below briefly reviews these research findings.  
Epistemological beliefs and learning. Generally speaking, advanced 
epistemological beliefs appear to link to positive learning outcomes. For example, 
Schommer and colleagues have conducted several studies examining epistemological 
beliefs and text comprehension. In one study, Schommer (1990)  asked students to read a 
passage on either social science or physical science with the last paragraph removed. 
Students were asked to rate their confidence in understanding the passage, write the 
concluding paragraph, and complete a mastery test. Results showed that student beliefs in 
quick learning were linked to oversimplified conclusions and poor performance in the 
mastery test. In addition, beliefs in certain knowledge were shown to predict 
inappropriately absolute conclusions in the concluding paragraphs written by students. In 
another study focusing on the belief in simple knowledge and its effects on mathematical 
text comprehension, Schommer, Crouse, and Rhodes (1992) found similar results, that 
beliefs in simple knowledge resulted in poor test performance and inaccurate estimate of 
one’s actual understanding. In addition to text comprehension, studies have also found 
influence of beliefs in quick/fixed learning on middle school students’ math problem 
solving (Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Hutter, 2005) as well as the effects of beliefs in the 
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speed of learning on college business students’ academic performance (Schommer-
Aikins & Easter, 2006). Also, beliefs in gradual learning and incremental ability 
positively impacted middle and high school students’ GPA (Schommer-Aikins, et al., 
2005; Schommer-Aikins, Mau, Brookhart, & Hutter, 2000; Schommer, 1993).  
While the studies reviewed up to this point suggest that advanced epistemological 
beliefs are generally associated with better academic performance, a recent study by 
Norwegian researchers Bråten, Strømsø, and Samuelstuen (2008) had some unexpected 
findings. In their study, Norwegian undergraduate students were assessed on their topic-
specific epistemological beliefs about climate change before reading multiple texts on 
climate change. The unexpected findings were that those students who viewed the source 
of the knowledge about climate change as their personal construction performed poorer 
when compared with those who viewed experts as source of the knowledge. While more 
studies are needed to replicate the findings, this study suggested that, advanced 
epistemological beliefs in certain dimensions are not always linked to positive learning 
outcomes.  
 In addition to direct impact on academic performance, epistemological beliefs 
were also found to affect students’ cognitive engagement and study strategies. Ravindran, 
Greene, and DeBacker (2005) examined the relationship between epistemological beliefs 
and preservice teachers’ cognitive engagement. The findings revealed that individuals 
with naïve epistemological beliefs tended to show shallow cognitive engagement whereas 
those with more advanced beliefs showed more meaningful engagement. Similar results 
were also reported by DeBacker and Crowson (2006), who found significant correlations 
between naïve epistemological beliefs and shallow cognitive engagement.  
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In their study on epistemological beliefs and mathematics text comprehension, 
Schommer et al. (1992) found a significant relationship between college students’ belief 
in simple knowledge and test-preparation strategies. In another study examining 
epistemological beliefs and undergraduate students’ cognitive strategies in reading a 
dual-positional text on HIV-AIDS relationship, Kardash and Howell (2000) found that 
the beliefs in the speed of learning affected the cognitive strategies the students employed 
while reading the text. In another study, Ryan (1984) asked undergraduate students to 
describe the criteria they used to evaluate whether or not they understood textbook 
chapters. The students’ reported criteria were subsequently divided into two general 
categories based on Bloom’s taxonomy (Bloom, Engelhart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, 
1956): knowledge and comprehension/application. Students’ epistemological beliefs were 
classified by Perry’s scheme of dualist or relativist. The findings suggested that dualists 
often used criteria that belong to the “knowledge” category, whereas those relativists 
tended to employ “comprehension/application” criteria to monitor their understanding. 
Thus, students’ epistemological beliefs affect how they perceive their comprehension 
level while learning from a textbook.  
 In addition to the influence on academic performance, cognitive engagement and 
study strategies, epistemological beliefs were also found to affect student motivation. 
Several studies investigated epistemological beliefs and achievement goals. DeBacker 
and Crowson (2006) treated epistemological beliefs as a single index in their study and 
found that students’ overall epistemological beliefs predicted all three achievement goals, 
with those who held more naïve beliefs being less likely to adopt mastery goals but more 
likely to adopt performance approach or avoidance goals. Bråten and Strømsø’s (2004) 
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study linked specific dimensions of epistemological beliefs to achievement goals. The 
findings suggested that Norwegian college students who believed in quick learning were 
less likely to adopt mastery goals, but instead would adopt performance approach or 
avoidance goals. In addition, those who believe that knowledge is stable and given were 
less likely to adopt mastery goals. Different from the above two studies, Ravindran and 
colleagues (2005) found that none of the dimensions of epistemological beliefs was 
correlated with learning goals, whereas two belief dimensions (innate ability and simple 
learning) were correlated with performance goals. Buehl and Alexander (2005) examined 
the relationship between students’ epistemological beliefs and their competency beliefs 
and achievement value. It was found that, in both history and mathematics domains, 
students with more sophisticated epistemological beliefs demonstrated more motivation 
than those with more naïve beliefs.  
 In summary, epistemological beliefs are related to academic performance, 
cognitive engagement, and study strategies, as well as student motivation. Generally 
speaking, the literature suggests that those who hold more sophisticated beliefs tend to 
show better learning outcomes, utilize more effective study strategies, engage in more 
meaningful learning, and exhibit higher motivation.  
 While earlier studies on epistemological beliefs assumed that the beliefs do not 
vary across different knowledge domains, in recent years researchers started to question 
such domain-general assumptions by suggesting that the same individual’s 
epistemological beliefs may vary across different knowledge domains or even different 
topics. The next section reviews the domain-specific claims about epistemological beliefs.  
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Domain-general and domain-specific claims. Questioning whether 
epistemological beliefs were general across different domains, Schommer and Walker 
(1995) set out to explore the differences in college students’ epistemological beliefs 
between the domains of social sciences and mathematics. Their findings suggested that 
epistemological beliefs are mainly domain-general, while the smallest correlations 
between the two domains occurred in the belief of certain knowledge.  
Schommer and Walker’s (1995) study measured students’ domain-specific beliefs 
with a domain-general epistemological belief questionnaire while asking students to think 
about a particular domain while completing the questionnaire. Such an approach was 
questioned by other researchers. As a result, Hofer (2000) developed a new instrument 
intended to measure domain-specific beliefs and used the instrument to investigate 
domain-specificity of epistemological beliefs. Hofer’s (2000) findings suggested that 
there are underlying general beliefs that transcend domains, while there are also differing 
beliefs across domains. Similar findings were later obtained by Buehl and Alexander 
(2002) who also used a domain-specific instrument to probe and compare students’ 
beliefs in mathematics and history. In reviewing studies on the beliefs among people of 
different majors as well as the same individuals’ beliefs about different domains, Buehl 
and Alexander (2001) proposed a multi-layered model of epistemological beliefs, 
consisting of a fundamental domain-general layer and also a domain-specific layer. To 
provide more evidence for their model, Buehl and Alexander (2005) used cluster analysis 
to examine students’ epistemological belief profiles in the domains of mathematics and 
history. The analysis suggested that while students have different belief profiles in the 
two domains, the level of sophistication in their beliefs was found to be relatively 
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consistent between the two domains. Thus again the findings support the dual nature of 
epistemological beliefs.  
More recently Muis, Bendixen, and Haerle (2006) reviewed 19 empirical studies 
that investigated the domain-specificity of epistemological beliefs and found evidence of 
both similarities and differences across domains. The researchers posited that as one 
progresses in education, their domain-general beliefs become less dominant whereas 
domain-specific beliefs grow in impact. In another effort to compare general and domain-
specific epistemological beliefs, Kienhues, Bromme, and Stahl (2008) suggested that 
while general beliefs may be more stable over time, domain-specific beliefs may be more 
malleable to instructional interventions. The next section discusses the malleability of 
domain-specific epistemological beliefs.  
Malleability of epistemological belief. Epistemological belief has traditionally 
been conceptualized and studied as a trait-like construct that exerts influence on different 
aspects of learning. As research studies revealed the important role of epistemological 
beliefs in learning, it became natural to ask whether it is possible to improve 
epistemological beliefs through instructional interventions. Therefore, in recent years 
research has been conducted to investigate the development of epistemological beliefs as 
a learning outcome. 
Several studies have been conducted in the domain of mathematics. Gill, Ashton, 
and Algina (2004) found that after a short instructional intervention with refutational text, 
preservice teachers made significant changes toward more sophisticated math-specific 
beliefs compared with their counterparts in a control group, as demonstrated in measures 
on both explicit and implicit beliefs. In her synthesis paper, Muis (2004) reviewed six 
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studies aimed at changing learners’ epistemological beliefs in mathematics through 
constructivist-oriented teaching approaches. Overall, positive results were found across 
the reviewed studies.  
In the domain of science, inquiry-based activities are often used to promote 
students’ science-specific epistemological beliefs. Carey and colleagues (Carey, Evans, 
Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1989) used a three-week unit to promote students’ epistemological 
beliefs in science by engaging them in hypothesis testing, theory building and reflective 
activities. Scorings on pre- and post-instruction clinical interviews revealed significant 
improvement in the students’ epistemological beliefs in science. Smith, Maclin, 
Houghton, and Hennessey (2000) compared two groups of sixth-graders who went 
through the elementary science curriculum that reflected either constructivist or 
traditional instructional approaches. Clinical interviews suggested that the group that 
went through the constructivist-oriented curriculum demonstrated more sophisticated 
science epistemological beliefs than did the other group. In another study conducted by 
Conley, Pintrich, Vekiri and Harrison (2004), elementary students’ science 
epistemological beliefs were measured by a self-report survey along four dimensions: 
Certainty, Source, Development, and Justification. After completing a nine-week science 
unit featuring hands-on activities, the students showed significant improvement in the 
Certainty and Source dimensions of science epistemological beliefs, whereas no 
improvement was found in the Development and Justification dimensions. In another 
study in which the experimental group of students collaborated in knowledge building 
activities (pose question, generate hypothesis, construct explanations, and revise theory), 
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the students demonstrated more gains in epistemological beliefs when compared with the 
control group that received traditional instruction (Lam & Chan, 2008).  
In addition to inquiry-based activities, other ways have also been experimented 
with to promote students’ epistemological beliefs. Valanides and Angeli (2005) taught 
undergraduate students critical thinking principles to promote their epistemological 
development. Among three treatment groups, the researchers found that the group in 
which students had opportunity to reflect, debate, and evaluate their own thinking over an 
ill-defined and controversial issue made significant changes in epistemological beliefs 
when compared with the other two groups.  
Borrowing strategies from conceptual change, Kienhues et al. (2008) directly 
confronted and challenged students’ naïve epistemological beliefs with refutational text. 
It was found that the refutational text worked well for students holding naïve beliefs, but 
for those who already had more sophisticated beliefs, the refutational text seemed to lead 
them toward the naïve end of the belief, which was somewhat unexpected.  
To summarize, it appears that through appropriate instructional interventions, it is 
possible to improve students’ domain-specific epistemological beliefs. Among the 
different strategies, inquiry-based activities are most frequently used. In addition, 
engaging students in critical thinking activities over ill-structured, controversial issues 
also has potential to improve students’ epistemological beliefs. Finally, while more 
studies are needed to replicate the findings, it seems that directly refuting naïve 
epistemological beliefs through refutational text works best for those who hold naïve 
beliefs while having negative effects on those whose beliefs are more advanced.  
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Measurement of epistemological beliefs. In the early days of epistemological 
belief research, the construct was often measured qualitatively through clinical interviews 
or open-ended questionnaires. Following the lead of pioneer researchers (e.g., Kitchener 
& King, 1981; Perry, 1970), a clinical interview was once the dominant approach to 
probing one’s beliefs in knowledge and knowing. The purpose of the interview was to 
understand how age and education led to the development in individuals’ epistemological 
beliefs. The results from the interviews generally positioned an individual at a particular 
level along a developmental dimension of epistemological beliefs, that is, from the naïve 
to the sophisticated end along a continuum. Later, based on the theories developed from 
clinical interviews, open-ended questionnaires were designed to probe students’ 
epistemological beliefs (Baxter-Magolda, 1992).  
While clinical interviews and open-ended questionnaires provide rich information 
about individuals’ epistemological beliefs, data collection and analysis is a costly and 
time-consuming process, and consequently this limited the sample size a research study 
can handle. The Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ) (Schommer, 1990), a 
self-report Likert-type scale, marked the beginning of large-scale, quantitative 
measurement of epistemological beliefs. However, the instrument itself has received 
criticisms for its unstable factor structures across studies (e.g., DeBacker, Crowson, 
Beesley, Thomas, & Hestevold, 2008) and for the inclusions of certain dimensions that 
are not considered as epistemic in nature (e.g., Hofer, 2000). Trying to address the 
problems identified with the SEQ, several other quantitative measures have been 
developed. The Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) (Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002) 
and the Epistemological Belief Survey (EBS) (Wood & Kardash, 2002) are two examples. 
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While each of the two has its own psychometric problems, they were found to be better 
than SEQ in measuring general epistemological beliefs, and particularly EBS appears to 
have fewer issues than the other two (DeBacker, et al., 2008). Therefore, in this study 
EBS was used to measure students’ general epistemological beliefs. 
In the particular domain of science, Carey and colleagues (1989) were among the 
first to devise a clinical interview to probe students’ “views on the nature of science 
knowledge and inquiry” (p.516). Referring to Kuhn and colleagues’ (D. Kuhn, Amsel, & 
O'Loughlin, 1988) research on students’ development of scientific thinking skills, the 
interview asks students a series of questions to tap their views of the nature of science in 
four particular clusters: the goal of science, the questions asked in science, the nature and 
purpose of science experiments, and the nature of the change processes (Carey, et al., 
1989; Smith, et al., 2000). Later researchers in science education devised open-ended 
questionnaires to be used in conjunction with clinical interviews to assess students’ views 
of the nature of science (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Schwartz, 2002). Coming 
from another line of research in science education, these instruments on the views of the 
nature of science (VNOS) probe not only students’ science-specific epistemological 
beliefs but also other dimensions such as the history and sociology of science. 
Nonetheless, science epistemological beliefs do constitute part of this type of instrument 
to certain degree.  
Parallel to the development of quantitative self-report instruments to measure 
domain-general epistemic beliefs, effort has been made to develop quantitative measures 
to probe domain-specific beliefs. In the domain of science, for example, Hofer (2000) 
developed an instrument that attempted to tap the four dimensions of beliefs (simple 
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knowledge, certain knowledge, source of knowing, and justification of knowing) in the 
domain of science. To understand fifth graders’ epistemological beliefs in science, Elder 
(2002) developed a questionnaire with four factors: Source, Certainty, Development, and 
Justification. The questionnaire was later adapted by Conley et al. (2004). In both studies, 
the instruments were developed for elementary students; therefore the items are 
appropriate for the research participants of the current study who are middle school 
students. Further, the instrument was used in Conley et al.’s (2004) study to measure 
changes in elementary students’ science epistemological beliefs after science inquiry 
activities. Given the similarities in research participants and research purpose, this 
instrument serves well for the current study.  
Summary. Epistemological beliefs, the beliefs individuals hold about the nature of 
knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), have traditionally been studied as a 
single-dimensional, domain-general construct. In recent years, studies have found that 
epistemological beliefs are multi-dimensional (Schommer, 1990). Moreover, it is now 
generally recognized that, while there is an underlying layer of domain-general beliefs, 
individuals also hold different beliefs in different knowledge domains (Buehl & 
Alexander, 2002). Because epistemological beliefs may exert influence on learning, it 
becomes desirable that instructional interventions help to advance learners’ 
epistemological development. There are some beginning discussions suggesting that 
while domain-general beliefs tend to be more stable, domain-specific beliefs may be 
more susceptible to instructional interventions (Kienhues, et al., 2008). In the domain of 
science, effort has been made to develop students’ science epistemological beliefs 
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through strategies like inquiry learning and reflective discourse, and the results appear to 
be encouraging (e.g., Smith, et al., 2000). 
Based on the reviewed literature, the construct of epistemological belief plays a 
double role in this study. On one hand, students’ domain-general epistemological beliefs 
are examined in terms of their possible effects on conceptual change learning outcomes; 
on the other hand, the study also takes an interest in investigating the effects of possible 
instructional interventions on the development of learners’ science epistemological 
beliefs. Regarding the instruments to measure domain-general and science-specific 
epistemological beliefs, Wood and Kardash’s (2002) EBS and Conley et al.’s (2004) 
science epistemological belief survey were adapted respectively in order to quantitatively 
study the constructs and their relationships with other variables in this study. 
The remainder of this part of literature review discusses another important 
construct in this study, namely metaconceptual thinking.  
Metaconceptual Thinking 
Metaconceptual thinking belongs to a broader category of metacognition. 
According to Yuruk et al. (2008), the term “metaconceptual” refers to “metacognitive 
knowledge and processes that are acting on and related to one’s conceptual system” 
(p.444). Before proceeding to the metaconceptual level, it is helpful to have a brief 
review of metacognition and its role in learning, in order to set the stage for the 
discussion of metaconceptual thinking. 
Metacognition. Metacognition has its roots back in the developmental research in 
the 1970s. In his pioneering work, Flavell (1976) identified metacognition as something 
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that young children lack in learning. He referred to this as “the active monitoring and 
consequent regulation and orchestration of [one’s cognitive processes]” (p.232).  
Since the inception of research on metacognition, researchers have proposed 
different taxonomies trying to make sense of metacognition. Among them, A. L. Brown 
(1978) defined metacognition as the knowledge and regulation of cognition, thereby 
classifying metacognition into two major components: the knowledge about cognition, 
and the regulation and monitoring of cognition. Pintrich, Wolters, and Baxter (2000) 
went further to separate the monitoring and the regulation of cognition, thus proposing 
three components of metacognition: metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive judgment 
and monitoring, and self-regulation and control of cognition.   
Often described as “thinking about one’s own thinking,” metacognition has been 
found to be positively related to academic performance such as reading comprehension, 
problem solving, and transfer of learning (Boulware-Gooden, Carreker, Thornhill, & 
Joshi, 2007; Lin & Lehman, 1999; Schoenfeld, 1991; Swanson, 1990).  
Realizing the values of metacognition in learning, researchers have tried to devise 
strategies to promote metacognition. It was encouraging to find that metacognition is 
trainable through appropriate instructional strategies (Hodge, Palmer, & Scott, 1992; 
Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). Reciprocal teaching (Palincsar & Brown, 1984) and 
metacognitive prompting (Scardamalia, Bereiter, & Steinbach, 1984), for example, are 
among the strategies used to promote metacognition. 
Metaconceptual thinking. In the context of conceptual change, the term 
“metaconceptual awareness” has been used to describe metacognitive thinking at the 
level of conceptual knowledge and learning. Murphy and Mason (2006) implied more 
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broadly that metaconceptual awareness is one’s thinking about their conceptions instead 
of thinking with the conceptions. At a more specific level, Vosniadou et al. (Vosniadou, 
et al., 2001) referred to metaconceptual awareness as learners’ awareness of (a) the 
presuppositions and beliefs that constrain their learning, (b) the hypothetical nature of 
their presuppositions which allows questioning and verification or falsification of these 
presuppositions (Vosniadou, et al., 2001), (c) the differences between naïve beliefs and 
scientific concepts (Mikkila-Erdmann, 2001; Vosniadou, 2007b), (d) the changes in one’s 
conceptual understanding (Mason & Boscolo, 2000). In addition, Wiser and Amin (2001) 
used the term metaconceptual understanding to refer to one’s understanding that 
scientists and lay persons may use the same term to refer to different things (e.g., heat as 
exchanged energy vs. heat as hotness). Further, in her effort to use analogy to promote 
conceptual change, Mason (1994a, 1994b) described metaconceptual awareness as 
learners’ understanding about the function and purpose of analogy. 
 As illustrated, while there appears to be a general agreement that metaconceptual 
thinking is a subset of metacognition and it refers to the thinking about one’s conceptions, 
there are inconsistencies among researchers in the terms used and the meanings attached 
to the terms. Different researchers emphasize different aspects of this construct. In this 
study, metaconceptual thinking is used as an encompassing term that incorporates the 
various terms used in the past (e.g., metaconceptual awareness, metaconceptual 
understanding). To better understand its impact on conceptual change and to guide 
metaconceptual intervention aiming at promoting conceptual change, it is necessary to 
clarify the meaning of metaconceptual thinking and to distinguish it from a broader 
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category of metacognition (Thorley, 1990). It was in this context that Yuruk et al. (2008) 
made the first attempt to clarify metaconceptual thinking.  
Yuruk et al. (2008) described metaconceptual thinking as “metacognitive 
knowledge and processes that are acting on and related to one’s conceptual system,” thus 
“metaconceptual” does not include “higher order thinking knowledge and processes 
about cognition in general” (p.452). Drawing from different taxonomies of metacognition, 
Yuruk et al. (2008) presented a systematic framework to characterize metaconceptual 
thinking, which constitutes metaconceptual knowledge and three metaconceptual 
processes: (a) metaconceptual awareness, (b) metaconceptual monitoring, and (c) 
metaconceptual evaluation. According to Yuruk et al. (2008), metaconceptual knowledge 
is the “stable and statable knowledge about concept learning and the factors influencing 
concept formation” (p.453). Metaconceptual awareness is “one’s awareness of and 
reflection on existing and past concepts and elements of conceptual ecology” (p.453). 
Metaconceptual monitoring is an “online process” (p.453) that monitors one’s conceptual 
understanding and thinking process. Lastly, metaconceptual evaluation refers to the 
learners’ judgment of the competitive conception. In investigating their metaconceptual 
intervention to promote students’ conceptual understanding, Yuruk et al. (2008) found 
evidence for all the three metaconceptual processes.  
With a clear definition of metaconceptual thinking and a systematic framework, it 
is possible to target specific metaconceptual knowledge and processes in designing 
instructional interventions.  
Metaconceptual intervention. Ever since researchers discovered the importance of 
metacognition in conceptual change, instructional interventions have been conducted 
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with the goal of promoting learners’ metacognitive thinking. While “metaconceptual” is 
not always explicitly stated, a significant part of the interventions in these studies were 
trying to promote learners’ metaconceptual thinking.  
Classroom discussion is a frequently used strategy. In Eryilmaz’s (2002) approach 
to conceptual change, students were engaged in guided discussions to expose their 
conceptions, make their own hypotheses explicit, confront different conceptions held by 
others, and become aware of the possible cognitive conflicts they were facing. Similarly, 
Mason (2001) engaged students in large and small groups to share their initial 
conceptions with others, formulate hypotheses, and discuss findings from experiments.  
In another intervention, an expert teacher utilized a set of seven learning goals to 
guide discussions in science classrooms (Beeth, 1998b). The following seven goals were 
presented at the beginning of the semester and emphasized throughout the process, which 
encouraged students’ metaconceptual thinking.  
1. Can you state your own ideas? 
2. Can you talk about why you are attracted to your ideas? 
3. Are your ideas consistent? 
4. Do you realize the limitations of your ideas and the possibility they 
might need to change? 
5. Can you try to explain your ideas using physical models? 
6. Can you explain the difference between understanding an idea and 
believing in an idea? 
7. Can you apply intelligible and plausible to your own ideas? (p.1093)  
 The same expert teacher employed another intervention, in which the status of 
one’s conceptual understanding as intelligible (understandable) or plausible (believable) 
was used as a metacognitive tool to engage students in metaconceptual thinking (Beeth, 
1998a). Specifically, students first worked together with the teacher to define the 
meaning of “intelligibility” and “plausibility” as the status of one’s conceptual 
37 
 
understanding, and then applied the constructs to elaborate their ideas and discuss with 
others throughout the learning process. The students’ use of the status language not only 
stimulated their conscious examination of the development of their ideas and provided 
them with a means to describe their understanding, but also opened a window through 
which the instructor could detect and remediate student learning difficulties. While no 
conceptual change learning outcomes were reported in either of the studies (Beeth, 1998a, 
1998b), students were observed actively engaging in metaconceptual thinking. 
In addition to discussion, writing is another often used metaconceptual 
intervention. In Mason and Boscolo’s (2000) study, students wrote to comment on others’ 
ideas, reason and reflect on their own ideas, express doubts, and synthesize what they had 
learned. These students demonstrated better conceptual change than the control group 
students. White and Gunstone (1989) implemented the PEEL (Project for Enhancing 
Effective Learning), a longitudinal effort intended to promote “metalearning” in a 
secondary school in Australia. Students wrote diaries to answer prompting questions like 
“What is the topic? What do I know about it? How does the new knowledge compare 
with what I used to think?”  
The questioning strategy used in PEEL pertains to a line of research on 
scaffolding (Vygotsky, 1978), particularly question prompting (Ge & Land, 2004; A.  
King, 1991; Scardamalia, et al., 1984). By posing questions for students to consider and 
respond, question prompting strategy was found effective in facilitating problem solving 
in both well-structured and ill-structured tasks (Ge & Land, 2003; A. King & Rosenshine, 
1993; Lin & Lehman, 1999). Cognitively, question prompts guide the problem solver 
through the stages of problem representation, solution development, and argumentation 
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construction. Metacognitively, question prompts facilitate the learner to monitor and 
evaluate solutions throughout the problem solving processes (Ge & Land, 2004). While 
question prompting has been widely used as a scaffolding strategy to support problem 
solving, there has been little research on the effects of question prompts on facilitating 
metaconceptual thinking for the purpose of conceptual change. On the other hand, 
question prompts have been used in science education to promote students’ 
metacognition, which led to positive findings (e.g., Davis & Linn, 2000; Lin & Lehman, 
1999). Considering that metaconceptual thinking is a subset of metacognition, and that 
question prompting has been successful in promoting metacognition in problem solving 
and science learning (Ge & Land, 2003; Rosenshine, Meister, & Chapman, 1996), we 
have reason to believe that question prompting can be a promising strategy to promote 
metaconceptual thinking.   
Instead of using a single approach to encourage metaconceptual thinking, some 
instructional interventions employed multiple approaches. Hennessey (2003) described 
META (Metacognitive Enhancing Teaching Activities), a longitudinal project in which 
elementary students engaged in discussions with the instructor and fellow students, verbal 
or written self-reflections, and activities like concept mapping, model building, and 
poster production which were intended for students to make explicit their preconceptions 
and the development of ideas.  Similarly, Yuruk et al (2008) utilized a variety of 
activities to engage learners in metaconceptual discourse: poster drawing, writing, debate, 
concept mapping, and discussions. Evidence showed that the students demonstrated 
metaconceptual thinking while engaging in these activities.  
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 As can be seen, the reviewed metaconceptual intervention was implemented in 
various forms. In essence, these approaches were intended to facilitate learners’ 
metaconceptual processes, which were summarized nicely by Yuruk et al. (2008): 
(a) reflect on their existing conceptions, the associated ontological 
presuppositions, past experiences, and contexts in which concepts are used; 
(b) make reference to their past ideas; (c) monitor their understanding of 
the new conception, other people’s ideas, the consistency between existing 
ideas and information coming from other sources and the change in ideas; 
and (d) evaluate the relative ability of competing conceptions to explain a 
physical phenomenon (p.458). 
 
 While the interventions reviewed above mainly emphasize metaconceptual 
processes, another aspect in Yuruk et al.’s (2008) taxonomy, metaconceptual knowledge, 
is also important in instructional interventions. Examples of metaconceptual knowledge 
include understanding the difference between science language and everyday language 
(Wiser & Amin, 2002), the purpose of cognitive tools such as analogy to aid conceptual 
learning (Mason, 1994a), the difference between understanding and believing (Beeth, 
1998a), and the importance of examining one’s existing idea (Yuruk, et al., 2008). These 
are all metaconceptual knowledge that, once equipped, can contribute to conceptual 
learning. 
Linking Together: Examining the Relationships 
After establishing a general understanding of the major constructs in this study, 
this part of the literature review focuses on the specific relationships among the reviewed 
constructs (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the relationships). Empirical evidences are 
presented and knowledge gaps are identified, which sets the stage for the research 
questions.  
40 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationships among the major constructs in the study 
Epistemological Beliefs and Conceptual Change 
While plenty of studies have investigated the link between epistemological beliefs 
and various aspects of learning, few have focused on the connections between 
epistemological beliefs and conceptual change. Qian and Alvermann (1995) were among 
the first to examine the relationship between learners’ general epistemological beliefs and 
conceptual change learning outcomes. Two hundred twelve 9th-12th grade students 
completed Schommer’s SEQ and a prior knowledge test. The fifty three items from the 
SEQ loaded on three factors: simple-certain knowledge, quick learning, and innate ability. 
The prior knowledge test was intended to measure students’ existing knowledge of 
Newton’s laws of motion. The test consisted of 10 true-false items that measured 
commonly held misconceptions about projectile motion, and two application problems 
that asked students to predict paths of cannon shots. Students then took 15 minutes to 
read a refutational text that directly confronted common misconceptions about Newton’s 
first law of motion. Afterwards, the students took an achievement test that evaluated their 
conceptual understanding and knowledge application. Canonical correlation found that 
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the students’ epistemological beliefs were moderately associated with their conceptual 
understanding and knowledge application. Further, beliefs about simple-certain 
knowledge and quick learning were two significant predictors of conceptual change 
learning outcomes.  
In Windschitl’s (1997) study, 255 undergraduate biology students spent three 
hours in dyads to study photosynthetic and respiratory processes in plants by using a 
computer simulation. Conceptual change learning outcomes were measured with 14 
conceptual questions. SEQ was adapted to measure one dimension of epistemological 
beliefs: belief in the complexity of knowledge acquisition. Regression of learners’ pretest 
and epistemological beliefs on their posttest score revealed that the learners’ beliefs in the 
complexity of knowledge acquisition were a significant predictor of posttest scores.  
In another study by Windschitl and Andre (1998), 250 non-biology undergraduate 
students learned human circulatory systems using a computer simulation and 
accompanying simulation guide. Learning outcomes were measured with a 24-item 
multiple-choice test. Epistemological beliefs were measured using the SEQ, while all the 
dimensions were added as one composite variable. Among other findings from this study, 
regression analysis showed that the students’ epistemological beliefs significantly 
predicted their posttest scores.  
To summarize the connections between epistemological beliefs and conceptual 
change, it appears that certain dimensions (e.g., simple and certain knowledge) of 
epistemological beliefs may contribute to conceptual change learning outcomes. Given 
that few studies investigated the link between epistemological beliefs and conceptual 
change in science, and existing studies either treated multiple dimensions of 
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epistemological beliefs as a single variable (e.g., Windschitl & Andre, 1998) or only 
measured certain dimensions of epistemological beliefs (e.g., Windschitl, 1997), it is not 
exactly clear which dimensions may significantly contribute to conceptual change, 
particularly in the context of simulation-based science inquiry.  More studies are needed 
to clarify the relationship. 
Metaconceptual Thinking and Conceptual Change 
As reviewed earlier, unlike scientists who consciously and continuously put their 
own ideas under investigation, students often are not aware of the metaconceptual 
knowledge associated with conceptual learning, nor are they actively engaged in 
metaconceptual monitoring and evaluation processes. Intuitively, metaconceptual 
thinking should contribute to conceptual change. This was pointed out by several 
researchers who recognized the important role of metaconceptual thinking in conceptual 
change (e.g., Hennessey, 2003; Vosniadou, et al., 2001). Mason’s (1994a) study provided 
some empirical evidence for such claims. In her intervention, using analogy to promote 
conceptual change, Mason found that students’ metaconceptual awareness of the purpose 
and use of analogy to change their initial conceptions was positively correlated with their 
conceptual understanding.  
Since the concept of metaconceptual thinking has not been clearly defined until 
very recently (Yuruk, et al., 2008), few studies explicitly implemented metaconceptual 
intervention and examined its effectiveness. Often metaconceptual thinking is implicitly 
addressed as part of broader-scope interventions aiming at conceptual change. For 
example, in Vosniadou and Kollias’ (2003) study, students were engaged in model 
building activities using a computer-based collaborative learning system to support their 
43 
 
critical discourse. Positive effects were found as the critical discourse promoted students’ 
metacognitive skills and intentional learning. In another study, Ravenscroft (2007) 
designed and used digital dialogue games that modeled reasoning, conceptual change and 
argumentative processes, and found that improved test performance was associated with 
the use of the dialogue tools. Takagaki and Tahara (2005) found in their study that when 
students were engaged in reciprocal teaching, strategies of predicting, theorizing, 
summarizing, and coordinating the prediction and theories to results this helped to guide 
student thinking and facilitated conceptual change. Hennessy (2003) reported several 
exploratory projects aimed at promoting students’ metacognition, including the META 
project introduced earlier, that utilized a variety of strategies to promote conceptual 
change. While these studies did yield positive conceptual change learning outcomes, they 
do not point directly to the effectiveness of metaconceptual intervention because the 
interventions in these studies usually addressed a variety of factors simultaneously, with 
metaconceptual thinking being only one of the factors.  
A few studies have implemented and investigated mainly metaconceptual 
intervention to promote conceptual change. For example, in Bieman and Simons’ (1995) 
study, students read instructional text and answered questions which were designed to 
emphasize metaconceptual thinking in five steps: (a) before studying a text, searching for 
own preconceptions; (b) after reading a text, comparing and contrasting these 
preconceptions with the new information; (c) formulating new conceptions, based on the 
previous step; (d) applying the new conceptions; and (e) evaluating the new conceptions, 
based on the previous step. The participants were assigned to different groups with some 
groups following all five steps while others only certain part of the steps (e.g., steps a and 
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b only). The quality of students’ final conception was measured by answering problem-
solving questions that required the utilization of the concepts addressed in the instruction. 
It was found that the group that went through all the five steps was superior than other 
treatment groups, suggesting that continuous metaconceptual thinking led to optimal 
learning outcomes.  
Mason and Boscolo (2000) used writing to promote metaconceptual thinking 
among elementary students. When they were learning photosynthesis, the experimental 
group students took notes to make comments, reflect on ideas, express doubts, and 
synthesize information. Learning outcome was measured by open-ended conceptual and 
transfer questions that were scored based on correctness and completeness. In addition, 
the students were asked five post-instruction questions to evaluate their metaconceptual 
awareness, (a) “Do you think your ideas on plant food have changed?” (b) If so, “What 
were your initial ideas?” (c) “Why did you have those ideas?” (d) “What are your current 
ideas?” (e) “Has changing your previous ideas been easy or difficult and what made it 
easy or difficult for you.” Comparison with the control group suggested that the 
experimental group showed better test performance and increased metaconceptual 
awareness.  
In Eryilmaz’s (2002) study, discussion was used as a means to promote 
metaconceptual thinking. High school students were divided into different treatment 
groups to study force and motion concepts. Students who participated in class discussions 
that emphasized metaconceptual thinking showed superior performance in both 
conceptual test and achievement test compared with all the other treatment groups.  
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Compared with the above studies, Wiser and Amin’s (2001) intervention 
addressed only one aspect of metaconceptual thinking, that the same concept can have 
different scientific and everyday meanings. Wiser and Amin provided a qualitative 
account of how the metaconceptual teaching capitalized on what the students had learned 
previously from direct instruction and other learning activities.  
Georghiades (2000) explored a variety of ways to enhance student metacognition 
in elementary science classrooms. At certain points in his instructional sequence, he 
implemented activities of two to three minutes’ length, during which students engaged in 
questioning and discussion (e.g., discuss one’s conception before instruction, and 
describe whether and how it was changed),  diary keeping (e.g., summarize what has 
been learned and what remains unclear), annotated drawing to illustrate certain concepts, 
or concept mapping. Preliminary data analysis found that the treatment group performed 
better than the control group in the immediate test and delayed posttests conducted two 
and eight months later. Similarly, Yuruk et al. (2008) implemented multiple strategies to 
enhance high school students’ metaconceptual thinking while learning force and motion 
topics. The treatment group showed superior performance in the posttest and delayed 
conceptual tests.  
To summarize, while few studies explicitly implemented and examined 
metaconceptual intervention, existing ones show positive effects. This suggests that 
interventions aiming at promoting metaconceptual thinking are likely to lead to improved 
conceptual change learning outcomes. Strategies like discussion, writing, question 
prompting, and concept mapping appear to be possible means to implement 
metaconceptual intervention. Given the few existing empirical studies of metaconceptual 
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intervention, many of which employed qualitative research methodology, and given the 
lack of a theoretical framework for metaconceptual thinking until very recently, a 
quantitative study that systematically implements metaconceptual intervention and 
explicitly investigates its effectiveness would be a valuable addition to the understanding 
of metaconceptual intervention and its effects on conceptual change.  
Epistemological Beliefs and Metaconceptual Thinking 
Thus far, the review examines epistemological beliefs and metaconceptual 
thinking separately. In elaborating her model of personal epistemology, Hofer (2004) 
postulated that personal epistemology is “a set of beliefs, organized into theories, 
operating at the metacognitive level” (p.46). If epistemological beliefs operate at the 
metacognitive level, then would it be possible that epistemological beliefs and 
metaconceptual thinking are related to each other? Existing literature has provided some 
clue about this question.  
Stathopoulou and Vosniadou (2007) speculated that epistemological beliefs not 
only directly influence conceptual change, but also indirectly through metacognition. In 
their case study, the researchers interviewed ten high school students who were selected 
based on their scores on a conceptual test on force and motion and an epistemological 
belief survey. Five of the students represented higher achievers with more constructivist 
epistemological beliefs, whereas the other five represented lower achievers with more 
objectivist beliefs. Preliminary analysis from the interviews with the students showed that 
the higher achieving students with more constructivist beliefs were more 
metaconceptually aware of the development and changes in their conceptual 
understanding whereas the lower achieving students with more objectivist beliefs were 
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not metaconceptually aware of the evolution of their conceptual understanding. While no 
definite conclusion could be drawn from this study, it does indicate the possible 
interactions between epistemological beliefs and metaconceptual thinking. 
Fulton and Kendeou’s (2009) study indicated more evidence about the possible 
connections between epistemological beliefs and metaconceptual thinking. Their study 
was to examine the effects of epistemological beliefs (advanced vs. naïve) and text 
structure (refutation vs. non-refutation) on undergraduate students’ cognitive processes 
while reading an instructional text on force and motion. Students’ cognitive processes 
were captured by asking them to think aloud while reading the text, and their think-aloud 
responses were subsequently coded into eight categories. One of the categories was 
related to metaconceptual thinking. Statistical analysis found that among those students 
who read refutational texts, those with more advanced epistemological beliefs were more 
engaged in metaconceptual thinking than their epistemologically less advanced 
counterparts, while such difference did not exist among those students who read non-
refutational text. The findings suggested that learners with different levels of 
epistemological beliefs may demonstrate different metaconceptual thinking patterns in 
different instructional interventions.  
As Mason (2002) reasoned, epistemological beliefs work like a “thinking 
disposition” (p.321). In the above two cases, the evidence seems to point out the 
possibility that epistemologically more mature learners may be more prone to 
metaconceptual thinking. If this is the case, then would individuals with more advanced 
epistemological beliefs benefit more from structured metaconceptual intervention? To the 
author’s knowledge this question has not been explored.  
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 On the other hand, would learners’ continuous engagement in metaconceptual 
thinking play a role in their epistemological development? In their integrative model of 
personal epistemology, Bendixen and Rule (2004) described metacognition as crucial in 
the overall development of epistemological beliefs. There are a couple of studies 
providing preliminary support for such claim. Smith et al. (2000) compared two sixth-
grade science classes which followed different curricula throughout their elementary 
years: one reflected a constructivist view and the other was a traditional science 
curriculum. The former placed particular emphasis on developing students’ 
metaconceptual thinking. The analysis of interviews with the students on their views of 
the nature of the science revealed that the students who went through the constructivist 
curriculum showed more mature views of the nature of science as compared with their 
counterparts who went through the traditional curriculum. Similar to Smith et al.’s (2000) 
study, Wyre’s (2007) dissertation compared classes in a community college that 
implemented metacognitive components with those that did not implement metacognitive 
teaching. Using Schommer’s (1993) SEQ at the beginning and end of a semester, Wyre 
(2007) found that the students who went through metacognitive teaching showed 
significant improvement in two of the four dimensions as measured by the SEQ: quick 
learning and fixed ability.  
While the above two reviewed studies suggested the potential influence of long-
term metacognitive teaching on learners’ epistemological development, they did not 
focus exclusively on metaconceptual intervention – there were quite many other 
variations in the learning environment in both studies. If a study can focus on 
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metaconceptual intervention, it may provide a more accurate answer in terms of the 
effects of metaconceptual intervention on learners’ epistemological development.  
To summarize this part of the literature review, while solid empirical support is 
lacking, there is a possible relation between metaconceptual thinking and epistemology 
beliefs, and it is possible that the relation is bidirectional. Specifically, on one hand 
epistemological beliefs may act like a thinking disposition that affects learners’ 
engagement in metaconceptual thinking; on the other hand, long-term exposure to 
metaconceptual intervention may also improve one’s epistemological beliefs, especially 
domain-specific epistemological beliefs, given the review earlier about the malleability of 
domain-specific epistemological beliefs. More studies are needed to provide more solid 
evidence regarding the linkage between the two constructs.  
General Summary 
In this part of the literature review, the intertwined relationship between 
metaconceptual thinking, epistemological beliefs, and conceptual change are closely 
examined. Between metaconceptual thinking and conceptual change, while literature 
does imply the importance of metaconceptual thinking in conceptual change, few studies 
to date have singled out the construct to exclusively confirm its impact. Between 
epistemological beliefs and conceptual change, existing studies suggest the impact of 
epistemological beliefs on conceptual change, although specific dimensions were not 
pinpointed. Finally, with regard to the relationship between metaconceptual thinking and 
epistemological beliefs, existing literature implies a bidirectional relationship: 
epistemologically advanced individuals may be more adept in metaconceptual thinking, 
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while long-term metaconceptual intervention may also contribute to individuals’ 
epistemological development.  
Given the above theoretical background, it would be fruitful for this study to 
implement metaconceptual intervention and explore how such intervention, learner’s 
epistemological beliefs, and the possible interactions between the two impact conceptual 
change learning outcomes. Further, it may also be worthwhile to explore whether the 
metaconceptual intervention would make a difference on learners’ domain-specific 
epistemological development.  
Situating the Study: Simulation-Based Inquiry Learning 
This study was situated in the context of simulation-based inquiry learning. The 
reason for situating the study in a simulation-based inquiry learning environment was 
two-fold. Theoretically, inquiry learning is often used to promote science learning. 
Situating the study in the context of simulation-based inquiry would provide insights into 
the major constructs involved in this study as well as their inter-relationships. Practically, 
computer simulations and inquiry learning are increasingly being used in today’s science 
education, while science teachers are often not fully prepared to capitalize on simulations 
and inquiry learning as new pedagogical agents. Findings from this study may provide 
research-based guidelines as to the design and implementation of inquiry learning and 
relevant computer tools. In this part of the literature review, I first define inquiry learning 
and computer simulation, and then review literature on the connections between 
simulation-based inquiry learning and the two learning goals pursued in this study: 
conceptual change and epistemological development.   
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Defining Inquiry Learning and Simulation 
Inquiry learning in science, or sometimes called discovery learning, is “a way of 
learning in which knowledge acquisition is based on the induction of domain rules 
through structured experimentation” (de Jong, 2005, p. 225). Science inquiry is a 
complex process in which students often engage in scientific reasoning activities such as 
defining a problem, making hypotheses, designing and conducting experiments, obtaining 
and making sense of data from observation, applying the results, and making predictions 
based on results (Friedler, Nachmias, & Linn, 1990). During inquiry learning, various 
cognitive tools can be used to assist the inquiry process. Simulation is one of such tools. 
According to Alessi and Trollip (2001), simulation is “a model of some 
phenomenon or activity that users learn about through interaction with the simulation” 
(p.213). Computer simulations are often associated with inquiry learning. They generally 
support the “what if” situation; students can manipulate components or variables to see 
consequences, and thus draw inferences and discover relationships to help them build 
mental models of the concepts and processes under investigation.  
Simulations have been a common tool among scientists to support their scientific 
investigations. Linking to the earlier discussions on students’ inability to “think like 
scientists,” computer simulations have the potential to bridge the gap by providing 
students with the opportunity to engage in the common practice by scientists – to interact 
and experiment with simulations. As Wiser and Amin (2002) have nicely put it, 
simulation enables students to learn not only science content, but also the nature of 
science models and the practice of scientists. Corresponding well to the different 
perspectives on conceptual change as described earlier, simulation-based inquiry has the 
52 
 
potential to approach conceptual change not only cognitively, but also epistemologically 
and socioculturally.  
It is important to note that, simulation itself is a neutral term – simulation-based 
learning does not warrant itself to be inquiry learning. It is the way in which simulation is 
implemented in a learning environment that matters. Simulation can be used in a very 
didactic way in which learners follow recipe-like steps with limited or no inquiry 
activities or it can be fully used as an inquiry tool (Rezaei & Katz, 2002; Windschitl & 
Andre, 1998). While inquiry learning and computer simulations can be fertile ground to 
promote conceptual change and epistemological development, the design of a simulation-
based inquiry learning environment is critical to achieve the goals. 
Inquiry Learning, Simulation, and Conceptual Change 
Inquiry learning emphasizes actively engaging learners in authentic learning 
experiences in a meaningful way (Duit, 1999). In inquiry learning, students participate in 
authentic science practice, work on meaningful tasks, generate hypotheses, design and 
conduct experiments, build models, discuss and evaluate evidence, and draw conclusions. 
Presumably, with active engagement and negotiation of the meaning throughout this 
process, cognitive conflict may appear more meaningful to learners and their 
preconceptions may more likely be exposed, all of which satisfy the conditions for 
conceptual change.   
Empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the effects of inquiry 
learning on conceptual change. Some studies found promising results. For example, 
White (1993) used a set of computer microworlds with increasing complexity to engage 
sixth-grade students in a collaborative inquiry of prediction, experimentation, 
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formalization, and generalization activities. The learning outcomes were encouraging – it 
was found that the sixth graders who went through the inquiry learning demonstrated 
better conceptual understanding about force and motion than high school students who 
received traditional instruction. In Smith, Snir, and Grosslight’s (1992) study, sixth 
graders learned to differentiate the concepts of weight and density by engaging in inquiry 
with computer-based models and simulations. The study found a moderate effect of the 
instructional intervention on students’ conceptual change. Hsu (2008) compared students’ 
understanding about seasonal change between two types of technology-supported 
learning environments, one was teacher-guided and the other was a student-centered 
inquiry. Student-generated concept maps revealed that the student-centered approach 
which allowed for free exploration led to the students’ better conceptual understanding of 
seasonal changes when compared with the other approach. Similarly, Windschitl and 
Andre (1998) compared the use of simulation in objectivist and inquiry learning and 
found that the inquiry approach resulted in significantly greater conceptual change in two 
of six identified misconceptions. 
However, not all inquiry learning leads to positive conceptual change learning 
outcomes. Some found no advantage of simulation-based inquiry learning in facilitating 
or sustaining conceptual change. For example, Tao and Gunstone (1999b) engaged 
students in predict – observe – explain tasks while learning force and motion with 
computer simulations. The collected data suggested that most students’ conceptions were 
not stable after the intervention, vacillating from one context to another, suggesting 
problems with conceptual change and transfer. Hsu and Thomas (2002) compared three 
groups of students in a beginning meteorology course – a control group, a group using 
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simulation, and a group using simulation and having additional access to a log that 
recorded their previous actions. Quantitative analysis showed no difference among the 
three groups. 
The positive and negative findings of inquiry learning lead one to question what 
makes a simulation-based inquiry successful in promoting learning, particularly 
conceptual change. As de Jong (2005) argued, learner guidance is necessary to ensure 
learners interact with simulation in a productive and manageable manner. Rezaei and 
Katz’s (2002) study provided some evidence for the benefits of guided inquiry. The study 
compared a guided model of using simulation with two other approaches – a 
conventional approach that was lecture-based and placed emphasis on facts and formula, 
and a radical constructivist approach in which students were left to play with simulations 
on their own. The study found that the guided model led to better conceptual learning 
than the other two approaches. Thus neither conventional instruction nor radical approach 
fully taps the potential of simulation-based inquiry learning, and guided inquiry may be a 
better approach. 
Linking inquiry learning to conceptual change and our earlier review of 
metaconceptual thinking, it becomes reasonable to ask whether metaconceptual guidance 
implemented throughout a simulation-based inquiry process would facilitate conceptual 
change. While letting students play with computer simulations without any guidance is 
not likely to lead to conceptual change, a general inquiry guide that lacks explicit 
metaconceptual support may also be inadequate for conceptual change to occur and to be 
sustained. Learners may not be aware of their own preconceptions before interacting with 
a simulation, and they may not be able to recognize and reflect on any conflicting results 
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when they are faced with dissonance that emerges in exploring the simulation. 
Metaconceptual knowledge and processes may be the key to conceptual change as 
students learn with computer simulations. There is reason to postulate that 
metaconceptually-enhanced computer simulation may lead to learners’ more meaningful 
interaction with computer simulations and thus promote conceptual change in science 
learning.  
While to my knowledge there is no study that explicitly implemented 
metaconceptual guidance in inquiry learning to examine its effects on conceptual change, 
a closer look at some studies revealed the role metaconceptual thinking might play in 
inquiry learning. For example, in Tao and Gunstone’s (1999a) case study on students’ 
collaborative learning with computer simulations, it was found that conceptual change 
was evident among those students who were cognitively engaged and prepared to reflect 
on and reconstruct their conceptions. In another study, Li, Law and Lui (2006) found that 
teacher’s provision of appropriate dissonance (e.g., questions to help students identify 
discrepancies between their own model and the real phenomena) at certain points during 
the students’ inquiry with computer modeling tools was effective for conceptual change. 
Further, in Wiser and Amin’s (2001) qualitative study it was found that metaconceptual 
lessons after students’ interaction with simulation helped to capitalize on what they had 
learned from simulation.  
Taken together what has been reviewed so far, because inquiry learning affords 
the opportunity to engage learners in a theory building process through hypothesis, 
experimentation, observation, and analysis, it has high potential to promote conceptual 
change. However, inquiry learning without guidance is not likely to facilitate learning. In 
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the context of conceptual learning, metaconceptual guidance has special value as 
compared with general inquiry guidance. While no existing study provides empirical 
evidence for such claim, a study comparing inquiry learning with or without 
metaconceptual guidance would be a worthwhile endeavor.  
Inquiry Learning, Simulation, and Epistemological Beliefs 
 With simulation-based inquiry learning, learners have the opportunity to engage 
in authentic science practice and manipulate simulation as scientific tools. With such 
experience, learners may become more mature in their beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge and knowing in the field of science (Mason, 2002).  
There are a limited number of studies that have examined how inquiry learning 
facilitated epistemological development (e.g., Carey, et al., 1989; Smith, et al., 2000). Of 
particular interest is the study conducted by Conley et al. (2004), in which fifth-grade 
students went through a nine-week science unit with hands-on scientific investigations. 
The researchers observed that the guide provided to the teacher that was supposed to help 
them teach the unit did not provide explicit instructions on how to facilitate the students’ 
“thinking” process. As a result, the teacher was observed to emphasize the observation 
and exploration aspects of inquiry learning, while argumentation and reflection did not 
receive due attention. Students’ epistemological beliefs in science measured at the 
beginning and the end of the nine-week period revealed that while students’ beliefs in the 
certainty and source of knowledge improved as the result of the intervention, their beliefs 
in the Development and Justification of knowledge did not show significant improvement. 
Conley et al. (2004) postulated that the lack of improvement in the Development and 
Justification dimensions of epistemological beliefs might be linked to the lack of 
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emphasis on argumentation and reflection in the learning process. As such, students did 
not have enough opportunity for metaconceptual reflections in order to make sense of the 
science activities.  
While more research is needed to replicate Conley et al.’s (2004) study, their 
study nonetheless suggested two points that warrant further contemplation. First, it 
appears that both classroom teachers and existing instructional materials may not be fully 
equipped to facilitate students’ thinking process in science inquiry. To be more specific, 
in the case of using computer simulations to support science inquiry, teachers and 
existing instructional materials may not have sufficient capability to fully make use of the 
simulation tool. The second point drawn from the study is closely linked to the first one – 
if students’ reflective thinking is not facilitated in the inquiry process, it may affect their 
epistemological development. Therefore, would a simulation-based inquiry learning 
environment that emphasizes metaconceptual thinking lead to enhanced epistemological 
development?  
In summary, while few studies investigated the effects of science inquiry learning 
on promoting learners’ epistemological development, existing studies suggested such 
possibility. Moreover, it is possible that metaconceptual intervention during the science 
inquiry process may play a role in epistemological development.  
Now, based on the earlier review of the intertwined relationship between 
metaconceptual thinking, conceptual change, and epistemological belief, as well as the 
review in this section about simulation-based inquiry learning as a situating context, the 
next section presents the research questions for this study. 
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Research Questions 
This study was conducted in eighth-grade science classes. The study focused on 
students’ conceptual change and closely related belief change as important learning 
outcomes in a simulation-based inquiry learning environment. Specifically, the study 
aimed to test, in the context of simulation-based inquiry learning, the effects of 
metaconceptual intervention and learners’ general epistemological beliefs on conceptual 
change. Further, this study also explored the possible effects of metaconceptually-
enhanced, simulation-based inquiry on learners’ development of science epistemological 
beliefs. The research questions that guided this study are presented below. 
General Question 
How do students’ domain-general beliefs about knowledge and learning, 
metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based inquiry learning, and the interaction 
between the beliefs and the intervention contribute to students’ knowledge and belief 
change in science?  
Operational Questions 
1. Which instructional approach promotes better conceptual change in science: 
simulation-based inquiry learning or metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based 
inquiry learning?  
2. Do students’ general epistemological beliefs have an effect on conceptual change 
during simulation-based inquiry learning as well as metaconceptually-enhanced 
simulation-based inquiry learning? 
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3. Does each of the instructional approaches, simulation-based inquiry learning 
approach and metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based inquiry learning approach, 
have an effect on students’ science epistemological beliefs respectively? 
For Question 1, it was hypothesized that inquiry learning would promote 
conceptual change, but metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based inquiry learning 
would lead to better conceptual change outcome. 
For Question 2, it was hypothesized that general epistemological beliefs would 
have an effect on conceptual change. Further, it was postulated that epistemologically 
more advanced students would benefit more from additional metaconceptual intervention. 
For Question 3, it was hypothesized simulation-based inquiry learning would 
promote students’ development of science epistemological beliefs. Further, it was 
postulated that additional metaconceptual intervention would enhance simulation-based 
inquiry in promoting more mature science epistemological beliefs than simulation-based 
inquiry alone.  
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CHAPTER 3: PILOT STUDY 
Introduction 
While laboratory-based research does well to concentrate on study variables by 
excluding the “noise” that is common in real life settings, laboratory findings often 
cannot be translated directly into school settings. In order to increase the ecological 
validity of research findings, it was decided that this study be conducted in authentic, 
complex social context in order to realize two intertwined goals: to implement and refine 
theory-based learning environment and to develop theories from the study of the learning 
environment (Design-Based Research Collective, 2003). 
Since this study aimed at implementing an innovative, simulation-based 
instructional intervention in authentic science classrooms, it necessarily involved the 
messiness as found in any naturalist environment. To ensure successful implementation 
of the innovative learning environment, a pilot study was first conducted to (a) test run 
the instructional intervention and materials in real classroom settings in order to identify 
any potential implementation issues, (b) examine any emergent behaviors of students as 
they were immersed in the learning environment, (c) explore the research questions in a 
pilot environment, (d) actively engage students and teachers as research partners, and (e) 
eventually draw implications to refine and redesign the learning environment for the main 
study. After a detailed description of the study design and research participants, as well as 
the context, this chapter details the instructional intervention and instruments used in the 
pilot study. The chapter ends with a report of findings and implications, based on which 
the main study was implemented. 
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Study Design 
This study aimed at investigating the effects of students’ general epistemological 
beliefs (EB) and metaconceptually-enhanced, simulation-based inquiry learning on 
students’ conceptual change and the development of science EB. Particularly, the study 
was intended to identify relationships between several independent variables 
(metaconceptual intervention, simulation-based inquiry, and general EB) and dependent 
variables (conceptual change and science EB) by comparing two learning environments: 
metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based inquiry (META+SBI) and simulation-
based inquiry alone (SBI). The nature of the study lent itself to a quantitative research 
method. Further, since this study was conducted in a school setting where students were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions by their intact classes, a quasi-
experimental study approach was applied (Mertens, 2005). Table 1 summarizes the study 
design and instruments for each research question.   
Table 1  
Pilot Study Research Questions, Study Design, and Instruments 
Research Question Design Instruments 
1. Which instructional approach promotes 
better conceptual change in science: 
simulation-based inquiry learning or 
metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-
based inquiry learning? 
• Pretest-posttest 
design 
• Multiple-choice 
conceptual pretest 
and posttest 
• Concept mapping 
pretest and posttest 
2. Do students’ general epistemological beliefs 
have an effect on conceptual change during 
simulation-based inquiry learning as well as 
metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-
based inquiry learning? 
• Correlational 
design 
• Multiple-choice 
conceptual pretest 
and posttest 
• General EB survey 
3. Does each of the instructional approaches, 
simulation-based inquiry learning approach 
and metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-
based inquiry learning approach, have an 
effect on students’ science epistemological 
beliefs respectively? 
• Pretest-posttest 
design 
• Science EB pretest 
and posttest 
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Research Participants, Context, and Curriculum 
This research was approved by both the university’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) and the IRB office of the school district. All the IRB procedures and guidelines 
were followed in recruitment and study. Forty-three eighth-grade students (16 females 
and 26 males) were recruited from a middle school in the school district. The particular 
school and grade level were chosen because of convenient access. It was decided that the 
students who did not consent to participating in the study would still remain in their 
respective classes; however, no data were to be gathered from the non-participating 
students.  
The forty-three eighth-grade students were recruited from two science inquiry 
classes of an elective course taught by two different teachers. According to the teachers, a 
considerable number of students were enrolled in this course because the other electives 
were filled up. Therefore, the students’ motivation in taking the science inquiry course 
varied. The two intact classes were randomly assigned to either the META+SBI or the 
SBI treatment condition. The two treatment conditions are explained later in this chapter. 
Physics, as part of the eighth-grade physical science curriculum, was selected as 
the instructional subject in the current study. White (1993) argued that physics was an 
ideal subject to introduce to students the enterprise of science. Further, physics is also the 
foundation of engineering and science disciplines (National Research Council, 2001). Yet, 
many feel that physics is the most abstract and difficult subject among all the science 
subjects, which is beyond the capability of most primary and secondary students (B. Y. 
White & Frederiksen, 1998). Research has often found that traditional physics classes fail 
to help students to learn physics (B. Y. White, 1993) because overemphasis is placed on 
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quantitative problem solving while students’ qualitative understanding is often neglected 
(National Research Council, 2005). In such a context, simulation-based inquiry learning 
has great potentials in improving physics learning because it provides an environment in 
which students can actively engage in experimenting and building qualitative, mental 
models of the phenomena under study. In physics, the topics of motion and force are 
closely related to daily life. It is well documented that because of their familiarity with 
the phenomena, students often develop misconceptions based on their life experience 
(e.g., Hapkiewicz, 1992; Hestenes, et al., 1992). Thus, force and motion were chosen as 
specific instructional topics to be addressed in this study. The specific instructional 
content in this study followed the Oklahoma Priority Academic Student Skills (PASS) 
eighth-grade standards, which include both science process (e.g., Observe , Measure, 
Experiment, and Interpret) and physical science standards (e.g., Motions and Forces). A 
complete list of relevant eighth-grade PASS standards can be found in Appendix A.   
Before participating in this research, the students had not learned any of the 
eighth-grade science content related to motion and force. Therefore, they had little 
knowledge of the topics to be learned. The research participants were expected to learn 
the content solely from the instructional intervention during this study. In other words, 
the instruction of motion and force would be completely delivered through simulation-
based inquiry activities instead of being taught by the two science teachers. This 
arrangement not only allowed me to study the effects of the instructional intervention, but 
also minimized the possible variations different teachers might bring to the study. 
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Instructional Intervention 
 Both treatment groups (SBI and META+SBI) engaged in inquiry learning by 
interacting with computer-based simulations. While the two groups used the same 
computer simulation programs, they received different versions of web-based simulation 
guides that were intended to help learners with the inquiry activities. Compared with the 
simulation guide for the SBI group, the simulation guide for the META+SBI group 
contained additional metaconceptual components which are explained next.  
Computer Simulations 
The students in both treatment groups used the same two computer simulations to 
explore the topics of motion and force. The two simulations were developed by the 
Physics Education Technology (PhET) project group at the University of Colorado, 
Boulder and were downloaded from the PhET website 
(http://phet.colorado.edu/index.php). PhET is funded by the William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation, National Science Foundation, and a variety of other funding agencies. It 
offers a variety of open-source science and math educational simulations that are free for 
the public to use. The design of the simulations was based on the past research on how 
students learn and extensive studies with individual student users (e.g., Adams et al., 
2008a; Adams et al., 2008b; National Research Council, 2000).   
Two PhET simulations were chosen for this study: Moving Man and Forces in 1 
Dimension. Both simulations operate on the Java platform, which can be installed on a 
computer and accessed offline. Both simulations provide multiple types of visual 
representations. Take the Moving man for example, once launched, the interface provides 
three types of visual representations. At the top, there is an image of a man in a walking 
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position, as if walking from the left side of the screen, where there is a tree, to the right 
side of the screen, where there is a house. The graphics on the top part represents the 
man’s motion, which is the first type of visual display. The second type of visual display 
is the motion graphs depicting the man’s position, velocity, and acceleration over time. 
The last visual element in this interface is several numerical input boxes, which allow a 
user to assign a value to the man’s position, velocity, or acceleration and then click a Go 
button to run the simulation. The Playback, Pause, and Rewind buttons at the bottom of 
the interface allow a user to replay and examine any part of a motion that had previously 
run. Figure 2 is a screenshot of the Moving Man simulation interface. 
 
Figure 2. The Moving Man simulation interface 
The PhET simulations allow students to conduct virtual experiments – they can 
adjust a variable and observe how the change affects other variables in multiple ways. 
Take the Forces in 1 Dimension for example, as students interacted with the simulation, 
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they could enter a certain value of force and apply it to a visual object. The effect of the 
force could be examined in three ways: (a) an animation showing a man pushing an 
object, and depending on the amount of force, the object may or may not move; (b) the 
real-time graphs depicting how the force and the object’s position, velocity, and 
acceleration change with time; (c) a vector graph illustrating all the forces acting on the 
object. Figure 3 shows the interface of the Forces in 1 Dimension simulation. 
 
Figure 3. The Forces in 1 Dimension simulation interface 
Both simulations have been tested by researchers in real classrooms (Perkins et al., 
2006). In addition, the PhET website provides additional information for each simulation, 
including the main topics covered by the simulation, sample learning goals, and related 
teaching ideas. Further, users can upload and share with others their teaching ideas and 
instructional materials for a specific simulation.  
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Inquiry Activities 
Using the two computer simulations, the students performed a total of six 
investigation units on six motion and force topics: (a) Position and Distance, (b) Position-
Time Graph for At-Rest Object, (c) Constant Velocity and Velocity-Time Graph, (d) 
Constant Velocity and Position-Time Graph, (e) Changing Speed, and (f) Connecting 
Motion and Force. The students worked on certain parts of investigations each day. For 
each investigation, the students went through a set of inquiry activities through which 
they explored the force and motion topics under investigation, including making 
predictions, conducting and observing experiments with computer simulations, and 
explaining experiment findings. In addition, the META+SBI group learned additional 
metaconceptual knowledge, and answered additional questions regarding their 
metaconceptual awareness, monitoring, and evaluations during the inquiry. The students 
performed the investigations by following a simulation guide corresponding to their 
treatment condition, which is explained next.  
Simulation Guide 
While interacting with the same PhET simulations, the two treatment groups (SBI 
and META+SBI) followed different web-based simulation guides that led them through 
the inquiry. The two guides shared the same inquiry activities, but the guide for the 
META+SBI group had additional metaconceptual components throughout the inquiry.  
SBI simulation guide. Part of the SBI simulation guide was adapted from the 
Tools for Scientific Thinking curriculum created by Thornton (1989). The guide had a 
total of six parts corresponding to the six investigations, each of which consisted of two 
to four web pages. While using the guide, students could navigate from one page to the 
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next by clicking on the buttons on the web page. Each page of the simulation guide 
displayed instructional text and relevant graphics. Detailed information about the 
simulation guide for the SBI group can be found in Appendix B1.  
Each part of the simulation guide was organized around prediction, observation, 
and explanation activities. For example, in Part 3 of Investigation 3, the students explored 
the concepts of constant velocity and velocity-time graphs. In the prediction phase, the 
web page showed three velocity-time graphs with a question “Which of the following is a 
velocity-time graph for at-rest object?” The students had to select one out of four possible 
answers. Moving to the observation phase, the students were instructed to launch the 
Moving Man simulation, follow instructions to experiment with the simulation, and 
observe the experiment findings. The observation is followed by the explanation phase, 
during which students would switch back to the simulation guide window and answer the 
question “Did the velocity graphs agree with your prediction? If not, which of the above 
graphs (A, B, C) is correct?” The students had to type their answer in an input box 
provided on the web page. Upon submission of their answers, the students could navigate 
to the next page where a What do Scientists Say section briefly explained the main ideas 
in the activity. The same pattern was repeated throughout the simulation guide. To 
emphasize science inquiry processes, graphic icons were used throughout the simulation 
guide to highlight major inquiry tasks (e.g., prediction, observation, and explanation). As 
illustrated in Figure 4, the “O” and “E” icons represent the observation and explanation 
activities respectively. In this particular part of investigation, during the observation 
phase the students were instructed to use the Moving Man simulation to explore position-
time graphs when the man was standing still at different positions. Upon the students’ 
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explorations with the simulation, they came back and answered questions related to their 
findings. For example, they were asked what the man’s position-time graph looked like 
when he stood still on the left side of the computer screen.  
 
Figure 4. Screenshot showing part of the SBI group simulation guide 
META+SBI simulation guide. The simulation guide for the META+SBI group 
shared the same number of investigation activities, web pages, and the same inquiry 
activities as those in the SBI simulation guide. The only difference was the addition of 
metaconceptual intervention, which was presented as either instructional text or question 
prompts at various points of the inquiry process. To make the metaconceptual 
components salient to the META+SBI students, each metaconceptual section was 
presented under a banner that included an image of a magnifying glass and a Click to 
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Check Your Understanding message. When students clicked on the banner, they would 
see a drop-down panel which contained metaconceptual information and/or questions. 
Figure 5 shows a drop-down panel with a metaconceptual question displayed inside (Note:  
In Figure 5, the first paragraph, which defines the concepts of velocity and constant 
velocity, appears in both the META+SBI simulation guide and the SBI simulation guide. 
The only difference with the META+SBI simulation guide is the addition of 
metaconceptual question that follows the first paragraph.). 
 
Figure 5. A panel with a metaconceptual question displayed inside 
The metaconceptual intervention was designed by referring to Yuruk et al.’s 
(2008) taxonomy and other researchers’ work on metaconceptual thinking as reviewed 
earlier in Chapter Two, with specific consideration of the context for this study 
(simulation-based inquiry). The following metaconceptual knowledge and processes 
guided the design of the META+SBI simulation guide: 
1. Metaconceptual knowledge 
1.1 The importance of examining one’s preconceptions 
1.2 One’s idea as the object of thinking  
1.3 One’s idea is subject to change with new evidence 
1.4 Existence of different ideas 
1.5 Status of one’s understanding 
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1.6 The use of simulation to help understand concept 
 
2. Metaconceptual awareness 
1.1 Awareness of one’s existing ideas 
1.2 Awareness of the reasoning behind one’s idea 
1.3 Awareness of one’s experience associated with an idea 
1.4 Awareness of the relationship between ideas 
1.5 Awareness of the missing knowledge 
 
3. Metaconceptual monitoring 
3.1 Monitoring the ideas from other sources 
3.2 Monitoring the inconsistency between one’s idea and ideas from other sources 
3.3 Monitoring changes to one’s idea 
 
4. Metaconceptual evaluation 
4.1 Evaluate the status of an idea 
 
As reviewed earlier, literature suggested that question prompting could be a 
promising strategy to scaffold students’ metaconceptual thinking (e.g., Ge & Land, 2003, 
2004; Lin, 2001). Therefore, this study used question prompts to scaffold each of the 
above-listed metaconceptual aspects. Table 2 illustrates with examples the scaffolding 
framework in the META+SBI simulation guide. Detailed information about the 
simulation guide for the META+SBI group can be found in Appendix B2.  
Table 2  
Metaconceptual Intervention in the META+SBI Simulation Guide 
Metaconceptual 
thinking Intervention & Examples 
Metaconceptual 
knowledge 
Instructional text, stories or questions that taught students about 
metaconceptual knowledge in simulation-based inquiry context. Students were 
reminded of the metaconceptual knowledge throughout learning. 
Examples: 
1.1 The importance of examining one’s preconceptions, and  
1.2 One’s idea as the object of thinking  
At the very beginning, students were given the following scenario: A boy 
and his father were in a car accident. Both the boy and the father were 
injured. At the hospital, the surgeon assigned to the boy took a look at him 
and exclaimed, “This is my son!” After trying to guess what might have 
happened in this scenario, the students were told that the surgeon is the 
boy’s mother. Students were then led to a discussion that people are not 
always aware of our preconceptions (e.g., a surgeon is a male) which often 
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influence how one receives new information. Students were reminded at 
this point that they would focus on their ideas and observe how the ideas 
evolve over time. Throughout the entire learning process, this point was 
repeatedly emphasized to students.  
1.3 One’s idea is subject to change with new evidence, and 
1.4 Existence of different ideas 
Students read the story of how people started to question the flat earth 
theory because of new findings, which eventually led to the discovery of 
the round earth. In addition, in each investigation students were presented 
ideas by some cartoon figures (either right or wrong), and asked to judge 
the correctness of the ideas. 
1.5 Status of one’s understanding 
At the end of the first investigation, the simulation guide used the Lord of 
the Rings movie as an example to illustrate how one can understand 
something (e.g., the plot in the movie) but not believe it to be true.  
1.6 1.6 The use of simulation to help understand concept 
It was explained to students how simulation could help science inquiry and 
they were asked to give an example of how scientists used simulation to 
aid research.  
 
Metaconceptual 
Awareness 
Throughout the inquiry, the students responded to questions related to their 
initial ideas or predictions regarding the main concepts in the investigation.  
Examples: 
2.1 Awareness of one’s existing ideas 
• In your opinion, what is speed? Can you define it in your own words? 
• Based on what you have found from simulation, what is your current 
theory of xxx? Write down your theory.  
2.2 Awareness of the reasoning behind one’s idea 
• What is the reason for your prediction? 
2.3 Awareness of one’s experience associated with an idea 
• Can you give an example of distance? 
• Explain the reason for your answer and use an example to support it. 
2.4 Awareness of the relationship between ideas 
• In your mind, are distance and position the same thing or they are 
different? Explain your idea. 
2.5 Awareness of the missing knowledge 
• Are you sure about your predictions? 
• Are you very sure about your current idea? 
 
Metaconceptual 
monitoring 
At several points in an investigation, usually after an activity/presentation of 
new information/test of a prediction, when appropriate, students were asked to 
compare with their initial idea/prediction to see if there is any inconsistency.  
Examples: 
3.1 Monitoring the ideas from other sources 
• Was there something new or something different to you from what the 
scientists say?  
• Students were asked to judge whether an idea from others was right or 
wrong. They were asked to explain and justify their reason. 
3.2 Monitoring the inconsistency between one’s idea and ideas from other 
sources 
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• Does the simulation result agree with your prediction? 
• Write down the difference between your initial idea and what you 
found from the simulation?  
• Is the scientists' theory about position and distance the same as your 
own theory written earlier?  
3.3 Monitoring changes to one’s idea 
• Think back to your initial understanding of acceleration. Overall were 
there any changes to your initial understanding? If so, explain the 
biggest change in this investigation. 
 
Metaconceptual 
evaluation 
At the end of an investigation, when appropriate, students were asked to 
consider the status of their new understanding. 
Examples: 
4.1 Evaluate the status of an idea 
• If your prediction was different from what you found from the 
simulation, are you ready to give up your prediction and accept what 
you found from the simulation?   
To further illustrate the difference between the simulation guides used by the 
META+SBI and the SBI groups, Table 3 provides a side-by-side comparison of the 
questions asked in the prediction and explanation parts of each simulation guide. The 
observation part only provided instructions for the students to conduct simulation 
experiments, and so it did not have questions. Therefore observation is not included in 
Table 3.  
Table 3  
META+SBI and SBI Groups Simulation Guide Comparison  
Inquiry Phases SBI simulation guide  META+SBI group simulation guide 
Prediction Inquiry question 
• Without using the simulation, can you predict the car's motion from the 
above Position graph? Make your selection. 
Metaconceptual questions 
• N/A • If you are going to explain to someone why you 
made your prediction, what would you tell the 
person? 
• Zima thinks that a position graph shows an 
object’s moving path. She believes that the 
position graph above shows an object moving 
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from left to right, and so A is the correct answer. 
Do you agree with Zima? 
Explanation Inquiry question 
Based on what you found from the simulation, how would you answer the 
same question above? 
Metaconceptual questions 
• N/A • Look back at your earlier prediction, is it correct? 
• Based on what you found from the simulation, do 
you agree with Zima's idea now? 
• Can you explain to Zima what you found from 
the simulation and tell her whether she is right or 
wrong? Write down below what you want to say 
to her. 
Instruments 
Conceptual Evaluations 
The purpose of conceptual evaluations was to measure students’ conceptual 
change as a result of the instructional intervention in this study. The conceptual change 
was measured in two ways: multiple-choice conceptual test and concept mapping test. 
The multiple-choice conceptual test focused on specific misconceptions identified from 
literature, and the concept mapping test focused on the organization and interrelatedness 
of key concepts, namely the students’ mental models. Both tests were administered twice 
in the pilot study as pretest and posttest. 
Multiple-choice conceptual test. In order to develop an instrument to measure 
students’ conceptual understanding of motion and force, the following list of 
misconceptions was identified from the existing literature (T. Brown & Crowder, n.d.; 
Hestenes, et al., 1992; Thorton & Sokoloff, 1998):  
1. The location of an object can be described by stating its distance from a given 
point, ignoring direction. 
2. Velocity must be positive, plotted above the time axis.  
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3. Students have difficulty relating real world motions to a graph and vice-versa. 
4. Students plot position and velocity graphs as the path of the particle.  
5. Students don't know which quantity in a graph will answer a question (e.g., 
coordinate or slope). 
6. Constant velocity results from constant force. 
7. If there is no motion, there must be no force. 
8. If there is no force, there must be no motion.  
9. Faster moving objects have larger force acting on them. 
10. An object will slow down when the total force is zero. 
11. When a force is removed from a moving object, it still has impetus on the object 
to keep it moving. 
 
Corresponding to the misconceptions identified above, an 18-item multiple-choice 
conceptual test was developed (Appendix C1). Among the 18 items, four of them (#7-10) 
were selected from the Force and Motion Conceptual Evaluation (FMCE), which is a 
popular instrument developed by Thornton and Sokoloff (1998). FMCE is a 47-item 
multiple-choice instrument that diagnoses student misconceptions in one-dimensional 
forces and motion (Thorton & Sokoloff, 1998). The four items selected for the multiple-
choice conceptual test were relevant to the domain content for this study.  
In addition, two other items (#12 and 18) in the multiple-choice conceptual test 
were adapted from the misconception diagnosis questions developed by Brown & 
Crowder (n.d.) from the Student Difficulties in Physics Information Center at the 
Department of Physics in the Montana State University. Brown and Crowder (n.d.) 
reviewed physics education literature, identified a list of common misconceptions, and 
suggested question items that could help discover the misconceptions. Of these questions, 
two items were related to the instructional content in this study, and therefore they were 
included in the multiple-choice conceptual test.  
The remaining 12 questions were adapted from the instructional materials shared 
by various science teachers on the PhET website. The instructional materials were 
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carefully reviewed and the question items that addressed the identified misconceptions in 
this study were selected or adapted. As a result, a total of 18 test items were reviewed, 
revised, and validated by four eighth-grade science teachers from two middle schools. 
The complete multiple-choice conceptual test and the specific misconceptions 
corresponding to each question item can be found in Appendix C1. The multiple-choice 
conceptual test was administered twice in the pilot study – pretest and posttest. 
Concept mapping test. A second instrument used in this study to measure 
conceptual change was a concept mapping test. A concept map contains nodes that 
represent concepts and propositions which show the links between concepts (Novak, 
1991). Studies found that concept maps created by experts are significantly different in 
structural complexity and organizational patterns from those created by novices 
(Markham, Mintzes, & Jones, 1994). Concept mapping can elicit a learner’s mental 
model, thus it provides researchers means to examine learner’s cognitive understanding 
and developmental change (Novak & Gowin, 1984). Concept mapping has been used to 
study conceptual change in science education (e.g., Fellows, 1994; Hsu, 2008; Wallace, 
1990). However, the existing literature suggested that concept mapping scores did not 
always correlate with multiple-choice tests scores, which means that the two types of 
assessments may measure different aspects of understanding (Markham, et al., 1994). 
Therefore, in this study the multiple-choice conceptual test was intended to identify 
students’ specific misconceptions on motion and force while the concept mapping test 
was intended to assess the depth and width of students’ understanding about the 
relationships among key ideas in motion and force. It was expected that the two 
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instruments would complement each other to provide a complete picture of students’ 
conceptual change learning outcomes.  
During the concept mapping test, students were given a scenario of a child who 
became curious about how a car could move in different ways, and was asked to use a 
concept map to illustrate how force causes different motions of a car. Students were 
given 10 sticky notes, each of which showed one of the 10 concepts (nodes) (i.e., Force, 
Balanced Forces, Unbalanced Forces, Total Force = 0, Total Force ≠ 0, At Rest, Constant 
Speed, Changing Speed, Speeding Up, and Slowing Down). The selection of the 10 
nodes was based on Yuruk’s (2005) study in which students learned similar force and 
motion concepts. Students were assigned three tasks for the concept mapping test: (a) 
arrange the sticky notes in a way that would help them to explain how force affects a 
car’s motion, (b) draw causal links between the two sticky notes (nodes) that they thought 
were connected, and (c) write down the specific relationships between the two linked 
sticky notes they had completed in (b). The complete concept mapping test can be found 
in Appendix C2. The concept mapping test was administered twice in the pilot study – 
pretest and posttest. 
Epistemological Beliefs Survey  
As one of the independent variables in this study, students’ general EB were 
measured using the Epistemological Beliefs Survey (EBS) developed by Wood and 
Kardash (2002). According to DeBacker et al. (2008), there are three major EB 
instruments – EBS, Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ), and Epistemic 
Beliefs Inventory (EBI) (Schraw, et al., 2002). While all three have their own 
psychometric issues, EBS appears to fare better than others (DeBacker, et al., 2008). The 
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EBS consists of 38 self-report Likert-scale items that were drawn from the SEQ 
(Schommer, 1990) and another instrument developed by Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson 
(1993). EBS loads on five factors: speed of knowledge acquisition (8 items, e.g., “If 
something can be learned, it will be learned immediately”), structure of knowledge (11 
items, e.g., “It’s a waste of time to work on problems that do not have a clear-cut 
answer”), knowledge construction and modification (11 items, e.g., “Today’s facts may 
change tomorrow”), characteristics of successful students (5 items, e.g., “Some people 
are born good learners; others are not”), and attainability of objective truth (3 items, e.g., 
“If scientists try hard enough, they can find the answer to almost every question”). Wood 
and Kardash (2002) and DeBacker et al. (2008) reported internal consistencies of .73 
to .76 for the speed of knowledge acquisition subscale, .71 to .76 for structure of 
knowledge, .65 to .67 for knowledge construction and modifications, .58 to .63 for 
characteristics of successful students, .51 to .55 for attainability of objective truth. The 
instrument was coded in a way that lower scores represented more mature beliefs. 
Since EBS has been mainly used with undergraduate and above level students, the 
question items were rephrased or modified to accommodate the eighth-grade students’ 
reading level. I referred to Schommer-Aikins et al’s (2000) middle school version of SEQ 
to help me revise the items. In addition, I sought input from a science teacher and worked 
collaboratively with a professor in educational psychology to revise the items. These 
revised items were then reviewed by another science teacher and tested with several 
middle school students. The final version of the EBS can be found in Appendix C3. The 
EBS was administered to students at the beginning of the pilot study. 
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Science Epistemological Beliefs Survey 
To measure students’ science EB as one of the dependent variables in this study, 
an instrument used by Conley et al. (2004) was adopted for the study (Appendix C4). The 
instrument was originally developed by Elder (2002) and was later adapted by Conley et 
al. (2004). In both cases, the instruments were used with elementary students; therefore 
the items are suitable for the reading comprehension level of middle school students. 
Further, in Conley et al.’s (2004) study the instrument was used to measure changes in 
elementary students’ science EB after a 9-week instruction in a science unit featuring 
hands-on activities. Given the similarities between Conley’s study and this study in 
research participants, context, and purposes, this instrument served well for the current 
study. 
Similar to the EBS, the science EB survey is a self-report Likert-scale 
questionnaire. It measures science EB along four dimensions: Source (5 items, e.g., 
“Whatever the teacher says in science class is true”), Certainty (6 items, e.g., “All 
questions in science have one right answer”), Development (6 items, e.g., “Sometimes 
scientists change their minds about what is true in science”), and Justification (9 items, 
e.g., “Good answers are based on evidence from many different experiments”). There are 
a total of 26 items in the survey. The internal consistencies of the instrument reported by 
Conley et al. (2004) are .81 to .82 for Source, .78 to .79 for Certainty, .57 to .66 for 
Development, and .65 to .76 for Justification. Similar to the EBS, this instrument was 
also coded in a way that lower scores indicated more mature beliefs while higher scores 
indicated less mature beliefs. The science EB survey was administered twice in the pilot 
study – pretest and posttest. 
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Procedure 
As stated earlier, the two intact eighth-grade science classes were randomly 
assigned to one of two treatment groups. Specifically, the first-hour science inquiry class 
was assigned to the META+SBI group, and the second-hour class was assigned to the 
SBI group. 
Figure 6 shows the overall procedure of this study. The study lasted a total of nine 
school days with one 45-minute class each day. As illustrated, on Day 1, a total of four 
instruments were administered to students in both classes in the following order: concept 
mapping pretest, multiple-choice conceptual pretest, general EB survey, and science EB 
survey pretest.  
 
After Intervention 
(Day 9) 
META
+SBI 
Before Intervention 
(Day 1 and part of 
Day 2) 
1. Concept mapping pretest 
2. Multiple-choice conceptual pretest 
3. General epistemological beliefs 
survey 
4. Science epistemological beliefs 
survey pretest 
Intervention  
(Day 2 – Day 8) 
 
Simulation + 
inquiry guide 
Simulation + 
metaconceptually-
enhanced inquiry 
guide
1. Concept mapping posttest 
2. Multiple-choice conceptual 
posttest 
3. Science-specific epistemological 
beliefs survey posttest 
 
SBI 
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Figure 6. Pilot study procedure. 
The concept mapping pretest was administered first. I first walked the students 
through the creation of a concept map using concepts (i.e., nodes) that they were familiar 
with (e.g., trees, oxygen, wood, humans, plants, animals, houses, paper, and furniture). 
The example concept map can be found in Appendix D. Once the students had clear 
understanding about creating concept maps, they were given the instruction for the 
concept mapping task, that is, using a concept map to explain to their younger siblings 
how force was related to different motions of a car. Detailed instruction can be found in 
Appendix C2. Each student was then provided with a stack of 10 sticky notes and a big 
piece of construction paper. Each of the sticky notes had one of the 10 motion and force 
concepts written on it. Then, the students started to work individually, arranging the 
sticky notes, drawing links, and explaining relationships.   
For the written multiple-choice conceptual pretest, the students were told not to be 
concerned if they did not know how to answer the questions since they had not studied 
the content yet. However, they were encouraged to try their best to answer the questions. 
For the two written EB surveys, the students took the science EB survey pretest 
first, followed by the general EB survey. When they were taking the general beliefs 
survey, I asked the students to think about their learning in general. When they were 
responding to the science beliefs survey questions, I prompted the students to think about 
their science learning experience in particular. The four instruments took the entire Day 1 
and part of Day 2.  
On Day 2, after all the participating students completed the four instruments, I 
demonstrated and explained to students the first computer simulation (Moving Man) and 
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the accompanying web-based simulation guide. Afterwards, each student was given an 
ultra mobile portable computer (UMPC) where the Moving Man simulation was already 
loaded, and the students spent some time playing with the simulation. Once the students 
became familiar with the simulation, they were instructed to open a web browser and 
access the web-based simulation guide via a provided URL, and log on using their pre-
assigned ID and password. In the remaining time of the second class, I led the students 
through the first part of the first investigation by verbally presenting to students the 
information in the simulation guide. When a simulation experiment was needed, I led the 
entire class in this activity by first eliciting their responses and ideas about how to 
conduct the experiment and then performing the experiment myself, which was projected 
to a projector screen. When there were questions that required students to answer, I 
would read the questions to them first, and then I would give them some time to type and 
submit their answers on their computers. At the end of the class, the students logged off 
the simulation guide website. 
From Day 3 through Day 7, each session began with my brief review of what had 
been learned in the past days, followed by the students’ individual self-study on their 
computers. The review was based on each treatment condition’s respective simulation 
guide, and therefore was consistent with the two treatment conditions. That is, the review 
for the META+SBI group emphasized metaconceptual knowledge and processes, 
whereas the review for the SBI group did not address metaconceptual thinking. During 
the self-study time, the students worked individually on the investigations by following 
their respective simulation guide, that is, they made predictions, conducted and observed 
simulation experiments, and answered questions throughout the process.  
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During this process, it was found that students’ progress was slower than what 
was originally planned, either due to the slow progress of some individual students or 
because of technical issues, such as the UMPC battery running out or other technical 
problems. Based on students’ actual progress and discussions with the teachers, I 
eliminated the last three parts of the sixth investigation.  
On Day 8, I reviewed with the students the first five investigations that they had 
gone through in the past several days, and then took the lead in guiding the students 
through the sixth investigation which contained two parts. The teaching format was 
similar to that of Day 1. The review and guidance were consistent with the respective 
simulation guide for each treatment condition. 
On Day 9, the students took three posttests: the concept mapping posttest, the 
multiple-choice conceptual posttest, and the science EB survey posttest. All the three 
instruments were the same as those used in the pretest. 
During the entire process, the science teacher of each class remained in the 
classroom, but did not participate in any teaching activities. However, I talked with the 
teachers at the end of each class and consulted with them when it was necessary to make 
an instructional decision or a change.  
Results 
Coding and Scoring 
 Before processing data, I conducted data screening. Upon examination of the data 
and student attendance record, I removed from the dataset one student who missed three 
out of seven learning sessions, which was considered a significant amount of the learning 
experience.  As a result, there were a total of 42 participants remaining in the dataset.  
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The student-generated concept maps were transferred into an Excel spreadsheet 
for further data processing. Specifically, each of the ten concepts (nodes) in the concept 
map was coded with a letter from A to J, and every proposition (pair of linked concepts) 
in a concept map was entered into the spreadsheet. For example, in a concept map, the 
node Force (coded as A) might be connected to Balanced Forces (coded as B) and 
Unbalanced Forces (coded as C). Thus in the spreadsheet, “A” would be entered in the 
Node 1 column and “B” would be entered in the Node 2 column for the first proposition 
(Force – Balanced Forces). Similarly, for the second proposition (Force – Unbalanced 
Forces), “A” and “C” would be entered in respective columns. Figure 7 illustrates a 
partial concept map and the corresponding data entry.  
 
Figure 7. Concept map data entry example.  
In this way, all the nodes and propositions in a concept map were recorded in the 
spreadsheet. Further, each concept map was given a unique ID, and pretest and posttest 
data were also uniquely identified. Appendix E shows a complete concept map and its 
corresponding spreadsheet data entry. 
Once all the concept maps were coded into spreadsheets, they were analyzed 
using the HIMATT (Highly Integrated Model Assessment Technology) methodology. 
HIMATT is an automated computer-based system that analyzes and compares the 
structural and semantic characteristics of concept maps (Pirnay-Dummer, Ifenthaler, & 
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Spector, 2009). While concept maps have been used to investigate conceptual change 
(e.g., Fellows, 1994; Hsu, 2008; Wallace, 1990), its scope of use in quantitative studies 
was limited mainly because of the amount of work involved in coding concept maps. 
Compared to other concept map analysis techniques (e.g., Novak & Gowin, 1984), the 
automated nature of HIMATT enables the ability to analyze large numbers of concept 
maps in a time-effective manner. For this study, HIMATT performed computer-based 
calculations and generated six scores for each student-created concept map, representing 
six dimensions of a concept map (Eseryel, Ifenthaler, Ge, Law, & Guo, 2009). Four of 
the six dimensions – Surface, Graphical, Gamma, and Structural Matching, together 
compared the structure of a concept map with that of an expert. The other two 
dimensions – Concept and Propositional Matching, measured the semantic similarities 
between a student’s concept map and an expert’s map. In this particular study, student-
generated concept maps were compared against an expert concept map that was based on 
Yuruk’s (2005) study (see Appendix F for the expert concept map). The comparison 
resulted in six matching indexes which ranged from 0 to 1.  
An explanation of each HIMATT dimension is provided below. For detailed 
information about the HIMATT and its six dimensions, refer to Eseryel, et al. (2009), 
Ifenthaler (2008), Kopainsky, Pirnay-Dummer, & Alessi (2010), and Pirnay-Dummer 
(2010).   
1. Surface matching: The surface value represents the number of links (between two 
concepts) within a concept map. Among the three concept maps in Figure 8, A 
has one link, and therefore its surface value is 1. B has a total of 4 links, and 
therefore B’s surface value is 4. C’s surface value is 7 (a total of 7 links). Surface 
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value is a simple and easy indicator of a map’s surface complexity by showing 
how large a concept map (representing a mental model) is. Surface Matching is 
obtained by comparing the surface value of a concept map with that of an expert 
map. 
 
Figure 8. Three example concept maps. 
Reprinted from “Automated assessment of learners’ understanding in complex dynamic 
systems,” by B. Kopainsky, P. Pirnay-Dummer, & S. Alessi, 2010, Paper presented at the 
28th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, Seoul, Korea, p.13. 
2. Graphical matching: The graphical value calculates the diameters of the spanning 
trees of a map. A diameter is “the quantity of links of the shortest path between 
the most distant nodes” in a map (Ifenthaler, 2008, p. 86). For the concept map B 
in Figure 8, its graphical value is 3 (C1-C4-C5-C3). For a concept map with 
cycles (or loops) inside (e.g., concept map C in Figure 8), HIMATT would 
remove the loops when calculating the graphical value so that the map’s 
complexity would not be discounted because of the presence of the loops. 
Graphical value is an indicator of the range of conceptual knowledge displayed in 
a map, or the “width” of a map. Graphical Matching is obtained by calculating 
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the similarity index between the graphical value of a concept map and that of an 
expert map. 
3. Gamma matching: The gamma value is calculated as the number of nodes per link 
within a graph. In Figure 9, concept map A’s gamma value is 2 (6 nodes, 3 links) 
and B’s gamma value is 0.4 (6 nodes, 15 links). Gamma value is an indicator of 
the density, or the internal connectedness of a concept map. In Figure 9, concept 
map A only connects pairs of concepts, and map B connects every concept with 
all the other concepts (everything with everything). Both types of concept maps 
are considered weak mental models, and therefore a medium density is expected 
for most good working models. Gamma Matching is obtained by calculating the 
similarity index between the gamma value of a concept map and that of an expert 
map. 
 
Figure 9. Two concept maps illustrating Gamma Matching.  
Reprinted from “Automated assessment of learners’ understanding in complex dynamic 
systems,” by B. Kopainsky, P. Pirnay-Dummer, & S. Alessi, 2010, Paper presented at the 
28th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, Seoul, Korea, p.18. 
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4. Structural matching: Structural value represents the overall structure of the map 
regardless of the content. It is the most complex structural measure among the 
four HIMATT structural measures (Pirnay-Dummer, 2010). It detects the 
differences between two maps that other structural measures are not capable of 
detecting. For example, the three concept maps in Figure 10 have the same 
surface and graphical values (5 and 3 respectively), which means that the two 
measures cannot distinguish the structural differences which are clear to human 
eyes. However, the structural index is able to distinguish the difference. The 
structural index “retraces every structural component and analyzes the structure 
based on the basis of its parts” (Pirnay-Dummer, 2010, p. 239). Because of the 
exponential complexity involved in its calculation, Structural Matching is limited 
to analyzing concept maps of small or moderate size. Given that the concept 
mapping task in the current study only involved 10 concepts, this measure worked 
well for the study.  
 
Figure 10. Comparison of three concept maps.  
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Reprinted from “Automated assessment of learners’ understanding in complex dynamic 
systems,” by B. Kopainsky, P. Pirnay-Dummer, & S. Alessi, 2010, Paper presented at the 
28th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, Seoul, Korea, p.16. 
 
Structural Matching accounts for the internal structure of a concept map – how 
different concepts are integrated in one’s mental model. It is a good indicator of 
the extent to which a map demonstrates expert-level knowledge structure. 
According to Kopainsky et al. (2010), this measure is necessary for studies with 
assumptions that expert knowledge is structured differently from novice 
knowledge. The measure was shown to predict expertise (Pirnay-Dummer, 2010). 
On the other hand, one should keep in mind that the measure is about graphical 
structure only – it does not account for any semantic aspects of a concept map. 
5. Concept matching: Concept Matching counts how many concepts are alike 
between two concept maps. It determines the differences in language use between 
models and shows the semantic correctness of a concept map. Since in the current 
study students constructed concept maps using the same 10 pre-assigned concepts 
provided to them, the Concept Matching measure was of little value to the study. 
6. Propositional matching: Propositional Matching searches for and compares only 
fully identical propositions (concept-link-concept) between two concept maps. 
For example, if in the expert concept map two concepts unbalanced forces and 
changing speed are linked to each other, and if the two concepts are also linked in 
a student concept map, then there is a match between the two concept maps in this 
particular proposition. Propositional Matching is an indicator of the semantic 
similarity between two concept maps.  
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The six HIMATT measures have been used to study how learners’ externalized 
cognitive structures develop over time or change as a result of instructional interventions 
(e.g., Eseryel, et al., 2009; Ifenthaler, 2010; Ifenthaler, Masduki, & Seel, 2009). The 
reliability and validity of the HIMATT measures have been established in past studies 
(e.g., Eseryel, et al., 2009; Ifenthaler, 2010).  
Of note particularly are the multiple measures of the HIMATT technology. Other 
concept mapping assessment techniques such as the method suggested by Novak and 
Gowin (1984) typically measure four aspects of concept maps: (a) presence of relevant 
concepts, which is said to indicate the breadth of the concept; (b) propositional linkages, 
which are said to represent the interconnectedness or complexity of knowledge; (c) the 
number of levels emanating from the center node, which is said to represent the depth of 
knowledge; and (d) misconceptions, which is based on identifications of any 
misconceptions present in a concept map (Miller et al., 2009; Novak, 1991). Compared 
with these measures, the HIMATT technique measures some additional dimensions that 
otherwise might not be detected, e.g., the Structural Matching index.  
As explained earlier, since the Concept Matching index was of little meaning to 
the current study, Concept Matching was eliminated from further data analysis. As a 
result, there were only five measures (Surface, Graphical, Gamma, Structural, and 
Propositional Matching) to examine students’ cognitive structure.  
For the multiple-choice conceptual tests, since the last three parts of the sixth 
investigation were eliminated, three questions (#15, 17, 18) that were related to the 
eliminated parts were removed from the original test. Students’ pretest and posttest were 
scored based on the remaining 15 items. The total possible points for the conceptual test 
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were 15, with 1 point for each correct answer. Since this study focused on conceptual 
change which represented radical restructuring of one’s initial conceptual framework, 
those students who held considerable misconceptions were of main interest in the study. 
In introducing a frequently used instrument to measure force and motion concepts – the 
Force Concept Inventory (FCI), Hestenes et al. (1992) suggested that only those students 
who scored less than 60% would qualify as a valid sample. Referencing to this approach, 
one student who scored above 60% in the multiple-choice conceptual test was removed 
from further data analysis. 41 students remained as the valid samples for the pilot study. 
For the two EB instruments, reverse items were re-coded and the subtotals for 
each factor were calculated. For the general EB survey, the total scores were also 
calculated. 
After all the data were cleaned, scored, and coded, the following variables for 
each student were compiled in the final SPSS data file: (a) treatment group, (b) multiple-
choice conceptual test scores (pretest and posttest), (c) concept mapping test scores (five 
dimensions; pretest and posttest), (d) general EB survey scores (overall and five 
subscales), (e) science EB survey scores (four subscales; pretest and posttest).  
Preliminary Data Analysis 
 Because intact classes were used in this pilot study without real random 
assignment of each student to the two treatment groups, preliminary analyses were 
conducted to ensure that the two classes were comparable in all the pretest measures.  
 To examine whether the two treatment groups had any significant difference in 
the multiple-choice conceptual pretest, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted. The ANOVA was not significant, F(1, 33) = .36, p = .55.  
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 To examine whether the two treatment groups had any significant difference in 
the concept mapping pretest, a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
was conducted. No significant multivariate difference was found between the two 
treatment groups, Wilk’s Λ = .86, F(5, 28) = .95, p = .47. Analysis of variances (ANOVA) 
on each HIMATT measure did not show any significant group difference.  
 To examine whether the two treatment groups had any significant difference in 
the science EB pretest, a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted. No significant multivariate difference was found, Wilk’s Λ = .90, F(4, 27) 
= .71, p = .59. Analysis of variances (ANOVA) on each individual measure did not show 
any significant group difference.  
 Overall, the preliminary data analysis did not reveal any pretest difference 
between the two treatment groups across all the dependent variables in this study, which 
led to the conclusion that before the intervention, the two groups were about equal on the 
dependent variables under investigation.  
Data Analysis 
Table 4 summarizes the data sources and data analysis approaches for each of the 
three research questions. Results of each research question are reported thereafter.  
Table 4  
Pilot Study Data Analysis Framework 
Research Questions Data Sources Data Analysis 
1. Which instructional 
approach promotes better 
conceptual change in 
science: simulation-
based inquiry learning or 
metaconceptually-
enhanced simulation-
based inquiry learning? 
• Scores on multiple-
choice conceptual 
pretest and posttest 
• Scores on concept 
mapping pretest and 
posttest (5 dimensions) 
Repeated-measures ANOVA (for 
multiple-choice conceptual tests) 
and repeated-measures MANOVA 
with follow-up repeated-measures 
ANOVA’s (for concept mapping 
tests): 
• Within-subject factor: time, 2 
levels (pretest and posttest) 
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• Between-subject factor: 
treatment group, 2 levels (SBI, 
META+SBI) 
 
2. Do students’ general 
epistemological beliefs 
have an effect on 
conceptual change 
during simulation-based 
inquiry learning as well 
as metaconceptually-
enhanced simulation-
based inquiry learning? 
 
• Total scores on general 
EB survey 
• Scores on multiple-
choice conceptual 
pretest and posttest 
 
Multiple regression 
• Predictors: conceptual pretest 
scores, general EB total, 
treatment group, and General 
EB x Treatment interaction 
term. 
• Dependent variables: multiple-
choice conceptual posttest 
scores 
 
3. Does each of the 
instructional approaches, 
simulation-based inquiry 
learning approach and 
metaconceptually-
enhanced simulation-
based inquiry learning 
approach, have an effect 
on students’ science 
epistemological beliefs 
respectively? 
 
• Scores on the science 
EB pretest and posttest: 
4 dimensions 
Repeated-measures MANOVA 
with follow-up repeated-measures 
ANOVA’s 
• Within-subject factor: time, 2 
levels (pretest and posttest) 
• Between-subject factor: 
treatment group, 2 levels (SBI, 
META+SBI) 
Question 1. Which instructional approach promotes better conceptual change in 
science: simulation-based inquiry learning or metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-
based inquiry learning? 
Since students’ conceptual change was measured with two instruments: a 
multiple-choice conceptual test and a concept mapping test, the students’ performance in 
the multiple-choice conceptual test was examined first. Table 5 presents the means and 
standard deviations for the conceptual tests.  
Table 5  
Means and Standard Deviations of Conceptual Test, Concept Mapping Test, and Science 
EB Survey in the Pilot Study 
Instrument  META+SBI SBI 
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Subscales Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest 
Multiple-Choice Conceptual Test 
 3.67 (1.45) 6.87 (3.02) 3.60 (2.37) 5.00 (2.71) 
Concept Mapping Test 
Surface .91 (.08) .93 (.08) .92 (.12) .88 (.13) 
Graphical  .80 (.18) .80 (.13) .75 (.23) .81 (.14) 
Structural .85 (.13) .81 (.22) .83 (.20) .98 (.06) 
Gamma .88 (.11) .93 (.12) .91 (.17) .90 (.09) 
Propositional .39 (.14) .41 (.19) .35 (.22) .34 (.18) 
Science EB 
Source 11.43(3.92) 7.50 (2.18) 10.40 (3.95) 11.30 (4.45) 
Certainty 10.21 (3.40) 7.64 (2.31) 11.40 (5.93) 11.10 (5.36) 
Develop 10.07 (3.08) 9.36 (4.14) 10.30 (3.06) 11.00 (4.55) 
Justify 15.50 (3.92) 17.93 (8.20) 15.90 (5.49) 17.90 (5.70) 
The mean scores of the META+SBI group increased from 3.67 in the pretest to 
6.87 in the posttest. Comparatively, the SBI group’s pretest and posttest mean scores 
were 3.60 and 5.00 respectively. From the descriptive data, it appears that both groups of 
students made improvement in the multiple-choice conceptual test from pretest and 
posttest, and that the META+SBI group seemed to achieve more than the SBI group.  
To statistically investigate the treatment effects on the students’ multiple-choice 
conceptual test, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with treatment group as a 
between-subject and time as a within-subject factor. Repeated-measures analysis allows 
researcher to examine change over time while controlling for variations in dependent 
variables due to individual difference (Stevens, 2002). In addition, repeated-measures 
analysis is more powerful and requires fewer subjects. This was especially advantageous, 
given that the pilot study did not have a large sample. Maulchy’s test indicated that the 
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assumption of sphericity was met, p > .05. The repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a 
significant main time effect, Wilk’s Λ = .63, F(1, 23) = 13.47, p < .01, partial η2 = .37, 
which suggested that students from both treatment groups made significant improvement 
from pretest to posttest. However, there was no significant main treatment effect, F(1, 23) 
= 1.56, p = .22, partial η2 = .06, nor significant Treatment x Time interaction effect, 
Wilk’s Λ = .92, F(1, 23) = 2.06, p = .16, partial η2 = .08.  
Students’ performance on the concept mapping tests was examined next. The two 
treatment groups’ pretest and posttest means on the five HIMATT measures are shown in 
Table 5. To statistically investigate the treatment effects on learners’ concept mapping 
performance, a repeated-measures MANOVA was conducted on the five HIMATT 
dimensions (Surface, Graphical, Structural, Gamma, and Propositional Matching). 
Multivariate analysis showed no significant treatment effect, Wilk’s Λ = .74, F(5, 19) = 
1.31, p = .30, no significant time effect, Wilk’s Λ = .83, F(5, 19) = .76, p = .59, nor 
Treatment x Time interaction effect, Wilk’s Λ = .64, F(5, 19) = 2.13, p = .11. Follow-up 
univariate tests indicated a significant Treatment x Time interaction effect on Structural 
Matching, F(1, 23) = 4.48, p < .05, η2 = .16. However, the interaction effect favored the 
SBI group. While the SBI group’s Structural Matching scores improved in the posttest, 
the META+SBI group decreased in performance.   
Question 2. Do students’ general epistemological beliefs have an effect on 
conceptual change during simulation-based inquiry learning as well as 
metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based inquiry learning? 
This question was intended to find out the impact of students’ general EB and 
their interaction with treatment groups on the students’ conceptual change learning 
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outcomes. Multiple linear regression analysis was performed to answer this question. 
Given the small sample size in this pilot study, it was not feasible to enter all the five 
dimensions of general EB as predictors. Therefore the sum total of all the five dimensions 
was entered as one single predictor. The General EB x Treatment interaction term was 
created by multiplying the total scores of the students’ general EB with the treatment 
group variable. Both general EB total and treatment group variable were centered in order 
to avoid multicollinearity. Visual inspections of residual errors suggested that the 
assumptions of linearity and homogeneity of variance were met. Kurtosis and skewness 
for each variable was within the reasonable range which indicated that the normality 
assumption was met. Regarding the multicollinearity assumption, tolerance statistics 
( > .10) and VIF values ( < 10) indicated that the assumption was met. 
Predictors of the students’ multiple-choice conceptual posttest scores were 
entered in the following hierarchical order: multiple-choice conceptual pretest score at 
the first level, general EB total at the second level, treatment group at the third level, and 
finally, the General EB x Treatment interaction at the fourth level. In the first step, pretest 
did not appear as a significant predictor, R2 = .05, adjusted R2 = .005, F(1,22) = 1.12, p = 
.30. In the second step with added general EB, the model was significant, R2 change = 
.35, F(1,21) = 6.89, p < .01. The effect size was large. Specifically, general EB was a 
significant predictor, b = -.16, p < .01, as well as pretest, b = .59, p < .05. In the third and 
fourth steps, treatment and General EB x Treatment interaction did not predict 
significantly over and above the previous models.  
Table 6 shows the correlations among the variables, and Table 7 provides a 
summary of the regression analysis.  
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Table 6  
Correlations between Regression Analysis Variables in the Pilot Study 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Posttest – .22 -.52** -.34 .28 
2. Pretest  – .23 -.03 .003 
3. General EB   – .02 -.01 
4. Treatment group    – -.22 
5. EB x Treatment     – 
** p < .01 
Table 7  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Conceptual 
Posttest in the Pilot Study 
Predictor B SE B β t p 
Step 1 (R2 = .05) 
     Pretest 
 
.36 
 
.34 
 
.22 
 
1.06 
 
.30 
Step 2 (R2 = .40, ΔR2 = .35) 
     Pretest 
     General EB 
.59 
-.16 
.29 
.05 
.36 
-.61 
2.07 
-3.48 
.051 
.002** 
Step 3 (R2 = .50, ΔR2 = .10) 
     Pretest 
     General EB 
     Treatment group 
.57 
-.15 
-1.94 
.27 
.04 
.98 
.35 
-.60 
-.32 
2.14 
-3.65 
-1.98 
.045* 
.002** 
.06 
Step 4 (R2 = .54, ΔR2 = .04) 
     Pretest 
     General EB 
     Treatment group 
     EB x Treatment 
.57 
-.15 
-1.65 
.11 
.26 
.04 
.99 
.08 
.35 
-.60 
-.27 
.21 
2.18 
-3.72 
-1.67 
1.33 
.042* 
.001** 
.11 
.20 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Research Question 3: Does each of the instructional approaches, simulation-
based inquiry learning approach and metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based 
inquiry learning approach, have an effect on students’ science epistemological beliefs 
respectively? 
Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations of the science EB across its four 
dimensions. To make comparison between the two treatment groups, a repeated-measures 
MANOVA was conducted on the four dimensions of science EB, with time as a within-
subject factor and treatment group as a between-subject factor. No significant main time 
or treatment effect was found at the multivariate level. However, there was a significant 
Treatment x Time interaction effect across the four science EB dimensions, Wilk’s Δ 
= .62, F(4,19) = 2.94, p < .05, η = .38. Univariate analysis on the Source dimension 
showed a significant Treatment x Time effect, F(1, 22) = 10.25, p < .01, η = .32. Figure 
11 shows the two treatment groups’ scores on the Source dimension from pretest and 
posttest. As can be seen, from pretest to posttest, while the SBI group’s mean scores 
slightly increased, the META+SBI group’s mean scores significantly decreased, 
approaching more mature beliefs.  
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Figure 11. Pilot study science EB Source dimension pretest and posttest means 
Additionally, univariate analysis on the Certainty dimension also found a 
significant Treatment x Time effect, F(1, 22) = 4.96, p < .05, η = .18, as well as a 
significant time effect, F(1, 22) = 7.92, p < .01, η = .27. From pretest to posttest, while 
both groups decreased in the Certainty belief mean scores, and the META+SBI group 
decreased significantly faster than the SBI group. Figure 12 shows the two treatment 
groups’ pretest and posttest means of the Certainty dimension. 
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Figure 12. Pilot study Certainty dimension pretest and posttest means  
To examine the pretest-posttest change of science EB within each individual 
treatment group, paired-sample t-tests were conducted within each treatment group 
(META+SBI or SBI). For the META+SBI group, the Source dimension in pretest (M = 
11.43, SD = 3.92) and posttest (M = 7.50, SD = 2.18) was significantly different, t (14) = 
4.13, p < .01. Similarly, the Certainty dimension was also significantly different between 
pretest (M = 10.21, SD = 3.40) and posttest (M = 7.64, SD = 2.31); t (15) = 3.78, p < .01. 
Since the lower the EB scores, the more mature the beliefs are, the META+SBI group 
students demonstrated significant improvement in their beliefs in the source and certainty 
of science knowledge. For the other two science EB dimensions – Develop and Justify, 
the META+SBI group did not show any significant pretest-posttest difference.  
For the SBI group, paired-sample t-tests did not find any significant pretest-
posttest difference across all the four science EB dimensions, which suggested that the 
students in the SBI condition did not show significant improvement in their science EB.  
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Discussion 
 This pilot study was conducted with the purpose of testing the instructional 
materials, instruments, and the procedure in order to identify any potential issues 
associated with the implementation in the main study. Additionally, the pilot study 
provided an opportunity to test the study design.  
Interpretations of the Pilot Study Findings 
Treatment effects on conceptual change. In this study, it was expected that the 
META+SBI group would perform better than the SBI group on the conceptual change 
measures, since the additional metaconceptual intervention on the META+SBI group was 
designed to prompt the students to become metaconceptually aware of their 
preconceptions and to continuously monitor and evaluate their thinking throughout their 
inquiry. The findings, however, did not confirm the positive effects of metaconceptual 
intervention. 
Particularly, this study found that the META+SBI group did not show better 
performance than the SBI group in the multiple-choice conceptual test. This finding 
seemed to conflict with what is indicated in the existing studies. While few existing 
studies have exclusively examined the effect of metaconceptual thinking on conceptual 
change and even fewer were conducted in a simulation-based inquiry learning 
environment, they nonetheless imply that engaging learners in examining and monitoring 
their own thinking had potential effects on conceptual change (Biemans & Simons, 1995; 
Hennessey, 2003; Tao & Gunstone, 1999a; Vosniadou, 2003). The unexpected finding 
might be partially related to the limitations of this pilot study, such as the META+SBI 
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students’ lack of engagement in answering metaconceptual questions. The limitations are 
detailed in a later section.  
Further, on the Structural Matching measure of the concept maps, while the SBI 
group performed better in the posttest, the META+SBI group declined in their 
performance. As described earlier, Structural Matching is a unique, complex measure of 
the HIMATT technology, which is able to detect structural differences that other 
structural measures such as Surface, Graphical, and Gamma Matching fail to capture. 
The measure accounts for the complete structure of a concept map, indicating how the 
integration of concepts in a concept map compares to that in an expert concept map 
(Pirnay-Dummer, 2010). Thus, the decrease of the META+SBI group in Structural 
Matching suggested that the structure of, or the organization of concepts in this group of 
students’ mental models moved further away from the expert model.  
One possible reason could be that, compared to the SBI group students, the 
students in the META+SBI group had to process additional metaconceptual information 
and answer additional metaconceptual questions during their inquiry process. Given that 
the metaconceptual intervention focused on individual concepts (e.g., “what is speeding 
up and how does speeding up show in a velocity-time graph?”) or the relationship 
between two concepts (e.g., balanced forces and at-rest object), the META+SBI group 
might have engaged their cognitive resources in constructing knowledge at the individual 
concept level, without sufficient time or cognitive resources to focus on the overall 
structure of the key concepts that they had learned. As a result, when the old knowledge 
structure was going through changes, the new structure was not yet forming into a 
coherent whole, resulting in the META+SBI students’ poorer performance. In 
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comparison, the SBI students only needed to focus on answering essential inquiry 
questions without having to allocate additional cognitive resources to process 
metaconceptual intervention, thus they might be able to spend more time and cognitive 
resources to consider the key concepts more broadly, which helped the students in this 
group to develop concept maps of more sophisticated structure. 
With regard to the effects of simulation-based inquiry learning on conceptual 
change, the significant time effect on the students’ conceptual test indicated that 
simulation-based inquiry was capable of reducing student misconceptions. The finding 
was consistent with some previous studies on the effects of inquiry learning on 
conceptual change (e.g., Smith, et al., 1992; B. Y. White, 1993). On the other hand, the 
SBI group’s performance in concept mapping indicated that simulation-based inquiry had 
limited effects on the students’ structural and semantic understanding of the relationships 
among the key concepts they had learned. 
Effects of general EB on conceptual change. This study confirmed, in a 
simulation-based inquiry learning environment, the important role of learners’ general 
EB in conceptual change, as students’ general EB emerged as a significant predictor for 
the multiple-choice conceptual posttest. The finding was consistent with the findings 
from previous studies (Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Windschitl, 1997; Windschitl & Andre, 
1998). In Windschitl and Andre’s (1998) study, for example, university students used 
computer simulations to learn biology topics. General EB was also treated as a composite 
variable. The study found that general EB was a significant predictor of students’ posttest 
scores. Thus the findings suggested that in a simulation-based inquiry learning 
environment, students’ beliefs about knowledge and learning affected the revision of their 
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misconceptions. Those students who believed that learning took effort and that 
knowledge was complex and subject to change tended to revise their misconceptions, 
which was demonstrated by higher conceptual test scores; while those who believed that 
learning required little effort and that knowledge was simple and certain were less likely 
to revise their ideas, which was indicated by lower conceptual test scores. 
On the other hand, however, the speculated interaction between general EB and 
treatment on conceptual change was not confirmed in this study. Some existing studies 
speculated the possible links between EB and metaconceptual thinking (Fulton & 
Kendeou, 2009; Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007). In particular, it was suspected that 
students who have more mature EB tended to exhibit more metaconceptual thinking. 
Following the exploratory studies, this study was intended to explore whether more 
epistemologically mature individuals would more likely benefit from metaconceptual 
intervention. However, the results of this study indicated that the treatment effect on 
students’ conceptual change did not vary according to students’ epistemological maturity. 
Treatment effects on science EB. This study sought to examine the effects of two 
treatment conditions (SBI and META+SBI) on the development of students’ science EB. 
With some studies suggesting the potential effects of metaconceptual thinking on science 
EB (Smith, et al., 2000; Wyre, 2007), it was expected that the META+SBI group would 
outperform the SBI group on the science EB measures. The findings appeared to support 
this expectation in two dimensions (Source and Certainty beliefs about science 
knowledge) on which the META+SBI group outperformed the SBI group. Given that the 
META+SBI students were only exposed to the metaconceptual intervention for a short 
period of time (about two weeks), their improvement in science EB was promising. 
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The metaconceptual intervention on the META+SBI group might help to explain 
the group’s improvement in their Source and Certainty beliefs about science knowledge. 
At the beginning of this study, the students learned from several stories how 
misconceptions might affect one’s thinking and how new evidence led to theory revisions 
in history. Throughout their investigations with simulations, the students were prompted 
to monitor and evaluate their ideas, reflect on any necessary revisions to their ideas, and 
elaborate their own theories based on investigations. Even for those students who did not 
write down their answers to some metaconceptual questions, they could have still 
processed the questions to a certain extent. The metaconceptual thinking that the students 
were engaged in during the inquiry process might have shattered the students’ beliefs that 
science knowledge comes from authority and that there is only one way to understand 
science. As a result, the students moved towards a more mature level of beliefs by 
recognizing that science knowledge comes from different sources and is subject to 
change.  
On the other hand, simulation-based inquiry did not seem to improve students’ 
science EB in this pilot study, as the students in the SBI group did not show any 
significant pretest-posttest difference in all the four science EB dimensions. This finding 
is contradictory to previous research findings, which suggested that immersing students 
in inquiry learning over a relatively longer period of time had potential to promote 
students’ development of science EB (Carey, et al., 1989; Conley, et al., 2004). 
Relatively short intervention time might be one reason for the contradictive findings. 
Compared with previous studies which lasted several weeks, semesters, or even years, 
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this two-week intervention might be too short to bring about significant changes in 
science EB. Some other possible reasons are detailed later in the limitations section. 
Limitations of Pilot Study 
 While the findings from this study provided some preliminary evidence to the 
three research questions, these findings should be interpreted with caution. The remainder 
of this section discusses the limitations, which can probably provide some explanations to 
the findings.  
First, the sample size of this pilot study was small. There were only 41 students 
participating in the study. Some of these students missed taking one or more instruments 
during pretest and/or posttest, resulting in even smaller samples for data analysis. The 
small sample size might have contributed to the inadequate power to reject null 
hypotheses. 
Secondly, the intended metaconceptual intervention plan was not fully 
implemented. Based on my class observations, interactions with individual students, and 
my examination of students’ responses, it was revealed that only about a third of the 
students answered some of the metaconceptual questions, another third answered very 
few questions, and the remaining third did not answer any questions at all. It was also 
observed that some students did not closely follow the simulation guide to run 
simulations or answer questions as required. In addition, some students indicated that 
they did not understand some of the questions, and therefore they did not know how to 
answer them. All these factors might have resulted in the failure of metaconceptual 
intervention to enhance simulation-based inquiry in this pilot study.  
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Finally, the portable computers (UMPCs) students used for their investigations 
were inconvenient to use. Battery outage and technical issues frequently distracted the 
students from focusing on their inquiry tasks. Furthermore, the small screen display of 
the computers and the use of a stylus to interact with the screen made it harder for the 
students to perform inquiry tasks that could have been much easier on a regular PC, such 
as window switching between the simulation window and the simulation guide window 
and running experiments with simulations. The challenge was greater for the META+SBI 
students who had to switch the windows more frequently in order to answer the 
metaconceptual questions.   
Additional Findings 
This section reports some additional findings based on my in-class observations 
of student learning, which helped to improve the design of the main study.  
First, it was observed that, as they approached the inquiry tasks, the students from 
both groups lacked systematic understanding that predictions, experiments, and 
explanations were logical procedures that are meaningfully linked to each other. They 
probably treated each of the steps as a discrete and separate procedure without making 
the effort to think about the relationships among all the steps. A considerable number of 
students approached their inquiry tasks in a haphazard manner. In other words, the 
students were not actively and seriously engaged in hypothesis testing, but rather they 
were in a “free play” mode. Similar findings were reported by Vosniadou et al. (2001), 
who stated that students were often not aware that their ideas were in fact hypothetical 
theories that were subject to verification and falsification.  
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The second observation was that the students in both treatment groups 
demonstrated a lack of awareness that the computer simulations helped them to test 
predictions, examine how one variable is related to other variables, and to infer theories 
based on simulation results. The lack of participation or only partial participation in their 
inquiry and sense-making processes might have contributed to the students’ lack of 
development in their science EB, especially on the development and justification of 
science knowledge. 
Third, it was found that the individual students worked at a difference pace, which 
made it difficult for me to guide all the students through the same inquiry process. In the 
original plan, it was decided that the inquiry learning would take a teacher-guided 
approach so that the students would be held more accountable for conducting the inquiry 
tasks. While this format worked well on Day 2, it became clear on Day 3 that it was 
difficult to keep all the students at the same pace. Because all the information was 
available in the web-based simulation guide, some students chose to work ahead or 
behind at their own pace without following my leading. Therefore, the two science 
teachers and I decided to change teacher-guided inquiry to individual inquiry by 
following the self-study guide. After several days of self study, however, it was observed 
that the students’ motivation dropped. This was similar to White and Gunstone’s (1989) 
findings that students’ motivation and engagement dropped when a particular teaching 
format was used too long. White and Gunstone (1989) suggested bringing variations to 
the  teaching procedure to sustain students’ engagement. My informal conversations with 
the students also confirmed that they preferred alternating between teacher-led format 
and self-study format. 
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Lessons Learned and Potential Modifications in the Main Study 
 Based on the findings from the pilot study I have summarized the lessons learned. 
One of the major lessons learned was that the metaconceptual intervention needs to be 
further strengthened, and the science inquiry process must be further enhanced. 
Additional modeling and scaffolding were needed to help students really treat their 
conceptions as the object of thinking (Murphy & Mason, 2006), and to make predictions, 
carry out experiments, and interpret findings in a systematic manner. Several 
modifications were planned for the main study that is presented in the next chapter: 
1. To help students of both treatment groups to understand science inquiry, establish the 
systematic link between predictions, experiments, and conclusions, and understand 
the role of simulations in inquiry activities, I would guide students through a 
simulation-based mini-inquiry at the beginning, through which they would experience 
how to start from a prediction, use simulation to test their prediction, and draw 
conclusions based on the findings.  
2. To help the META+SBI students develop the habit and skills to reflect on their 
conceptual understanding and answer metaconceptual questions, I would conduct a 
mini-inquiry activity with additional metaconceptual questions and lead the first 
investigation myself in order to provide more modeling. In both cases, I would model 
and guide the students in answering the metaconceptual questions.  
3. To address some students’ misunderstanding and confusion about some of the 
metaconceptual questions, all the metaconceptual questions were to be further 
reviewed and revised by myself and two science teachers to be used for the main 
study.   
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4. To help the META+SBI students understand that one’s conceptions are subject to 
testing and can be proven false, I would introduce more historical examples to 
illustrate how some common misconceptions in human history were proved to be 
wrong, for example, the flat earth misconception.  
5. To remedy situations where students did not correctly follow instructions to conduct 
experiments, which possibly affected the intended results and their responses to 
subsequent questions, a video clip showing the correct way to run a simulation 
experiment was to be provided on the subsequent page of each experiment for the 
main study. 
6. To reduce the inefficiency and interference caused by the need to frequently switch 
between the simulation window and the simulation guide window, it was decided that 
the observation part of the simulation guide was to be provided in a handout. By 
doing this, the students would be able to focus as they conduct simulation 
experiments  
7. To encourage students’ engagement in the simulated inquiry process and to increase 
their on-task behavior, the main study would map out a plan to alternate between 
instructor-guided and self-study formats for both treatment groups. By switching 
between reading from a computer and listening to the teacher, the students would 
likely pay more attention to the content and tasks.  
8. To ensure an appropriate amount of learning, the last three parts of the sixth 
investigation and their corresponding test questions were eliminated. As a result, the 
new conceptual test consisted of 15 items.  
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CHAPTER 4: MAIN STUDY 
Participants and Context 
 The research participants were 151 eighth-grade students from a different middle 
school in the same school district as the middle school where I conducted the pilot study. 
Therefore, the two schools shared the same curriculum. However, there were some 
differences in the teaching approaches between the two schools. While the students in the 
pilot study had been exposed more to inquiry-based learning (e.g., the prediction – 
observation – explanation inquiry cycle), the students in the main study had less 
experience with inquiry learning; the instruction was mainly dominated by lectures.  
The students in the main study came from eight regular science classes in the 
middle school. The eight classes took place during four school hours: the first and the 
second hour in the morning, and the seventh and the eighth hour in the afternoon. Each 
hour had two classes that were combined and co-taught by two science teachers.  
According to the two science teachers, the academic levels of all the eight classes 
were about the same. Therefore, the eight classes were randomly assigned to two 
experimental conditions according to school hours. Four classes with a total of 73 
students from the first and the seventh hours were assigned to the SBI condition, and the 
other four classes with a total of 78 students from the second and the eighth hours were 
assigned to the META+SBI condition.  
Instructional Materials and Intervention 
While the computer simulations were the same as those in the pilot study, some 
changes were made to the simulation guide and the intervention based on the experience 
learned from the pilot study. The changes are highlighted in the description below.  
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Simulation Guide 
Several changes have been made to the simulation guide. First, to ensure that the 
students complete all the investigations within the allocated time for this study, the last 
three parts of the sixth investigation on Connecting force and motion were removed from 
the original simulation guide. Second, to avoid frequent switches between the simulation 
window and the simulation guide window, the observation sections, which instructed 
students to conduct simulation experiments, were removed from the web-based 
simulation guide and presented to the students in paper format instead. Third, after the 
students completed each simulation experiment, a video demonstration on the proper way 
to conduct the experiment was made available on the subsequent web page. In this way 
those students who did not conduct the experiment appropriately still had a chance to see 
the correct way to conduct it. Finally, to avoid distraction, for all the teacher-guided 
investigations, the entire instructional information was removed from the corresponding 
simulation guide, leaving only the original questions and input boxes for the students to 
type their answers. 
Additional Interventions  
Additional interventions were introduced to both treatment groups in the main 
study. For the SBI group, additional mini-inquiries were introduced after the pretests and 
before the students started the first investigation. The purpose of the mini-inquiries was 
for the students to further understand the science inquiry process and the role of 
simulations in science inquiry. During the mini-inquiries, I guided the students to use a 
computer simulation, Mouse Genetics, to explore genetic topics. The simulation was 
developed by the ExploreLearning Company (http://www.explorelearning.com/). At the 
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beginning, the simulation interface showed a pure white mouse and a pure black mouse, 
and the students were asked to predict what the two mice’s offspring would look like and 
write down their predictions on a piece of paper. After a brief class discussion of the 
students’ predictions, I ran the simulation Mouse Genetics on a projector screen to breed 
the two mice. The students observed the simulation results and recorded their findings. 
After a second brief discussion of the simulation findings, the students were asked to go 
through a second mini-inquiry by predicting the offspring of a pure white mouse and a 
hybrid black mouse, observing the simulation, and recording the findings. At the end, I 
led the students to reason how predictions, experiments, and conclusions worked together 
in science inquiry and how simulations helped to support the inquiries.   
For the students in the META+SBI group, two additional interventions were 
introduced. First, more examples were provided to the students illustrating how some 
misconceptions in the history of science were later proved to be wrong. The purpose of 
introducing these examples was to raise the students’ awareness of science 
misconceptions and the need to question, test, and refute them. Three historically 
renowned misconceptions were introduced and refuted with simulations or examples: (a) 
when being dropped, a heavy ball travels faster than a light ball; (b) a heavier pendulum 
bob causes shorter pendulum period; (c) the earth is flat.  
The second additional intervention to the META+SBI group was the Mouse 
Genetics mini-inquiries. The mini-inquiries were conducted in the same way as in the 
SBI group, except for the additional metaconceptual questions that the students had to 
answer during the inquiry. For example, when making predictions, the students were also 
asked to explain the reasons for their predictions. After a simulation experiment, the 
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students were asked to verbalize whether their predictions were supported by the 
experiment, in addition to recording their findings. Finally, at the end of the inquiry, the 
students were also asked to state whether there was any change to their initial ideas. 
Throughout the process, I provided guidance and modeling to help the students answer 
the metaconceptual questions. In addition, the students were able to share and discuss 
their answers during class discussions.  
Format of Learning 
To encourage students’ engagement in learning and to increase their on-task 
behavior, the format of learning alternated between teacher-guided inquiry and students’ 
independent inquiries. During the independent inquiry sessions, the students were 
informed at the beginning that their goal was to develop their own theories about the 
topics addressed in a specific investigation. The students then worked individually on 
their computers to read through the simulation guide, perform experiments by following 
the paper handout, and answer questions when necessary.  
During the teacher-guided investigations, the instructional text was removed from 
the original simulation guide, leaving only the original questions and input boxes. I 
presented the instructions to the students. When it was necessary to conduct an 
experiment with simulation, the students ran the simulation individually on their own 
computers by following the paper handout. When students were required to answer 
questions, I verbally asked the questions to the students, and the students would then type 
and submit their answers from the simulation guide web page.  
Special effort was made to help the students adjust to the new learning 
environment. During the first investigation, which was a teacher-guided session, I 
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provided more scaffolding to both treatment groups by walking the students through the 
investigation, explaining questions to the students, and demonstrating the appropriate 
ways to answer the questions.  
Instruments 
 The same four instruments used in the pilot study were also used in the main 
study: (a) concept mapping test, (b) multiple-choice conceptual test, (c) general EB 
survey, and (d) science EB survey. The concept mapping test and the multiple-choice 
conceptual test were administered three times in the study: pretest, posttest, and delayed 
posttest which took place four weeks later. Additionally, the students took the science EB 
survey twice, one as pretest and the other as posttest. Finally, the general EB survey was 
conducted once at the beginning of the study.  
Procedure 
 The procedure of the main study was similar to that in the pilot study. The study 
lasted a total of 10 days, with one 45-minute session per day. On Day 1 and part of Day 2, 
the students took all the four instruments. For the rest of Day 2, the SBI group went 
through the mini-inquiries introduced earlier, and the META+SBI group went through 
the same mini-inquiries but received additional metaconceptual intervention as described 
earlier. 
From Day 3 to Day 9, the students worked on the six investigations. All students 
had laptop PCs on which they could launch the simulation required for the day and log on 
to the simulation guide website corresponding to their treatment conditions. Each day 
began with my review of the main points from the previous days. Among all the six 
investigations, the first, third, and sixth were led by me, and the students independently 
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conducted the other three investigations by following the web-based simulation guide.  
 On Day 10, after a brief final review, the students took three posttests: concept 
mapping, multiple-choice, and science EB posttests. About four weeks later, I returned to 
the school, and the students took two delayed knowledge tests: concept mapping and 
multiple-choice conceptual tests. The two science teachers informed me that during the 
four-week period, they did not re-teach any content covered during the intervention to 
any of the eight classes. All the classes moved on to the next unit on force and motion 
which was about momentum. In the new unit occasionally there was some opportunity 
for the students to apply what they had learned from the intervention, but the opportunity 
was equal in all the eight classes, as the two teachers continued to co-teach all the classes. 
Results 
Coding and Scoring 
 Upon an examination of the students’ attendance records, 12 students were 
removed from the dataset because they missed at least three out of eight learning sessions 
which were considered a significant portion of learning. The remaining 139 students 
constituted the valid sample for further data analysis. 
The student-generated concept map data were first transformed to an Excel 
spreadsheet and then were analyzed using the HIMATT technology (Ifenthaler, 2008; 
Pirnay-Dummer, et al., 2009). Each concept map was compared with the expert concept 
map, generating five HIMATT measures for data analysis: Surface, Graphical, Gamma, 
Structural Matching (i.e., structural measures), and Propositional Matching (i.e., 
semantic measure).   
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The multiple-choice conceptual pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest were graded. 
Similar to the pilot study, one student who scored more than 60% on the multiple-choice 
conceptual pretest was removed from the dataset (Hestenes, et al., 1992). The remaining 
138 students constituted the valid sample for the study.   
For the general EB and science EB surveys, reverse items were re-coded, and 
subscale scores as well as the total scores of the general EB were calculated.   
The following variables for each student were compiled and entered in the SPSS 
statistical analysis software: (a) treatment group, (b) multiple-choice conceptual test 
scores (pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest), (c) concept mapping test scores (by 
dimensions; pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest), (d) general EB survey scores (overall 
and by dimensions), (e) science EB scores (by dimensions; pretest and posttest).  
Preliminary Data Analysis 
 Since intact classes were used in the main study, preliminary data analyses were 
conducted to determine if there was any significant difference between the two treatment 
groups in the pretest. 
An ANOVA was conducted to examine whether the two treatment groups had any 
significant differences in the multiple-choice conceptual pretest. The result showed that 
there were no significant differences between the two groups in the conceptual pretest, 
F(1, 133) = 3.32, p = .07.  
A one-way MANOVA was conducted on the five HIMATT measures to examine 
whether the two treatment groups had any significant differences in the concept mapping 
pretest. Similar to the conceptual test, no significant multivariate differences were found, 
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Wilk’s Λ = .98, F(5, 130) = .51, p = .77. ANOVA on each of the five HIMATT 
dimensions did not reveal any significant group difference.  
Likewise, a one-way MANOVA was conducted to examine whether the two 
treatment groups had any significant difference in the science EB pretest. Significant 
difference was found between the two groups, Wilk’s Λ = .87, F(4, 129) = 5.08, p < .01. 
Univariate analyses revealed significant group differences in three of the four science EB 
dimensions: Certainty,  F(1, 132) = 12.10, p < .01, η2 = .08, Development, F(1, 132) = 
14.48, p < .01, η2 = .10, and Justification, F(1, 132) = 10.83, p < .01, η2 = .08. 
Specifically, the META+SBI group had significantly lower scores on the three 
dimensions than the SBI group, suggesting that the META+SBI group had significantly 
more mature beliefs about the certainty, development, and justification of science 
knowledge at the beginning of the study. 
Because of the group difference in science EB, it became worthwhile to explore 
whether the two groups also differed significantly in their general EB. Thus a MANOVA 
was conducted on the five general EB dimensions: speed of knowledge acquisition, 
structure of knowledge, knowledge construction and modification, characteristics of 
successful students, and attainability of objective truth. There was no significant 
multivariate difference between the two groups, Wilk’s Λ = .96, F(5,127) = 1.09, p = .37. 
Follow-up univariate tests found significant differences between the two groups in one of 
the dimensions – knowledge construction and modification, F(1,131) = 4.54, p < .05. The 
students in the META+SBI group held more mature beliefs about knowledge 
construction and modification than the students in the SBI group. However, the results 
indicated that the two groups’ general EB did not differ as much as in science EB.  
119 
 
Later communications with the two science teachers indicated that the more 
mature science EB of the META+SBI group was probably because more students from 
the META+SBI classes were enrolled in an optional high school biology class than the 
students from the SBI classes were. The biology class might have contributed to the more 
advanced development of science EB in the META+SBI group due to more enrollments 
in the biology class.  
Overall, the preliminary data analyses suggested that, while the two treatment 
groups did not differ in content knowledge, they differed significantly in science EB. 
This difference was taken into account when performing the subsequent data analyses.   
Data Analysis 
Given the pretest differences between the two treatment groups in science EB, it 
was decided that two sets of analyses would be conducted, with or without pretest science 
EB as a covariate, in order to obtain thorough understanding to the first research question 
and to examine the possible influence of science EB on students’ conceptual change. To 
investigate the third research question, the science EB pretest was used as a covariate in 
the analysis in order to directly examine the treatment effect on science EB. Table 8 
summarizes the data sources and data analysis approaches for each of the research 
questions. 
Table 8.  
Main Study Data Analysis Framework 
Research Questions Data Sources Data Analysis 
1. Which instructional 
approach promotes 
better conceptual 
change in science: 
simulation-based 
• Scores on multiple-
choice conceptual 
pretest, posttest, and 
delayed posttest 
• Scores on concept 
Repeated-measures 
ANOVA/ANCOVA (for 
multiple-choice conceptual 
tests); Repeated-measures 
MANOVA/MANCOVA with 
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inquiry learning or 
metaconceptually-
enhanced simulation-
based inquiry 
learning? 
mapping pretest, 
posttest, and delayed 
posttest (5 
dimensions) 
• Science EB pretest 
total 
 
follow-up repeated measures 
ANOVA/ANCOVA (for 
concept mapping tests) 
• Within-subject factor: time, 
3 levels (pretest, posttest, 
and delayed posttest) 
• Between-subject factor: 
treatment group, 2 levels 
(SBI, META+SBI) 
• Covariate: science EB 
pretest total 
 
2. Do students’ general 
epistemological beliefs 
have an effect on 
conceptual change 
during simulation-
based inquiry learning 
as well as 
metaconceptually-
enhanced simulation-
based inquiry 
learning? 
• Scores on general EB 
survey (5 dimensions) 
• Scores on multiple-
choice conceptual 
pretest and posttest 
 
 
Multiple linear regression 
• Predictors: pretest scores, 5 
general EB dimensions, 
treatment group, and 
General EB x Treatment 
• Dependent variables: 
multiple-choice conceptual 
posttest  
3. Does each of the 
instructional 
approaches, 
simulation-based 
inquiry learning 
approach and 
metaconceptually-
enhanced simulation-
based inquiry learning 
approach, have an 
effect on students’ 
science 
epistemological beliefs 
respectively? 
 
• Scores on the science 
EB pretest and 
posttest (4 
dimensions) 
• Science EB pretest 
total 
MANCOVA with follow-up 
ANCOVA 
• Grouping variable: 
treatment group 
• Dependent variable: science 
EB posttest scores on 4 
dimensions 
• Covariate: science EB 
pretest total 
Research Question 1: Which instructional approach promotes better conceptual 
change in science: simulation-based inquiry learning or metaconceptually-enhanced 
simulation-based inquiry learning? 
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Students’ performances in the multiple-choice conceptual test were examined first. 
Table 9 presents the means and standard deviations of the conceptual tests.  
Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations of Conceptual Test and Concept Mapping Test 
Instruments/ 
Dimensions 
META+SBI SBI 
Pretest Posttest Delayed Pretest Posttest Delayed
Conceptual Test 
 4.25  (1.98) 
9.09 
(3.42) 
8.42 
(3.23) 
3.79  
(1.53) 
6.15 
(2.89) 
5.25 
(2.77) 
Concept Map Assessment 
Surface .93(.10) .95(.09) .94(.09) .93(.10) .94(.10) .95(.07)
Graphical .78(.16) .77(.17) .82(.14) .78(.13) .83(.13) .82(.14)
Structural .79(.16) .79(.17) .85(.16) .83(.15) .88(.14) .87(.16)
Gamma .92(.12) .93(.12) .93(.10) .92(.12) .93(.11) .94(.09)
Propositional .45(.18) .56(.20) .55(.23) .48(.18) .55(.22) .55(.22)
The mean scores of the SBI group for the pretest, posttest, and delayed posttest 
were 3.79, 6.15, and 5.25 respectively. The means scores of the META+SBI group were 
4.25, 9.09, and 8.42 respectively. The descriptive data suggested that both treatment 
groups made significant improvement, but that the META+SBI group seemed to gain 
more than the SBI group. 
To statistically investigate the treatment effect, a repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted on students’ multiple-choice conceptual tests, with the treatment group as a 
between-subject and time as a within-subject factor. Maulchy’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity was met, p > .05. There was a significant main time effect, 
Wilk’s Λ = .40, F(2, 113) = 85.97, p < .01, η2 = .60, a significant treatment effect, F(1, 
114) = 28.49, p < .01, η2 = .20, and a significant Treatment x Time interaction effect, 
Wilk’s Λ = .80, F(2, 113) = 14.42, p < .01, η2 = .20. As shown in Figure 13, both groups 
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made significant improvement as a result of the intervention, and the META+SBI group 
made significantly more progress than the SBI group. 
 
Figure 13. Main study multiple-choice conceptual test performance. 
To take into account the difference of the two treatment groups in the science EB 
pretest, a repeated-measures ANCOVA was conducted using the pretest science EB total 
score as a covariate. A preliminary analysis indicated that the homogeneity-of-slopes 
assumption was met, F(1,110) = .05, p = .82. Maulchy’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity was met, p > .05. There was a significant main time effect, 
Wilk’s Λ = .81, F(2, 110 ) = 12.83, p < .01, η2 = .19, a significant treatment effect, F(1, 
111) = 15.96, p < .01, η2 = .13, and a significant Treatment x Time effect, Wilk’s Λ = .85, 
F(2, 110) = 9.91, p < .01, η2 = .15. Therefore the main time, treatment, and Treatment x 
Time effects remained significant even after the difference in science EB pretest was 
controlled. 
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Descriptive data for the concept mapping tests are displayed in Table 9. To 
statistically investigate the treatment effect on students’ concept mapping performance, a 
repeated-measures MANOVA was conducted on the five HIMATT dimensions, with 
treatment group as a between-subject and time as a within-subject factor. Box’s M test 
indicated that the homogeneity assumption was met (Box’s M = 154.19, p > .05). 
Multivariate test showed significant main time effect, Wilk’s Λ = .79, F(10,108) = 2.80, 
p < .01, η2 = .21. There was no significant treatment or Treatment x Time effect. 
Follow-up univariate tests indicated significant effects on three dimensions: 
Propositional Matching, Graphical Matching, and Structural Matching. The first 
dimension, Propositional Matching, showed a significant time effect, F(2,234) = 8.83, p 
< .01, η2 = .07. Figure 14 shows that both groups of students made significant 
improvement in Propositional Matching in the posttest.  
 
Figure 14. Main study concept mapping test performance in Propositional Matching 
124 
 
The second dimension, Graphical Matching, also showed significant time effect, 
F(2,234) = 4.56, p < .05, η2 = .04. As shown in Figure 15, the two treatment groups 
exhibited different trends, although the Treatment x Time interaction was not statistically 
significant. SBI group made significant improvement in the posttest, but declined slightly 
in the delayed posttest. Comparatively, the performance of the META+SBI group 
decreased in the posttest, but then significantly improved in the delayed posttest.  
 
Figure 15. Main study concept mapping performance in Graphical Matching 
The third dimension, Structural Matching, showed significant time effect, 
F(2,236) = 5.54, p < .01, η2 = .05, treatment effect, F(1,117) = 4.71, p < .05, η2 = .04, 
and Treatment x Time effect, F(2,234) = 3.19, p < .05, η2 = .03. As Figure 16 illustrates, 
SBI group made major improvement in Structural Matching in the posttest, and then 
declined slightly in the delayed posttest. Comparatively, the META+SBI group declined 
slightly in the posttest, and then increased significantly in the delayed posttest. As 
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demonstrated, the trend of the two treatment groups on the Structural Matching 
dimension was similar to that of the Graphical Matching dimension. 
 
Figure 16. Main study concept mapping performance in Structural Matching 
Considering the two treatment groups’ significant differences in the science EB 
pretest, a repeated-measures MANCOVA was conducted with students’ total score of the 
science EB pretest as a covariate. No significant time, treatment, or Treatment x Time 
effect was found. Follow-up univariate tests did not find any significant effect.  
Research Question 2: Do students’ general epistemological beliefs have an effect 
on conceptual change during simulation-based inquiry learning as well as 
metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based inquiry learning? 
Multiple linear regression analysis was performed to answer this question. Before 
conducting multiple regression, visual inspections of residual errors suggested that the 
assumptions of linearity and homogeneity of variance were met. Kurtosis and skewness 
for each variable was within the reasonable range which indicated that the normality 
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assumption was met. Regarding the multicollinearity assumption, tolerance statistics 
( > .10) and VIF values ( < 10) indicated that the assumption was met. 
Predictors of the students’ multiple-choice conceptual posttest scores were 
entered in the following hierarchical order: pretest score, scores on the five general EB 
dimensions, treatment group, and General EB x Treatment interaction term. In the first 
step, the pretest was a significant predictor of the conceptual posttest, R2 = .12, adjusted 
R2 = .11, F(1,122) = 16.10, p < .01. In the second step with added general EB 
dimensions, both pretest and general EB were significant predictors of the posttest, R2 
change = .12, F(6,117) = 6.13, p < .01. Specifically, there were three significant 
predictors: pretest, b = .48, p < .01, beliefs about the speed of knowledge acquisition 
(Speed), b = -.14, p < .05, and beliefs about the structure of knowledge (Structure), b = -
.14, p < .05. In the third step with added treatment group factor, four significant 
predictors emerged: pretest, b = .42, p < .01, Speed, b = -.14, p < .05, Structure, b = -.13, 
p < .05, and treatment group, b = 2.56, p < .01. In this step, R2 change = .13, F(7,116) = 
9.86, p < .01. In the last step, General EB x Treatment interaction did not predict 
significantly over and above the previous models.  
Table 10 shows the correlations among the variables, and Table 11 presents the 
summary of the regression analysis.  
Table 10.  
Correlations between Regression Analysis Variables in the Main Study 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Posttest – .34** -.35** -.26** -.13 -.11 -.17* .43** .04 
2. Pretest  – -.25** -.07 -.13 .07 -.07 .11 .09 
3. EB Speed   – .26** .09 .43** .40** -.08 -.06 
4. EB Structure    – -.25** .34** .22** -.02 .14 
5. EB ConMod     – .01 -.17* -.16* .05 
6. EB Success      – .23** -.02 .08 
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7. EB Truth       – -.03 -.06 
8. Treatment group        – .04 
9. Treatment x EB         – 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
Table 11 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Conceptual 
Posttest in the Main Study 
Predictor B SE B β t p 
Step 1 (R2 = .12) 
     Pretest 
 
.67 
 
.17 
 
.34 
 
4.01 
 
.00** 
Step 2 (R2 = .24, ΔR2 = .12) 
     Pretest 
     EBS-Speed 
     EBS-Structure 
     EBS-ConMod 
     EBS-Success 
     EBS-Truth 
.48 
-.14 
-.14 
-.08 
.05 
-.07 
.17 
.07 
.06 
.05 
.08 
.13 
.25 
-.22 
-.23 
-.14 
.06 
-.05 
2.85 
-2.21 
-2.51 
-1.62 
.62 
-.51 
.005** 
.03* 
.013* 
.11 
.54 
.61 
Step 3 (R2 = .37, ΔR2 = .13) 
     Pretest 
     EBS-Speed 
     EBS-Structure 
     EBS-ConMod 
     EBS-Success 
     EBS-Truth 
     Treatment group 
.42 
-.14 
-.13 
-.04 
.05 
-.05 
2.56 
.15 
.06 
.05 
.05 
.08 
.12 
.51 
.22 
-.22 
-.21 
-.08 
.06 
-.03 
.37 
2.74 
-2.34 
-2.57 
-.99 
.66 
-.40 
4.98 
.007** 
.02* 
.011* 
.32 
.51 
.69 
.00** 
Step 4 (R2 = .37, ΔR2 = .00) 
     Pretest 
     EBS-Speed 
     EBS-Structure 
     EBS-ConMod 
     EBS-Success 
     EBS-Truth 
     Treatment group 
     Treatment x EB 
.42 
-.14 
-.13 
-.05 
.05 
-.05 
2.55 
.01 
.16 
.06 
.05 
.05 
.08 
.12 
.52 
.04 
.21 
-.21 
-.22 
-.08 
.06 
-.03 
.37 
.03 
2.70 
-2.30 
-2.58 
-1.02 
.64 
-.38 
4.94 
.34 
.008** 
.02* 
.01* 
.31 
.52 
.70 
.00** 
.74 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
Research Question 3: Does each of the instructional approaches, simulation-based 
inquiry learning approach and metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based inquiry learning 
approach, have an effect on students’ science epistemological beliefs respectively? 
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Table 12 shows the means and standard deviations of the four science EB 
dimensions.  
Table 12 
Means and Standard Deviations of Science EB Survey 
Instruments  
(Subscales) 
META+SBI SBI 
Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest 
Source 9.80 (3.29) 8.78 (3.60) 10.53 (4.06) 9.86 (4.04) 
Certainty 10.78 (3.28) 11.45 (4.64) 13.02 (4.57) 12.03 (4.30) 
Develop 9.75 (3.54) 9.91 (4.54) 11.97 (4.00) 11.84 (4.38) 
Justify 14.51 (4.51) 15.70 (5.25) 17.24 (5.09) 17.72 (5.50) 
To examine the pretest-posttest change of science EB within each of the 
individual treatment groups (META+SBI or SBI), paired-sample t-tests were conducted. 
For the META+SBI group, scores on the Source beliefs significantly decreased between 
pretest (M = 9.80, SD = 3.29) and posttest (M = 8.78, SD = 3.60), t (66) = 2.52, p < .05, 
which suggested that the META+SBI group became more mature in their beliefs about 
the source of science knowledge. For the SBI group, their beliefs about the Certainty of 
science knowledge became more mature between pretest (M = 13.02, SD = 4.57) and 
posttest (M = 12.03, SD = 4.30), t (57) = 2.59, p < .05.  
To compare the two treatment groups’ science EB while controlling the science 
EB pretest, MANCOVA was conducted on all the science EB dimensions with the total 
score of the science EB pretest as a covariate. Box’s M test indicated that the 
homogeneity assumption was met, Box’s M = 7.56, p > .05. Multivariate tests did not 
show any significant group difference, F(4, 119) = 1.24, p = .30, η2 = .04. Follow up 
univariate tests did not reveal any significant group difference in the four science EB 
dimensions.   
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 Overall, while the two treatment groups each made significant improvement in 
one of the dimensions in science EB (Source for the META+SBI group and Certainty for 
the SBI group), no significant difference was found between the two groups when taking 
their science EB pretest into consideration. 
Discussion 
Built on the pilot study, this main study was conducted at a different school in 
formal science classes with a larger sample size. The study continued to examine the 
effect of metaconceptually-enhanced simulation-based inquiry on students’ conceptual 
change and science EB, as well as the influence of learners’ general EB on conceptual 
change. While some changes were made to the instructional materials and intervention, 
the research design in the main study was similar to that in the pilot study. Different from 
the pilot study, the two treatment groups in the main study had significant difference in 
science EB at the very beginning while there was no significant group difference in 
content knowledge. This section discusses the findings in response to each of the research 
questions. 
Treatment Effects on Conceptual Change 
In this study, it was hypothesized that both the SBI and the META+SBI groups 
would make significant improvement in conceptual change, and that the META+SBI 
group would outperform the SBI group because of the additional metaconceptual 
intervention that was intended to promote conceptual change. The findings only partially 
supported the initial hypotheses.  
Students’ performance in the multiple-choice conceptual tests was as expected. 
Both treatment groups made significant improvement in the conceptual posttest. While 
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there was a slight drop in the delayed posttest, the change was insignificant. More 
importantly, the META+SBI group outperformed the SBI group, as demonstrated by the 
significant interaction effects between treatment and time. Even with the consideration of 
the students’ science EB pretest, the time, treatment, and interaction effects were still 
significant. Since the conceptual test focused on measuring specific misconceptions, it 
was therefore inferred that simulation-based inquiry helped to reduce misconceptions, 
and that the additional metaconceptual intervention was even more powerful in reducing 
students’ misconceptions when compared with simulation-based inquiry alone. The 
findings were consistent with some previous studies (Biemans & Simons, 1995; 
Hennessey, 2003; Tao & Gunstone, 1999a; Vosniadou, 2003), which indicated the 
potential benefits of metaconceptual intervention, although few of them studied 
metaconceptual thinking exclusively as an intervention.  
It is noted that, different from the META+SBI group in the main study, the same 
group in the pilot study did not perform better than the SBI group in the conceptual test. 
The improved performance of the META+SBI group in the main study could be 
attributed to the improvement made to the simulation guide and the additional 
interventions added to the main study. An examination of student records in the database 
revealed that the majority of the students in the main study answered most of the 
questions presented by the simulation guide whereas the majority of the students in the 
pilot study answered very few questions. Therefore, by working and interacting with the 
questions, the students in the main study were not only able to engage in inquiry tasks, 
such as making predictions, performing experiments, and drawing conclusions, but more 
importantly, they were able to actively engage in metaconceptual thinking. At the 
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beginning of their inquiry, they were led to realize the importance of questioning and 
checking their ideas, and to understand how simulation helped to test one’s ideas. As they 
approached an investigation, they were prompted to become aware of their 
preconceptions and explain the reasoning behind the conceptions. Throughout the inquiry 
cycle, the students monitored the incoming new information from experiments, experts, 
or other sources, consciously checked against their own ideas, and made revisions as they 
deemed necessary. At the end of an investigation, students were led to critically evaluate 
the status of their understanding and reflect on any change to their beginning ideas. The 
metaconceptual intervention helped the students to purposely reflect on their conceptual 
knowledge, which might have led to the significant reduction of their misconceptions. 
On the other hand, compared to their significant improvement in the conceptual 
test, the students’ performance on the concept mapping test was not as positive as 
expected.  When the students’ differences in the science EB pretest were not taken into 
account, both groups were shown to have made significant improvement in Graphical, 
Propositional, and Structural Matching dimensions. Further, the SBI group outperformed 
the META+SBI group in Structural Matching. However, if the students’ differences in 
the science EB pretest were considered, the META+SBI group did not show any 
advantage over the SBI group in any of the five concept mapping dimensions. Since 
using science EB as a covariate could not completely equate the two nonequivalent 
groups – other confounding variables might exist. The effects of enhancing simulation-
based inquiry with metaconceptual intervention on changing one’s cognitive structure 
remain inconclusive.  
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On the other hand, it is worth discussing the initial significant effects on the 
Propositional, Graphical, and Structural Matching dimensions, as well as the possible 
role science EB might have played in accounting for these significant effects. There are 
two possible reasons for the initial significant findings. First, similar to what was 
speculated in the pilot study, the META+SBI group might have focused their cognitive 
resources on processing the additional information provided by the metaconceptual 
simulation guide. As discussed earlier, the metaconceptual intervention in this study 
targeted individual concepts and the relationships between two concepts, rather than the 
overall relationships among multiple concepts. To use a tree vs. forest metaphor, the 
intervention focused more on the tree rather than on a broader, forest level. Thus the 
META+SBI students might have developed better understanding about individual 
concept (i.e., the trees), but might have not dedicated sufficient cognitive resources to 
reflect on the overall relationships among the key concepts that they had learned (i.e., the 
forest). Comparatively, the SBI group did not need to dedicate cognitive resources to 
process additional information provided by the metaconceptual simulation guide, thus the 
cognitive demand on the SBI group might not be as much as the demand on the META-
SBI group. As a result, they were more likely to see the overall relationships among 
multiple concepts. 
The second reason for the initial significant findings is related to the META+SBI 
students’ more mature science EB. The META+SBI students might not readily accept 
new information and reconcile it with their existing cognitive structure, because this 
group of students had stronger beliefs that (a) not everything from a science book or other 
authority was true (i.e., the Source beliefs), (b) knowledge was subject to change with 
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new evidence (i.e., the Development beliefs), and (c) knowledge was of personal 
construction through experiments and reflection (i.e., the Justification beliefs). 
Consequently, it might have taken the META+SBI students more processing time before 
they were able to construct all that they had learned as a coherent whole. Comparatively, 
the SBI students might have been more ready to accept the new knowledge because of 
their more naïve epistemological beliefs (e.g., authority is the source of knowledge; 
knowledge is fixed; the justification of knowledge requires little personal construction).  
Linking the above two reasons to the students’ concept map performance, first we 
see that both treatment groups made significant improvement in Propositional Matching 
in the posttest, which is a semantic, tree-level measure that examines the number of 
correct propositions (concept-link-concept) in a concept map. The two groups’ 
improvement in Propositional Matching was consistent with their significant 
improvement in the multiple-choice conceptual test.   
Secondly, on the Structural Matching dimension, which examined the overall 
structure of a concept map (at the forest level), the two groups exhibited different trends. 
While the SBI group students made significant improvement in the posttest, the 
META+SBI group did not make significant improvement.  This trend was very similar to 
the findings of the pilot study on the same measure, and also corroborated with another 
structural measure in this study – Graphical Matching, which exhibited a similar trend. 
As discussed earlier, the META+SBI group’s lack of improvement on this measure might 
be due to the lack of cognitive resources to conceptualize at the forest level as well as the 
time needed for this group to personally make sense of and integrate the new knowledge. 
Therefore, although the META+SBI group made more correct propositions in the posttest 
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(as demonstrated by the significant time effect on Propositional Matching), the 
propositions were not assembled correctly (as demonstrated by a lack of improvement in 
Structural and Graphical Matching). In other words, synthetic models were built 
(Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Similar results were found in Bråten, Strømsø, and 
Samuelstuen’s (2008) study in which after reading multiple expository texts, those 
students who held more mature beliefs about the source of knowledge and viewed 
learning as personal construction showed poorer understanding than those with more 
naïve beliefs.  
While Bråten et al. (2008) did not study students’ performance in the delayed 
posttest, this study revealed the intriguing findings that the META+SBI group made 
significant improvement four weeks after the intervention, as demonstrated by the 
group’s significantly improved Structural and Graphical matching performance in the 
delayed posttest. Less cognitive demand of learning tasks, more personal knowledge 
construction through reflection, and the lagging effects of metaconceptual intervention 
might have contributed to the students’ continued restructuring of their mental models, 
which resulted in a more holistic mental structure of the key concepts that they had 
learned. Possibly, the concept mapping posttest might have served as a metaconceptual 
intervention which caused the META+SBI group to reflect more on the relationship 
among the 10 key concepts. Furthermore, the possible events in which they were able to 
apply some of what they had learned in the subsequent unit might have also triggered 
metaconceptual thinking among this group of students.  
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(a) Concept map in the pretest 
 
(b) Concept map in the posttest 
 
(c) Concept map in the delayed posttest 
Figure 17. The concept maps of a META+SBI student: (a) the pretest, (b) the posttest, 
and (c) the delayed posttest. 
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Figure 17 shows the concept maps of a META+SBI student in the pretest, posttest, 
and delayed posttest, whose performance represented the trend of the META+SBI 
treatment group. Table 13 shows the scores of three dimensions of interest: Propositional, 
Structural, and Graphical Matching.  
Table 13 
The Pretest, Posttest, and Delayed Posttest Scores of a META+SBI Student’s Concept 
Maps 
Concept Map Scores Pretest Posttest Delayed Posttest 
Propositional Matching .22 .78 1.00 
Structural Matching .86 .86 1.00 
Graphical Matching .86 .86 1.00 
 As shown in Table 13, the student’s Structural and Graphical Matching scores 
did not change from the pretest to the posttest. A close examination of the student’s 
concept map created in the pretest and the one created in the posttest revealed that the 
structures of the two maps were very similar. This could explain why the student’s 
overall mental models, did not show much improvement right after the intervention.  
Having said that, the student’s Propositional Matching score increased from .22 to .78, 
which indicated that the student built more correct propositions in the posttest concept 
map. As shown in Figure 17(a), in the concept map created by the student in the pretest, 
the Force concept was linked to two concepts – Total force = 0 and Total force ≠ 0, and 
the two concepts were subsequently linked to two other concepts: Balanced forces and 
Unbalanced forces. While such a relationship was plausible, it did not serve to illustrate 
that it is the balanced or unbalanced forces that determined the amount of total force 
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(equal to or not equal to 0). In the posttest concept map, the student rearranged some 
concepts: Force was linked to Balanced forces and Unbalanced forces, which were 
subsequently linked to Total force = 0 and Total force ≠ 0.  The posttest concept map 
revealed that the student improved his understanding about the causal relationships 
among the concepts. Further, the new structure, as demonstrated in Figure 17(b), also 
made it clear that it was the amount of total force that determined the different motions of 
an object (e.g., at rest, speeding up, etc.). 
 Four weeks after the intervention, the same student was able to construct a 
concept map that completely resembled the expert concept map, as shown in Figure 17(c) 
(also available in Appendix F).  The delayed posttest concept map indicated significant 
improvement in Structural and Graphical Matching, as well as continued improvement in 
Propositional Matching. It is assumed that during the four-week period, the student was 
able to reconceptualize the relationships among the 10 concepts. While this particular 
student achieved the expert level in delayed posttest, those META+SBI students who did 
not achieve the expert model might continue to improve beyond the delayed posttest, 
given the trajectory of the group’s growth.  
 To summarize, several conclusions can be drawn in regard to the treatment effect 
on the students’ conceptual change: (a) While simulation-based inquiry led to the 
significant reduction of misconceptions, enhancing simulation-based inquiry with 
additional metaconceptual intervention led to greater reduction of misconceptions; (b) the 
respective effects of metaconceptual intervention and simulation-based inquiry on 
learners’ cognitive structure are still unclear; (c) students’ science EB might influence the 
effect of metaconceptual intervention on students’ construction of mental models. 
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Specifically, more mature science EB could result in disequilibrium in one’s cognitive 
structure right after the intervention, yet it could also facilitate continued effort and 
improvement in cognitive restructuring.  
Effects of General EB on Conceptual Change 
In this study it was expected that (a) certain dimensions of general EB would be 
significant predictors of the students’ multiple-choice conceptual posttest, and (b) 
epistemologically more advanced students would benefit more from the META+SBI 
intervention. The findings supported the first expectation but not the second one.  
Specifically, beliefs about the speed of knowledge acquisition (the Speed 
dimension) and the structure of knowledge (the Structure dimension) were found to be 
significant predictors of the students’ conceptual change. The findings were consistent 
with the existing studies. In Qian & Alverman’s (1995) study, which used refutational 
text to promote conceptual change, the researchers found two significant predictors of the 
students’ conceptual change: quick learning and simple-certain knowledge, which were 
equivalent to the Speed and Structure dimensions in this study.  
This study also extended the findings from the pilot study by revealing that the 
Speed and Structure dimensions of EB are specific predictors of conceptual change. 
Therefore, the study suggested that the more a student thought that learning was quick 
and that additional study time would not contribute to learning, the less likely the student 
was to spend time and effort on conducting simulation-based inquiry. Similarly, students 
who tried to avoid ambiguity as much as possible and always sought the single correct 
answer would not try to reflect on some puzzling findings that might challenge their 
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preconceptions. In both cases, the students were not likely to identify and revise their 
misconceptions, resulting in poor performance in the conceptual test. 
On the other hand, this study found that epistemologically more mature students 
did not benefit more from the metaconceptual intervention as expected. This finding was 
consistent with the pilot study. While some studies speculated that there was a possible 
relationship between EB and metaconceptual thinking (Fulton & Kendeou, 2009; 
Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007), the findings from both the pilot and the main studies 
failed to support such a speculation. The reason for the findings could be that students 
who are more epistemologically mature might be engaged in more metaconceptual 
thinking by nature, regardless of whether they received metaconceptual intervention or 
not. In other words, the metaconceptual intervention might not have much added value to 
students who are more epistemologically mature. 
Treatment Effect on Science Epistemological Beliefs 
In this study, while it was expected that both the SBI and the META+SBI 
conditions would have positive effects on developing students’ science EB, it was 
speculated that the META+SBI condition would further promote students’ science EB in 
comparison with the SBI condition. However, the findings only partially support the 
expectations.  
The META+SBI group significantly improved in only one dimension of the 
science EB – the Source beliefs, which suggested that after the intervention the 
META+SBI group developed stronger beliefs that authorities, such as books, teachers, or 
scientists, were not the only sources of science knowledge. The SBI group, on the other 
hand, made significant improvement in another science EB dimension – the Certainty 
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beliefs, indicating that the SBI condition had led the students to believe more strongly 
that science knowledge is not always true and does not always have one right answer. 
The comparison between the two groups in science EB did not reveal any significant 
difference, suggesting that the additional metaconceptual intervention did not promote 
the META+SBI group’s science EB as expected. The findings were different from 
Conley et al (2004) findings that inquiry learning improved students’ Source and 
Certainty beliefs. Similar to what was discussed in the pilot study, the relatively short 
intervention time could be one of the reasons for the contradictory findings. 
The findings from the main study were also different from the pilot study, in 
which the META+SBI group significantly outperformed the SBI group in both the 
Source and the Certainty dimensions whereas the SBI group did not improve in any 
science EB dimension. Several possible reasons might help to explain the inconsistent 
findings. First, the general student characteristics between the pilot study and the main 
study were different. A number of students from the science inquiry classes in the pilot 
study did not seem to be interested in science. However, in the main study the students 
were recruited from the general science classes, and they represented a more diverse 
group with a wider range of interest in science. Further, as mentioned earlier, the students 
from the two schools had different experiences with inquiry learning (e.g., the students in 
the pilot study had been exposed to inquiry-based learning while the students in this study 
had little experience with inquiry-based learning). Altogether, the differences in the 
students’ characteristics between the two schools might have contributed to the different 
patterns in the students’ development of science EB.  
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The second reason for the different findings between the pilot study and the main 
study might be due to a set of revisions made to the intervention in the main study. For 
example, compared with the SBI students in the pilot study, the simulation-based mini-
inquiry in the main study might have helped to engage the SBI students in science inquiry 
processes. As they were constructing their own knowledge and building their own theory, 
the students might have become more mature in their beliefs about the certainty of 
science knowledge. Yet, it was unclear why the META+SBI students in the main study 
did not show development in their beliefs about the certainty of science knowledge.  
The third possible reason for the different findings between the two studies might 
be that the two treatment groups in the main study had different science EB at the very 
beginning. Although statistical analysis could partial out the pretest difference, the results 
could not account for the different development patterns, which might show up in the two 
groups with different starting points.  
Finally, the small sample size in the pilot study and the resulting low power might 
have also contributed to the different findings between the two studies.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 As this country is making STEM education its top priority (National Science 
Board, 2007), conceptual change and the development of mature epistemological beliefs 
have become two important goals in science education (Pintrich, et al., 1993; Sinatra, 
2005; Vosniadou, 2007b; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Conceptual change is related to 
students’ entrenched preconceptions that interfere with what they learn in the science 
classroom. Although not explicitly studied in the literature, it is expected that 
metaconceptual thinking, an active mental process of keeping aware of and monitoring 
one’s conceptual understanding, is likely to promote conceptual change (Murphy & 
Mason, 2006; Vosniadou, et al., 2001).  
Learning science is not only about acquiring science content knowledge, but more 
importantly developing mature beliefs about the ways of knowing and the nature of 
knowledge in science, that is, science epistemological beliefs. However, students often 
hold naïve science epistemological beliefs, and they often do not think like scientists. 
Existing literature postulates that epistemological beliefs may have two layers – at the 
fundamental level are domain-general beliefs about knowledge and learning, and as 
individuals grow with life experience and education, domain-specific epistemological 
beliefs become more dominant (Buehl & Alexander, 2001; Muis, et al., 2006). Some 
studies have found that a learner’s general epistemological beliefs may have an impact on 
conceptual change (Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Windschitl, 1997), and that science 
epistemological beliefs may be malleable to instructional interventions such as inquiry 
learning (Conley, et al., 2004; Kienhues, et al., 2008; Smith, et al., 2000). Further, there 
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may be a possible relationship between epistemological beliefs and metaconceptual 
thinking (Lam & Chan, 2008; Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007).  
Situated in a simulation-based inquiry learning environment, the current research 
aimed at investigating how students’ general epistemological beliefs, metaconceptual 
intervention, simulation-based inquiry, and the interaction between the beliefs and the 
intervention contribute to students’ conceptual change and the development of science 
epistemological beliefs. Two studies (i.e., the pilot study and the main study) were 
conducted to answer the three research questions. This section first provides an overview 
of the convergent findings, which is followed by a discussion of implications for research. 
This section ends with a discussion about the limitations of the study. 
Overview of Findings 
Metaconceptual intervention enhanced simulation-based inquiry learning by 
significantly reducing students’ science misconceptions. 
In the pilot study, the META+SBI group did not show significantly fewer 
misconceptions than the SBI group. One of the major reasons was that many students 
were not engaged in metaconceptual intervention. After modifications were made to the 
main study, the META+SBI group demonstrated significantly fewer misconceptions than 
the SBI group in both posttest and delayed posttest. Therefore, it was concluded that the 
metaconceptual intervention was able to enhance simulation-based inquiry learning.  
As research indicated (Murphy & Mason, 2006; Vosniadou, et al., 2001), students 
often lack metaconceptual thinking when learning science, and this can interfere with 
conceptual change. While engagement in inquiry tasks has potential to help students 
construct knowledge and build their own theories, students often do not consciously 
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examine their own ideas and monitor the development of those ideas as they perform 
inquiry tasks. Therefore, in this study metaconceptual intervention was systematically 
implemented to the META+SBI group in order to stimulate the students’ metaconceptual 
thinking during the process of simulation-based inquiry. Compared with the SBI students 
who performed typical science inquiry tasks, the META+SBI students acquired 
metaconceptual knowledge (e.g., one’s idea is subject to check, the idea can change with 
new evidence) and engaged in metaconceptual processes as they were prompted to 
become aware of their own ideas, monitor new information from other sources, and 
evaluate their new understanding. As a result, the META+SBI group in the main study 
showed significantly fewer misconceptions than the SBI group.  
 Metaconceptual intervention did not facilitate immediate change of broad 
knowledge structure, but may have potential delayed effect.   
While metaconceptual intervention was effective in reducing misconceptions, it 
did not do as well in changing students’ knowledge structure, that is, their mental models 
of the interrelated key concepts in a given topic they were studying. In both the pilot 
study and the main study, the metaconceptual intervention either did not improve 
students’ concept mapping performance, or led to the students’ poorer posttest 
performance in Structural Matching. As speculated in earlier discussions, the reason for 
the META+SBI group’s lack of improvement in the posttest might be that (a) the 
metaconceptual intervention was mostly focused on helping the students to build local, 
propositional knowledge rather than a broader network of multiple interrelated concepts, 
(b) there might be a certain level of cognitive demand associated with the mental 
processing of metaconceptually-enhanced simulation guide. These two factors might 
145 
 
have resulted in the META+SBI students’ lack of sufficient cognitive resources to 
conceptualize a bigger knowledge structure.    
On the other hand, four weeks after the intervention, the META+SBI students in 
the main study improved in several structural dimensions of concept mapping, which 
suggested that the metaconceptual intervention might have potential delayed effects. 
However, given that the two groups were nonequivalent in the main study, the speculated 
delayed effect requires more empirical evidence. 
Beliefs about the speed of learning and the construction of knowledge affected 
students’ correction of misconceptions in science inquiry learning. 
 Both the pilot study and the main study confirmed the relationship between 
students’ general EB and their learning performance. While the pilot study found that the 
students’ general EB was a significant predictor of the conceptual change, the main study 
pinpointed the specific dimensions – beliefs about the speed of knowledge acquisition and 
beliefs about the construction of knowledge. Therefore, the findings suggested that when 
students worked on science inquiry, their beliefs about the speed of learning and the 
construction of knowledge determined whether they were likely to take time to perform 
inquiry tasks, examine findings, question their understanding, and correct potential 
misconceptions.  
 More epistemologically mature students did not necessarily benefit more from 
metaconceptual intervention than their less mature counterparts. 
 Some studies found that more epistemologically mature students tended to 
demonstrate more metaconceptual thinking (Fulton & Kendeou, 2009; Stathopoulou & 
Vosniadou, 2007), which indicated a possible relationship between epistemological 
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beliefs and metaconceptual thinking. This study set out to investigate whether more 
epistemologically mature students would benefit more from metaconceptual intervention. 
In both studies, the original speculation was not supported. Students across different 
epistemological levels equally benefited from the metaconceptual intervention.    
 The effects of simulation-based inquiry and metaconceptual intervention on 
students’ science epistemological beliefs were inconclusive.  
 Inquiry learning has been found to promote science EB (Conley, et al., 2004; 
Smith, et al., 2000). Further, there was also beginning evidence that continuous 
engagement in metaconceptual thinking might promote one’s epistemological 
development (Wyre, 2007). Therefore, this study investigated whether the SBI students 
would show improvement in science EB, and whether the META+SBI group would 
demonstrate more mature science EB than the SBI group. This study showed inconsistent 
findings. 
In the pilot study, the META+SBI group became significantly more mature than 
the SBI group in their beliefs about the source and certainty of science knowledge, while 
the SBI group did not show any pretest-posttest improvement in science EB. However, in 
the main study the META+SBI group showed improvement only in their beliefs about 
the source of science knowledge, while the SBI group became more mature in their 
beliefs about the certainty of science knowledge. No significant difference in science EB 
was found between the two groups in the main study.  
Given the inconsistent findings, limited treatment time, and the significant group 
difference in science EB pretest found in the main study, the effects of simulation-based 
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inquiry and metaconceptual intervention on the development of science EB remained 
inconclusive in this study.   
Theoretical Implications and Future Research 
Conceptual Change 
 In quantitative research on conceptual change, the learning outcomes were often 
conceptualized and measured as the number of corrected misconceptions. This study took 
advantage of the HIMATT technology to quantitatively examine the changes occurring to 
both students’ misconceptions and their mental models. The inclusion of the concept 
mapping assessment allowed the researcher to zoom out the lens from local 
misconceptions to a broader cognitive structure that consisted of multiple concepts and 
their interrelationships. While the study confirmed the effectiveness of simulation-based 
inquiry and metaconceptual intervention on reducing students’ misconceptions, it also 
revealed the inadequacies of the intervention on the change to the broader cognitive 
structure. As found in the study, while the students demonstrated over-time improvement 
in multiple-choice conceptual test, their concept mapping performance did not make 
simultaneous improvement. 
This study demonstrated that conceptual change is a multi-faceted process. As 
illustrated by the earlier analyses of concept map findings, as the students revised their 
misconceptions and built more correct individual propositions in their cognitive structure, 
the propositions might not be assembled correctly to form a coherent, holistic knowledge 
representation. Successful conceptual change, in the context of this study, should be a 
process during which learners build more correct propositions and in the meantime 
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assemble the propositions in a structure that resembles the knowledge structure of the 
experts.  
Future research should try to use multiple measures to assess conceptual change 
in order to obtain a more holistic picture of the students’ conceptual change learning 
outcomes. Focus should be placed on the changes to learners’ cognitive structure, by 
using both quantitative research method to examine trends and make comparisons, and by 
using qualitative approaches to track the developmental process of learners’ knowledge 
structure. It would also be interesting to examine the linkage between the revisions of 
misconceptions and the changes to the overall cognitive structure. Finally, studies on how 
students use the restructured knowledge in problem solving situations will also shed light 
on the transfer of conceptual change learning outcomes. 
Epistemological Beliefs 
Several theoretical implications were drawn from this study to inform research on 
epistemological beliefs. First, learners’ general epistemological beliefs have significant 
effect on the extent to which one revises initial misconceptions in a simulation-based 
inquiry learning environment. Particularly, learners’ beliefs about the speed of learning 
and the construction of knowledge act like a thinking disposition that affects how they 
work with computer simulations and perform inquiry tasks which lead to the revision of 
misconceptions.  
Second, this study confirmed that science epistemological beliefs are malleable 
with appropriate instructional intervention. Traditionally epistemological beliefs have 
been treated as a stable, trait-like construct that develops only with years of experience 
and education. Researchers have just begun to explore ways to promote the development 
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of students’ science epistemological beliefs with instructional intervention (Conley, et al., 
2004). This quantitative study demonstrated that students’ beliefs about source and 
certainty of science knowledge improved as the result of the intervention. On the other 
hand, learners’ beliefs about the development and justification of science knowledge did 
not have significant change in this study. One of the explanations could be that the nature 
of the inquiry tasks and activities in this study were relatively well-structured. Students 
were asked to follow the procedure to investigate pre-defined topics, and they did not 
have much opportunity to freely conduct science inquiry. As a result, these inquiry 
activities did not have enough influence on students’ beliefs about the justification and 
development of science knowledge.  
Thirdly, this study provided more evidence about the multilayered framework of 
epistemological beliefs. In the main study where the two treatment groups had significant 
difference in their science epistemological beliefs, their general beliefs were at a similar 
level (except for one dimension). The findings suggested that while more students in the 
META+SBI group participated in accelerated science classes, the science classes 
appeared to have more impact on the students’ science epistemological beliefs than on 
their general beliefs. Therefore, it is inferred that individuals’ general epistemological 
beliefs are relatively stable over time, and that science epistemological beliefs are more 
susceptible to instructional interventions.  
Finally, as found in the main study, when pretest science epistemological beliefs 
were included as a covariate, the significant effects on several concept map measures 
were no longer significant. The findings indicated that the maturity of students’ science 
150 
 
epistemological beliefs might be a factor that influenced the effect of metaconceptual 
intervention on the students’ concept mapping performance.  
Based on the theoretical implications, future research should explore the ways to 
promote students’ mature science epistemological beliefs, especially the beliefs about 
development and justification of science knowledge. Interventions such as ill-structured 
science inquiry activities, discussions, and team activities can provide more opportunities 
for argumentation, elaboration and reflection, which contribute to the development of 
science epistemological beliefs. Studies with a longer period of treatment time will be 
particularly helpful in examining the intervention effects. Furthermore, clinical 
interviews can be used to complement quantitative surveys to address the psychometric 
weaknesses of epistemological belief instruments, and to provide better understanding 
about students’ epistemological beliefs and their relationship with treatment and 
conceptual change. Finally, it is worth further investigation on whether science 
epistemological beliefs interact with metaconceptual intervention in influencing the 
change to learners’ mental models. For example, it remains to be confirmed whether 
more epistemologically advanced learners need more time to process metaconceptual 
intervention and reconcile new knowledge with their existing knowledge.  
Metaconceptual Thinking 
Since Yuruk et al. (2008) advanced the theoretical framework for metaconceptual 
thinking, this study represented one of the first efforts to systematically implement 
metaconceptual intervention to examine its effects on conceptual change. The findings 
from this study provided explicit evidence that the additional metaconceptual intervention 
was able to enhance simulation-based inquiry by significantly reducing learner 
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misconceptions. In the mean time, the findings also revealed the complexities related to 
the effects of metaconceptual intervention in influencing the change of learners’ mental 
models; for instance on some concept map measures, the learners performed poorer in the 
posttest, but later improved in the delayed posttest. 
The findings led to speculations about the possible cognitive demand associated 
with metaconceptual intervention, which might interfere with the students’ immediate 
learning outcome. The findings also revealed a lack of emphasis on a broader cognitive 
structure in the current metaconceptual framework. Specifically, metaconceptual 
intervention should zoom out from individual concept level to help students (a) develop 
metaconceptual knowledge, that is,  conceptual learning involves a network of 
interconnected ideas, (b) become aware of their understanding about key concepts and 
their interrelationships, (c) monitor how new information integrates into individuals’ 
existing mental models, (d) construct and evaluate new mental models.  
The theoretical implications provided directions for future research on 
metaconceptual thinking. Future studies should pay attention to facilitating students’ 
metaconceptual thinking about multiple interrelated concepts and consequently 
investigate the intervention effect on students’ mental models. Discussions, group 
activities, and concept mapping learning exercises can be used to promote students’ 
metaconceptual thinking. 
For future research, the study design must be carefully examined and improved to 
ensure that the META+SBI students’ learning outcomes are indeed influenced by the 
metaconceptual intervention, and not by any other factors, such as cognitive demand or 
motivation. There are several alternatives to approach this issue and improve the design. 
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First, the level of cognitive demand of the SBI group can be matched with that of the 
META+SBI group by having the SBI group perform additional, but content-irrelevant 
learning activities. Second, students’ levels of metaconceptual thinking can be measured 
as a manipulation check. For example, a questionnaire can be designed to elicit students’ 
self-perceived level of metaconceptual thinking as a result of intervention. Alternatively, 
students’ responses to metaconceptual questions in the simulation guide can provide rich 
context and information to help researchers better understand the nature and the effect of 
metaconceptual intervention. Students’ qualitative responses can be rated based on the 
demonstrated levels of metaconceptual thinking. In both cases, students’ metaconceptual 
thinking can be quantified, which will allow researchers to identify those who indeed 
demonstrate metaconceptual thinking as a valid pool for further investigation. In this way, 
researchers will be able to more accurately examine the linkage between metaconceptual 
intervention, metaconceptual thinking, and conceptual change.  
 Lastly, in this study metaconceptual thinking was used mainly as a means to 
promote students’ conceptual change. One of the instructional goals for future studies is 
to help students who are less metaconceptual to become more metaconceptual through 
metaconceptual intervention. Research should explore the development of 
metaconceptual thinking as a learning goal itself. In other words, an important goal of 
metaconceptual intervention should be developing students’ habit of mind to examine and 
monitor their metaconceptual thinking even when metaconceptual support is not available. 
In addition, future studies should examine students’ learning progress and outcome in 
metaconceptual thinking not only immediately after an intervention, but also at a delayed 
time when the metaconceptual scaffold is no longer available.  
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Implications for Science Education 
Enhance Science Inquiry Learning with Metaconceptual Intervention 
Inquiry learning has been advocated in science education, but emphasis has been 
placed on facilitating the process of making predictions, conducting and observing 
experiments, and drawing conclusions. While these processes are essential to help 
students actively build knowledge, they do not effectively address students’ 
misconceptions. Without intentional monitoring of individuals’ conceptual thinking, 
students are not likely to be aware of the inconsistencies between their misconceptions 
and the information coming from other sources during the inquiry process. In other words, 
with inquiry learning alone, conceptual change is difficult to achieve.  
Therefore, teachers may encourage students to become more aware of the nature 
of conceptual learning, that is, students need to possess a certain level of metaconceptual 
knowledge. Further, during students’ inquiry learning, the teacher should systematically 
promote students’ metaconceptual awareness, monitoring, and evaluation. As 
demonstrated in this study, question prompting can be an effective strategy. For 
instructional designers who design and develop inquiry-based learning materials, 
metaconceptual components should be purposely built in the process of inquiry. The 
metaconceptual intervention framework illustrated in Table 2 can serve as a reference in 
designing and facilitating students’ metaconceptual thinking.  
To provide more focused and individualized intervention, it is recommended that 
metaconceptual intervention be aligned with diagnosis and assessment. In both classroom 
and web-based learning, assessment tools can be developed to diagnose students’ specific 
misconceptions, and metaconceptual intervention can be provided according to individual 
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needs. A linkage and alignment between misconception, intervention, and assessment has 
potential to reduce students’ misconceptions and enhance their metaconceptual thinking.   
Promote Metaconceptual Thinking on Broader Cognitive Structure 
One of the weaknesses of the metaconceptual intervention in this study was the 
lack of emphasis on helping students conceptualize a broader cognitive structure. 
Therefore, while facilitating students’ science inquiry learning and metaconceptual 
thinking, science teachers should encourage students to consider a conceptual framework 
that consists of the key concepts they have learned. The teacher can explicitly prompt 
students to consider the relationships among the key concepts, or let students construct 
concept maps using the key concepts. Similarly, instructional designers can identify the 
key concepts in learning materials and use question prompts, concept mapping, or other 
learning activities to encourage students not only to build correct propositions in their 
mental models, but also to assemble the propositions appropriately to form expert-like 
mental models.   
Provide Scaffolding for Inquiry Learning and Metaconceptual Intervention  
 As found in the pilot study, when implementing inquiry learning and 
metaconceptual intervention, students were not instantly oriented to new ways of learning. 
They might not know how to answer metaconceptual questions; they might not know 
they were supposed to link prediction, observation, and explanation in a systematic way; 
and they might not know the role simulation plays in inquiry learning. They needed more 
guidance and support to be able to perform the inquiry tasks more effectively. Therefore, 
explicit information, examples, modeling, and some mini-inquiry exercises, whether 
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provided in person or through computer-based learning materials, can prepare students to 
understand the nature of inquiry and to interact well with metaconceptual intervention. 
 Furthermore, in simulation-based inquiry learning, especially in a web-based 
environment, if an instructor is not available to facilitate learning, students’ independent 
inquiry runs the risk of going off-track – they may misinterpret information, lack 
knowledge to conduct an experiment in a simulated environment, or miss some important 
steps. When this happens, the students may not be able to encounter an anomalous 
experiment result which was intended to refute students’ misconceptions. In such 
circumstances, providing expert feedback and video demonstrations illustrating the 
appropriate way to conduct the experiment can help students to stay on track. 
Promote Students’ Epistemological Beliefs 
As demonstrated in this study, epistemological beliefs play significant roles in 
conceptual change. While general epistemological beliefs may take time to develop, 
science epistemological beliefs are malleable and can be shaped by relatively short 
intervention. In this study, two weeks of inquiry activities were able to promote change in 
certain aspects of science epistemological beliefs. For these reasons, science teachers 
should make it an explicit goal to develop students’ science epistemological beliefs in 
their daily teaching practice. While the intervention in this study was not able to improve 
students’ beliefs in the development and justification of science knowledge, effort should 
be made to effectively address these two aspects in science education. Two types of 
learning activities may have high potential to promote the development and justification 
dimensions of science EB: (a) long-term interventions that allow students to work on 
more ill-structured inquiry tasks in which they can initiate their own ideas and put them 
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to the test; (b) collaborative inquiry activities that provide opportunities for students to 
work with peers to elaborate their ideas, negotiate meaning, justify thinking, and develop 
theories. 
Alternate Methods of Learning to Sustain Student Motivation 
From the pilot study it was found that students’ motivation level dropped when 
only one delivery method was used. In the main study with planned sequence of teacher-
guided and students’ independent inquiries, the students stayed more on task and showed 
more engagement. Therefore, for both science teachers and instructional designers, in 
order to sustain student motivation, variety should be planned in instruction. The method 
of learning can alternate between instructor-led inquiries and students’ independent 
inquiries. Other learning activities such as discussions and group work can also be helpful. 
While changing the format of learning, it is important for students to review previous 
sessions before starting a new session in order to ensure the continuity and consistency 
between different formats of learning.  
Limitations of the Study 
 Due to the researcher’s attempt to conduct the study in a naturalistic setting in 
order to gain more ecological validity, several accommodations were made in order to 
address the constraints in the school settings. The following are some noticeable 
limitations in this research. 
First, in both the pilot and the main study, it was almost impossible to carry out 
random assignment of participants to the two treatment conditions, as required by a 
rigorous experimental study. Therefore, a quasi-experimental study was conducted. With 
intact classes assigned to one of the treatment conditions, significant pretest group 
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differences could have confounded the results of the studies. Further, the naturalistic 
school settings introduced various factors which might affect the study, for example, 
student absences, occasional events (e.g., a fire drill), and other extraneous factors. 
Secondly, because of the same constraints in the school setting, a true control 
group (e.g., a regular science class) was not available to establish a baseline in order to 
gauge how well the two treatment groups performed in comparison with a regular science 
class. 
Third, ideally a relatively longer period of time was required to investigate and 
answer the research questions. For example, the development of science epistemological 
beliefs is likely to take more than two weeks of time. However, the time limit in this 
study did not allow the researcher to implement longer intervention and examine the 
effects.  
Fourth, as discussed earlier, this study lacked the measurement of metaconceptual 
thinking as a manipulation check. Therefore, the validity of study findings can be further 
improved by measuring students’ levels of metaconceptual thinking, which would ensure 
that the differences in the students’ learning outcomes were indeed influenced by the 
metaconceptual intervention.  
Fifth, the inquiry activities in this study were relatively well-structured. Students 
did not have sufficient room for free inquiry, which might have resulted in the students’ 
lack of development in their beliefs about the development and justification of science 
knowledge. With sufficient time for intervention, the inquiry activities could have been 
designed to be more ill-structured which would allow students to explore and experiment 
with their own ideas. In this way the researcher could also have the opportunity to 
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examine the effects of ill-structured science inquiry activities on students’ conceptual 
change and science epistemological beliefs. 
Lastly, this study took a quantitative approach with little qualitative data to 
enhance findings. The HIMATT quantitative data, for example, were based on complex 
computer calculations and thus the findings from the data were not as direct and easy to 
interpret as visual inspections of concept maps. Rich qualitative data could have provided 
more insights into the research findings, especially the unexpected results.  
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APPENDIX A: PASS STANDARDS ADDRESSED IN THE INTERVENTION 
The following eighth-grade PASS standards on science processes and physical 
science are relevant to this study:  
Process Standard 1: Observe and Measure - Observing is the first action taken by 
the learner to acquire new information about an object, organism, or event. 
Opportunities for observation are developed through the use of a variety of 
scientific tools. Measurement allows observations to be quantified. The student 
will accomplish these objectives to meet this process standard.  
 
Process Standard 2: Classify - Classifying establishes order. Objects, organisms, 
and events are classified based on similarities, differences, and interrelationships. 
The student will accomplish these objectives to meet this process standard.  
 
Process Standard 3: Experiment - Experimenting is a method of discovering 
information. It requires making observations and measurements to test ideas. The 
student will accomplish these objectives to meet this process standard.  
 
Process Standard 4: Interpret and Communicate - Interpreting is the process of 
recognizing patterns in collected data by making inferences, predictions, or 
conclusions. Communicating is the process of describing, recording, and 
reporting experimental procedures and results to others. Communication may be 
oral, written, or mathematical and includes organizing ideas, using appropriate 
vocabulary, graphs, other visual representations, and mathematical equations. 
The student will accomplish these objectives to meet this process standard.  
 
Process Standard 5: Inquiry - Inquiry can be defined as the skills necessary to 
carry out the process of scientific or systemic thinking. In order for inquiry to 
occur, students must have the opportunity to ask a question, formulate a 
procedure, and observe phenomena. The student will accomplish these objectives 
to meet this process standard. 
 
Physical Science Standard 2: Motions and Forces - The motion of an object can 
be described by its position, direction of motion, and speed. The student will 
engage in investigations that integrate the process standards and lead to the 
discovery of the following objectives:  
 
2. The motion of an object can be measured. The position of an object, its speed 
and direction can be represented on a graph.  
 
3. An object that is not being subjected to a net force will continue to move at a 
constant velocity (in a straight line and a constant speed) (Oklahoma State 
Department of Education, 2009). 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE SIMULATION GUIDE 
B1: Sample Simulation Guide for the SBI Treatment Group  
B2: Sample Simulation Guide for META+SBI Treatment Group  
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B1: Sample Simulation Guide for the SBI Treatment Group 
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B2: Sample Simulation Guide for the META+SBI Treatment Group 
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APPENDIX C: INSTRUMENTS 
C1: Motion and Force Multiple-Choice Conceptual Test  
C2: Motion and Force Concept Mapping Test  
C3: Epistemological Beliefs Survey (adapted from Wood & Kardash, 2002) 
C4: Science-Specific Epistemological Beliefs Survey (Conley, et al., 2004) 
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C1: Motion and Force Multiple-Choice Conceptual Test 
Motion and Force Conceptual Test 
 
1. A fire station receives a phone call that a building is on fire. The fire station is 5 miles 
to the west of the city center, and the distance between the city center and the 
building on fire is 10 miles. How far do the fire trucks have to travel before arriving 
at the building? (1*) 
 
A. 15 miles 
B. 5 miles 
C. There is no sufficient information to answer the question. 
 
2. If an object is at rest, which of the following is a possible position-time graph for the 
object? If you think that none is correct, answer D. (Note: A position-time graph 
shows how an object’s position changes with time) (3, 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The following velocity-time graph shows the motion of two balls. Which of the 
statements below is true about the velocity of the two balls? (Note: A velocity-time 
graph shows how an object’s velocity changes with time) (2, 3, 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. A is rolling faster than B. 
B. B is rolling faster than A. 
C. A and B are rolling equally fast. 
D. Both A and ball B are at rest. 
 
V
elocity 
Time (s) 
A
B
Position (m
)
Time (s) 
Position (m
)
Time (s) 
Position (m
) 
Time (s) 
A B
C
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4. A man starts at the origin, (1) walks to the left at a slow, constant velocity for 6 
seconds, then (2) stands still for 6 seconds, and then (3) changes direction and walks 
to the right twice as fast, but still at a constant velocity for 6 seconds. Which velocity-
time graph best depicts the man’s movement? Suppose the positive direction is 
moving to the right. If you think that none is correct, answer F.  (2, 3, 4, 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The position-time graph below shows how a ball’s position changes with time. Which 
of the following correctly describes the ball’s motion? (suppose the positive direction 
is moving forward) (2, 3, 4, 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. The ball moves along a flat surface. Then it moves forward down a hill, and 
then keeps moving. 
B. The ball moves along a flat surface. Then it moves backward down a hill, and 
then keeps moving. 
C. The ball is moving at constant velocity. Then it slows down and stops. 
D. The ball doesn’t move at first. Then it moves forward down a hill and finally 
stops. 
V
elocity (m
/s) 
Time (s) 
V
elocity (m
/s) 
Time (s) 
V
elocity
(m
/s)
Time (s) 
V
elocity
(m
/s)
Time (s) 
V
elocity
(m
/s)
Time (s) 
A B
C D
E
Position (m
)
Time (s) 
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E. The ball doesn’t move at first. Then it moves backwards and then finally stops. 
 
6. The following position-time graph shows how the positions of two balls, A and B, 
change with time. Which of the statements below is true about the two balls’ motion? 
(3, 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. A is rolling faster than B 
B. B is rolling faster than A 
C. A is speeding up more than B 
D. B is speeding up more than A. 
 
Questions 7-10 refer to the following scenario: 
 
 
 
A toy car can move to the right or left along a horizontal line. The positive direction is to 
the right. Choose the correct velocity-time graph (A-H) for each of the following 
questions. You may choose a graph more than once or not at all. If you think that none is 
correct, answer J.  
 
 
 
7. Which velocity graph shows the car moving toward the right at a steady (constant) 
velocity? (3, 4, 5) 
 
8. Which velocity graph shows the car reversing direction? (3, 4, 5) 
Position (m
) 
Time (s) 
A
B
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9. Which velocity graph shows the car moving toward the left at a steady (constant) 
velocity? (2, 3, 4, 5) 
 
10. Which velocity graph shows the car increasing its speed at a steady (constant) rate? (3, 
4, 5) 
 
11. The position-time graph below shows the movement of a bowling ball down the alley. 
Which of the following correctly describes the ball’s motion? (Suppose the positive 
direction is moving forward) (3, 4, 5)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. The ball is moving forward at a constant velocity. 
B. The ball is moving backward at a constant velocity. 
C. The ball is moving forward and slowing down steadily. 
D. The ball is moving backward and slowing down steadily. 
E. The ball is slowing down steadily down a hill. 
F. The ball is speeding up steadily down a hill. 
 
12. A sports car and a school bus are both on the road running to the north. The sports car 
is running at a constant velocity of 60 miles per hour, and the school bus is running at 
a constant velocity of 40 miles per hour. Which of the following is true about the total 
force acting on each of the two cars? (Note: Total force is the sum total of all the  
forces acting on an object) (6, 9) 
A. The sports car has a larger total force on it. 
B. The school bus has a larger total force on it. 
C. The two cars have the same total force. 
D. There is not enough information to tell. 
 
13. If an object does not move, there must be no force acting on it. (7)  
A. True 
B. False  
 
14. If the total force on an object is zero (0), which of the following is true? (Note: Total 
force is the sum total of all the  forces acting on an object) (8, 10) 
A. The object must be at rest. 
B. The object must be slowing down. 
C. The object must be moving at a steady (constant) velocity. 
D. The object must be either at rest or moving at a steady (constant) velocity. 
 
Questions 15-16 refer to the following scenario:  
 
Position (m
)
Time (s) 
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David gave his shopping cart a push and then released the cart. The cart moved forward 
and gradually slowed down.  
 
15. After David released the shopping cart, which of the following is correct about the 
horizontal force(s) acting on the cart? (11) 
A. The force from David’s push 
B. The friction force from the floor 
C. Both of the above 
D. None of the above 
 
16. A large box is being pushed forward across the floor at a constant velocity. What can 
you conclude about the total force acting on the box? (6, 10) 
A. The total force must be 0. 
B. The total force must be decreasing. 
C. The total force must be constant. 
D. The total force must be increasing. 
 
Questions 17-18 refer to the following scenario: 
 
A block is sitting on a table when a hand pushes it, giving it an initial velocity. The block 
starts to slide across the table. Suppose that we are in an ideal situation where the table 
has NO friction at all. In the image below, at state a, the hand is pushing block; at state b, 
the hand is no longer pushing the block. 
 
 
 
17. For state b, which of the following correctly describes the block’s movement on the 
frictionless table after the hand stops pushing it? (10, 11) 
A. The block will slow down steadily at constant acceleration until it stops. 
B. The block will move steadily at constant velocity and will not stop. 
C. The block will speed up steadily at constant acceleration. 
 
18. For state b, which of the following correctly describes the horizontal force(s) acting 
on the block after the hand stops pushing the block? Remember the table has NO 
friction. (11) 
A. The force from the push 
B. There is no force acting on the block 
C. None of the above is correct 
* The number(s) listed at the end of each question stem links to the misconception(s) 
listed below: 
1. The location of an object can be described by stating its distance from a given 
point, ignoring direction. 
2. Velocity must be positive, plotted above the time axis.  
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3. Students have difficulty relating real world motions to a graph and vice-versa. 
4. Students plot position and velocity graphs as the path of the particle.  
5. Students don't know which quantity in a graph will answer a question (coordinate 
or slope). 
6. Constant velocity results from constant force. 
7. If there is no motion, there must be no force. 
8. If there is no force, there must be no motion.  
9. Faster moving objects have larger force acting on them. 
10. An object will slow down when the total force is zero. 
11. When a force is removed from a moving object, it still has impetus on the object 
to keep it moving. 
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 C2: Motion and Force Concept Mapping Test  
Imagine that your younger brother, sister, or cousin becomes curious about cars and how 
they can move in different ways, like speeding up, slowing down, or running smoothly 
(at constant speed). You try to use what you know about motion and force to explain to 
him/her the reason of different forces that make a car move in different ways. Suppose 
you are given the following concepts, each of which is written on a sticky note. 
1. Force 
2. Car at rest  
3. Balanced force on the car  
4. Unbalanced force on the car 
5. Total force on the car = 0 
6. Total force on the car ≠ 0 
7. Car running at constant speed 
8. Car changing speed 
9. Car slowing down 
10. Car speeding up 
 
• Try to arrange the sticky notes into a map that represents the relationship between the 
concepts. The purpose is to use the map to explain to the younger kid what makes a 
car move in different ways.  
• Next, use your pencil to draw a line between any two notes that you think are 
connected. 
• Lastly, explain the link you draw between any two notes. What is the reason for you 
to link two sticky notes? What is the relationship between the concepts written on the 
two notes? Write down the relationship. 
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 C3: Epistemological Beliefs Survey 
The following statements are about your beliefs about knowledge and learning. Please 
indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements listed below. 
Please select the number that best describes the strength of your belief. There is no right 
or wrong answer. 
 
Strongly Disagree-----------------------------------------------------------------------Strongly 
Agree 
1                                                                                                                         5 
 
1. You can believe most things you read.  
 
2. Nothing we learn is certain.  
 
3. If something can be learned, it will be learned immediately.  
 
4. I like information to be presented straightforwardly; I do not like having to figure out 
myself the meaning behind.  
 
5. It is difficult to learn from a textbook unless you start at the beginning and learn one 
part at a time.  
 
6. Forming your own ideas is more important than learning what the textbooks say.  
 
7. The first time you read a textbook is when you get almost all the information you can 
understand from the book.  
 
8. A really good way to understand a textbook is to organize its information according 
to your own understanding.  
 
9. If scientists try hard enough, they can find the answer to almost every question.  
 
10. You should evaluate the accuracy of information in textbooks if you are familiar with 
the topic.  
 
11. You will just get mixed up if you try to combine new ideas in a textbook with what 
you already know.  
 
12. When I study, I look for specific facts.  
 
13. If teachers would stick more to the facts and spend less time explaining theories, 
students could get more out of school.  
 
14. To be a good student, you have to memorize a lot of facts.  
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15. Wisdom is not knowing the answers, but knowing how to find the answers.  
 
16. Working hard on a difficult problem only pays off for really smart students.  
 
17. Some people are born good learners; others are not.  
 
18. If you do not understand something, going over it the second time usually won’t help.  
 
19. Successful students understand things quickly.  
 
20. Today’s facts may change tomorrow.  
 
21. I really like teachers who organize their lessons carefully and then stick to their plan.  
 
22. The most important part of scientific work is original thinking.  
 
23. Even advice from experts should be questioned.  
 
24. If I can’t understand something quickly, it usually means I will never understand it.  
 
25. I try to combine information from different chapters of textbook or even from 
different classes.  
 
26. I don’t like movies that don’t have a clear ending.  
 
27. Scientists can ultimately get to the truth.  
 
28. It’s a waste of time to work on problems that do not have a clear-cut answer.  
 
29. Understanding main ideas is easy for good students.  
 
30. It is annoying to listen to teachers who cannot seem to make their mind up about what 
they really believe.  
 
31. A good teacher’s job is to keep students from wandering off the right track.  
 
32. A sentence has little meaning unless you know the situation in which it was spoken.  
 
33. The best thing about a science class is that most problems have only one right answer.  
 
34. Most words have one clear meaning.  
 
35. The really smart students don’t have to work hard to do well in school.  
 
36. When I learn, I like to make things as simple as possible.  
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37. I find it exciting to think about issues that scientist can’t agree on.  
 
38. The things we learn in school will not change.  
 
 
Adapted from Wood & Kardash (2002) 
 
Scoring: 
 
Speed: 3, 7, 11, 16, 18, 24, 34, 38 
Structure: 4, 5, 12, 13, 21, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36 
ConMod (R): 2, 6, 8, 10, 15, 20, 22, 23, 25, 32, 37 
Success: 14, 17, 19, 29, 35 
Truth: 1, 9, 27  
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 C4: Science-Specific Epistemological Beliefs Survey 
The following statements are about your beliefs about knowledge and learning. Please 
indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements listed below. 
Please select the number that best describes the strength of your belief. There is no right 
or wrong answer. 
 
Strongly Disagree-----------------------------------------------------------------------Strongly 
Agree 
1                                                                                                                         5 
 
1. Everybody has to believe what scientists say.  
 
2. In science, you have to believe what the science books say about stuff.  
 
3. Whatever the teacher says in science class is true.  
 
4. If you read something in a science book, you can be sure it’s true.  
 
5. Only scientists know for sure what is true in science.  
 
6. All questions in science have one right answer.  
 
7. The most important part of doing science is coming up with the right answer.  
 
8. Scientists pretty much know everything about science; there is not much more  
to know.  
 
9. Scientific knowledge is always true.  
 
10. Once scientists have a result from an experiment, that is the only answer.  
 
11. Scientists always agree about what is true in science.  
 
12. Some ideas in science today are different than what scientists used to think.  
 
13. The ideas in science books sometimes change.  
 
14. There are some questions that even scientists cannot answer.  
 
15. Ideas in science sometimes change.  
 
16. New discoveries can change what scientists think is true.  
 
17. Sometimes scientists change their minds about what is true in science.  
 
187 
 
18. Ideas about science experiments come from being curious and thinking about  
how things work.  
 
19. In science, there can be more than one way for scientists to test their ideas.  
 
20. One important part of science is doing experiments to come up with new ideas  
about how things work.  
 
21. It is good to try experiments more than once to make sure of your findings.  
 
22. Good ideas in science can come from anybody, not just from scientist.  
 
23. A good way to know if something is true is to do an experiment.  
 
24. Good answers are based on evidence from many different experiments.  
 
25. Ideas in science can come from your own questions and experiments.  
 
26. It is good to have an idea before you start an experiment.  
 
 
Source: Conley et al. (2004) 
 
Scoring: 
 
Source: 1-5 
Certainty: 6-11 
Development (R): 12-17 
Justification (R): 18-26 
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APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE CONCEPT MAP FOR TRAINING PURPOSE 
1. Example concepts (nodes) for student to practice concept mapping 
 
 
 
2. Example concept map demonstrated at the end of the concept mapping training 
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APPENDIX E. SAMPLE CONCEPT MAP AND CORRESPONDING DATA ENTRY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Column heading Description 
modID Every concept map is assigned a unique ID. 
node 1 & node 2 Represent two linked pairs in the concept map. Each concept is 
labeled with a unique letter: A-Force, B- Balanced forces, C-
Unbalanced forces, D-Total force=0, E-Total force≠0, F-At rest, 
G-Constant speed, H-Changing speed, I-Slowing down, J-
Speeding up. 
vpn Represent the ID assigned to the student in this study. 
mzp Represent the measurement point: 1-pretest, 2-posttest, 3-delayed 
posttest 
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APPENDIX F: EXPERT CONCEPT MAP 
 
 
 
 
